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Abstract
ZONGQIANG LIAO: Monetary Policy Evaluation and Inverse Control with
Endogenous Policy Regimes.
(Under the direction of Michael Salemi.)
This study applies a unified approach of econometric policy evaluation to investigate
“endogenous” evolution of U.S. monetary policy during the post-war period. A policy
regime is defined as a set of preference parameters which the Federal Reserve chooses
for minimizing the value of loss function. The evolution of monetary policy is assumed
to depend on a stochastic switching process that evolves according to a Markov chain.
Preference parameters in the Federal Reserve’s policy objective function together with
parameters in the structure of economy are estimated simultaneously. This study uses
forward-looking New Keynesian models as the structure of economy in which equilibrium
values of output and inflation depend on their own future expected values.
The results suggest that three different policy regimes can be better used to describe
U.S. monetary policy than two policy regimes and that in all policy regimes the Federal
Reserve consistently placed far greater weight on inflation stabilization than on output
and interest rate stabilizations. Estimating a baseline model with data from 1965 through
2001 shows that policy regime one is a special regime that only prevailed between 1979 and
1984, which is commonly known as the Volcker disinflation period. Policy regime two is
a regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into during expansionary
periods, and regime three is a regime which the monetary policy switched into during
recessionary periods. The estimation with optimal policy restriction can also alter and
sharpen the estimates of model parameters. Estimating the baseline model with extended
data from 1965 through 2008 shows similar results to those obtained with the shorter
sample. The results from the longer sample suggest that the Federal Reserve did follow
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an optimal policy during the post-war period. The Federal Reserve’s monetary actions
were very close to optimal during policy regimes two and three. A counterfactual analysis
shows that the small value of preference parameter placed on output stabilization plays
an important role in conducting monetary policy. Finally, estimating an augmented
model with extended data from 1965 through 2008 suggest that the findings associated
with the three-regime monetary policy are robust.
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To my parents and my wife.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
In recent economic literature on monetary policy, it has become a common practice
to analyze and evaluate central bank’s policy behavior using a simple policy rule similar
in nature to the one suggested in Taylor (1993), see Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000).
Although an estimated policy rule can capture the systematic relationship between inter-
est rates and macroeconomic variables and can be viewed as an approximation to central
bank’s decision rule, it is not able to address questions on the policy formulation process.
Since the policy rule function is only a reduced form, the feedback coefficients in the
policy rule do not have a structural interpretation and can not draw conclusions on the
policy preferences of central bank.
As shown by Svensson (1999), under an optimal monetary policy framework, one
can formally derive a Taylor-type interest rate rule that solves the intertemporal opti-
mization problem of a central bank for a specified loss function. In the framework, the
coefficients in the optimal interest rate rule depend on the central bank’s preferences as
well as parameters describing the structure of economy. Therefore, if a policy rule is
estimated under the optimal policy framework, a change of estimated parameters in the
policy equation can be unequivocally interpreted as a modification of the central bank’s
preferences rather than a modification in the structure of economy, see Favero and Rovelli
(2003). This study follows the optimal monetary policy framework and describes mone-
tary policy behavior at the level of policy objectives and not just at the level of reaction
function. Therefore, this study defines a policy regime as a set of preference parameters
which central bank chooses for minimizing the value of its loss function.
It is also widely believed that monetary policymakers should display time-varying
behavior in conducting monetary policy, especially when considering a longer period of
time. One potential source of changing monetary policy is that monetary policymakers
would face different levels and variabilities of inflation and other economic variables in
different time spans. In the case of United States, monetary policymakers in the Federal
Reserve must contend with the high inflation that occurred in the 1970’s, the disinflation
in the 1980’s, several large oil price shocks, the geopolitical events, and the recessions
that occurred in the early 1980’s and 1990’s, early and late 2000’s. Clarida, Gal´ı and
Gertler (2000) show that many studies credit the stabilization of macroeconomic volatility
between 1970 and 1980 to the switch of U.S. monetary policy behavior. On the other
hand, there are also studies showing that the Federal Reserve consistently conducted
monetary policy throughout the post-war period. Therefore, it is interesting to study
the evolution process of underlying policy preferences of monetary policymakers.
This study extends the existing literature by applying a unified approach of econo-
metric policy evaluation to investigate “endogenous” evolution of monetary policy over
time. The unified approach allows the structural parameters of the model to be estimated
jointly with the parameters of the central bank’s objective function. There are several
advantages of being able to use the unified approach, see Atoian (2005), Dennis (2006),
and Salemi (2006). First, it allows direct estimation of the preference parameters in
central bank’s objective function, and it is an example of inverse control. Therefore, this
methodology is more appropriate when one’s primary objective is to investigate evolution
of policy preference parameters in the objective function over time. Second, the unified
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estimation approach allows one to test whether an estimated policy rule is the outcome
of central bank’s optimal behavior and assess whether observed economic outcomes can
be reconciled and accounted for within an optimal policy framework. Indeed, the setup
of the problem allows for a formal test of the hypothesis that the policy is implemented in
a manner consistent with the loss-minimizing behavior of the central bank. Third, while
assuming the policy rule is loss-minimizing, the unified approach to policy preference
estimation also considers additional economic structure equations. This estimation ap-
proach can potentially sharpen estimates of the structural model parameters. The cost
of the unified approach is the greater computational burden that results from nesting
the optimal-policy algorithm of the central bank within the estimation algorithm of the
model.
In this paper, the evolution of monetary policy is assumed to depend on a stochastic
switching process that evolves according to a Markov chain. The Markov-switching
framework is an appealing technique for evaluating monetary policy behavior over time.
First, it reflects the common view on the likelihood that monetary policy may take
the form of an abrupt shift from one policy regime to another1. Second, the technique
reveals a new policy regime rather than making assumption on the timing of a switch
in policy regime. At the same time this approach can utilize full-sample information to
make accurate inferences2. Finally, using the Markov-switching approach respects the
Lucas (1976) critique in monetary policy evaluation. According to the Lucas critique,
policy changes are embedded in private agents’ perception, and agents will change their
1In contrast to assuming abrupt policy switches hence using the Markov-switching models, some
studies alternatively assume that monetary policy changes gradually and develop a functional form for
the gradually time-varying policy changes.
2It is a common practice in the literature to assume changes in policy regime according to a priori
information. However, Davig and Leeper (2007) find that splitting sample into distinct regimes can
distort inferences when compared to inferences drawn on the full sample. Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2008)
also suggest that caution needs to be taken in interpreting empirical results which are derived from a
sub-sample covering only one of the policy regimes.
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expectations and decisions accordingly with changes in policy. Markov-switching models
are expected to fit data well if there were policy changes and important expectation
effects of these policy changes on private sectors’ behavior.
This study uses forward-looking New Keynesian structure model as the constraint
for the central bank’s optimization problem. The central bank’s stabilization objectives
are represented by a quadratic loss function that penalizes deviations of inflation and
output from their targets as well as changes in the policy instrument referred to as inter-
est rate smoothing. This study estimates the parameters of forward-looking structural
model jointly with the preference parameters of the central bank’s objective function
under the restriction that monetary policy is a solution to the policymaker’s loss min-
imization problem. With this restriction, the central bank follows a Taylor-type policy
with coefficient values chosen optimally to minimize the policymaker’s quadratic objec-
tive function. To examine how optimal monetary policy affects the empirical findings,
this study also estimates the model separately without imposing the optimality restric-
tion. This study assesses the model fit of these two policies by using statistical tests. The
tests employed are appropriate for comparing model fit because optimal and non-optimal
policies are nested policies in the sense that optimal policy imposes a set of restrictions
on the model.
This study estimates two types of structural models subject to the condition that the
policy equation minimizes a well-defined loss function. Both models are New Keynesian in
spirit in that policy affects aggregate demand through a conventional interest rate channel
and inflation through a Phillips curve specification. These structural New Keynesian
models are becoming pervasive in macroeconomic analysis. The first model is a baseline
model that determines the equilibrium relationship among the output gap, the inflation
rate, and the short-term interest rate controlled by the central bank. While sharing some
broad characteristics, the second model differs substantially from the baseline model
4
by taking into account the additional inflationary effect generated by oil prices. The
augmented model explicitly models an oil production sector and illustrates that the
Phillips curve includes a term that is a measure of oil price that exerts extra pressures
on inflation. The second model confirms that the standard cost push effects of oil prices
are present in the economy. Therefore, the model with oil price implies a more complex
relationship between the structural and reduced form parameters.
The important findings in this paper are the following. First, estimating the baseline
model with data from 1965 through 2001 suggests three different policy regimes can be
better used to describe U.S. monetary policy than two policy regimes. Policy regime
one is a special regime that only prevailed between 1979 and 1984. During this period,
the Federal Reserve successfully reduced high inflationary pressure in the U.S., and this
period of time is commonly known as the Volcker disinflation period. Policy regime two is
a regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into during expansionary
periods, and regime three is a regime which the monetary policy switched into after
recessionary periods. The results also show that in all policy regimes including the
economic expansionary periods the Federal Reserve consistently placed greater weight
on inflation stabilization than on output stabilization. Finally, the data can formally
reject the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was loss-minimizing.
Second, estimating the baseline model with extended data from 1965 through 2008
shows similar results to those obtained with the shorter sample data. Indeed, three
different policy regimes provide a better description of U.S. monetary policy than two
policy regimes. Policy regime one is a special regime that only prevailed between 1979
and 1984 and is commonly known as the Volcker disinflation period. Regime two is a
regime prevailed during the economic expansionary periods, and regime three is a regime
prevailed during the economic recession periods. In all policy regimes, the inflation
stabilization objective is found to dominate the Federal Reserve’s preferences. Contrary
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to the previous findings, the results here suggest that the Federal Reserve did follow
an optimal policy during the extended sample period. The Federal Reserve’s monetary
actions were very close to their optimal counterparts during policy regimes two and three.
Third, the results from estimating the augmented model support the presence of three
policy regimes. Policy regime one is a regime that only prevailed during the deep post-
war recessions began in 1973, 1980, 1981, and 2007. Policy regime two is a regime which
the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into during the post-1985 expansionary
periods and mild recessions in 1990 and 2000. Policy regime three is a regime which
the monetary policy switched into during the pre-1985 expansionary periods and mild
recession in 1970. Therefore, the important findings associated with the three-regime
monetary policy are robust to estimations using a variation of the structural model.
The results here still suggest that three different policy regimes can provide a cogent
description of U.S. monetary policy although the interpretation for each policy regime
is different from that in the previous findings. In line with the previous findings, the
results also suggest the Federal Reserve consistently placed greater weight on inflation
stabilization than on output and interest rate stabilizations in all three policy regimes
including the economic expansionary periods. Lastly, the Federal Reserve did follow an
optimal policy during the extended sample period. This conclusion is also consistent
with that in the previous findings. The Federal Reserve’s monetary action was very close
to their optimal counterpart during policy regime two.
1.2 Related Literature
This study is not the first one that applies inverse control on monetary policy to re-
veal preference parameters in policy objective function3. Salemi (1995) estimates a VAR
3Although the methodology of inverse control is applicable in studying the behavior of central bank,
some studies use indirect approaches to estimate preference parameters in central bank policy objective
function, see Ozlale (2003) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006).
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subject to the restriction that the equation with monetary policy variables minimizes
expected loss. He finds that the Federal Reserve placed greater weight on stabilizing
output prior to 1979 and greater weight on stabilizing inflation between 1982 and 1992,
and he can not reject the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve’s policy rule minimized
expected loss. Korenko (1998) infers preferences of the Federal Reserve using a version
of Dornbusch’s overshooting model similar to that in Papell (1989). He finds that the
Federal Reserve placed much higher weight on output stabilization than on other objec-
tives during 1973 through 1995. Dennis (2006) jointly estimates the parameters of an
IS equation and a Phillips curve in a backward-looking Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)
model and Federal Reserve loss function subject to the restriction that the coefficients of
the reaction function minimize loss function. He finds that for both pre-Volcker period
(1966 − 1979) and post-Volcker period (1980 − 2000), the Federal Reserve placed more
weight on stabilizing output than on stabilizing inflation and even more weight on sta-
bilizing interest rate changes. Favero and Rovelli (2003) also use the backward-looking
Rudebusch and Svensson model to estimate loss-function parameters4. In contrary to the
findings in other studies, Favero and Rovelli find that the Federal Reserve placed more
weight on stabilizing inflation than on stabilizing output in two sub-samples 1961− 1979
and 1980− 1998.
Although the previously-mentioned studies have produced plausible results, all of the
work has employed backward-looking models that are not able to incorporate rational
expectation and consequently can potentially be subject to the Lucas (1976) critique5.
To overcome this concern, one would need to develop an algorithm where the unified
4Unlike the common practice in literature that assumes a central bank’s optimization problem has an
infinite horizon, Favero and Rovelli assume that the Federal Reserve is only concerned with the impact
of its policy decision for four quarters.
5Many studies use statistical tests to show no evidence of parameter instability implied by Lucas
critique. However, it is more attractive to explicitly consider households and firms as forward-looking
agents.
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estimation approach is applied in the framework of forward-looking model. However,
the use of a forward-looking structure complicates the estimation algorithm dramatically
because strategic interactions may occur between the economic agents in the model.
Salemi (2006) is known as the first attempt to conduct a full-scale estimation of central
bank preference parameters with a forward-looking economic structure6. He imposes
policy optimality hypothesis by requiring the coefficients of the central bank’s reaction
function to minimize policy loss function and uses an algorithm that re-computes the state
transition equation for every contemplated change in monetary policy rule. In contrast to
the previous studies, Salemi finds that stabilizing inflation was far more important than
stabilizing output and interest rate in both periods 1965−1979 and 1980−2001. Dennis
(2003) utilizes a forward-looking rational expectation model and finds that interest rate
smoothing appeared to be the most important element in the Federal Reserve’s objective
function while the weight on consumption stabilization is found to be at zero, and the
weight on interest rate smoothing became smaller after 1980. Atoian (2005) uses a
small open-economy model with forward-looking agents to study policy preferences of
central banks in Canada and Switzerland7. He finds that the Bank of Canada placed
virtually no weight on inflation stabilization from 1970 to 1979, approximately equal
weights on inflation and output stabilizations between 1980 and 1987, and a greater
weight on inflation stabilization from 1988 to 2002; the Swiss National Bank assigned
dominant weight on inflation stabilization objective in both sub-samples 1973 − 1987
and 1988 − 2003. Givens (2004) considers a representative agent model in which wages
and prices are both sticky, and he finds that delegating policy authority to a central
6Given the difficulties of conducting a full-scale estimation in the forward-looking environment, some
studies attempt to reveal central bank policy preference parameters using calibration method to match
the stylized economic facts, see So¨derstro¨m, So¨delind, and Vredin (2002) and Castelnuovo (2003).
7Another known attempt to study central bank’s preferences in an open-economy framework is a
calibration exercise in Collins and Siklos (2004). They vary the weight parameters of the loss function
to obtain a reaction function that is similar to the case without the optimal policy constraint.
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banker who cares about wage stabilization produces policy outcomes almost as good as
provided by the timeless perspective policy. Givens and Salemi (2008) estimate central
bank preference parameters within several forward-looking models but focus on testing
the efficiency of a proposed GMM strategy for joint estimation.
While the above-mentioned studies in this literature investigate whether central bank’s
policy preference parameters were time-varying over time, they all share one aspect in
common. Each paper makes an a priori assumption about the timing of the shifts of
monetary policy regime by associating the shifts with the terms of office of different chair-
persons in the central bank. Then central bank’s preference parameters are estimated
in each sub-sample. By contrast, this study allows policy regimes to be determined en-
dogenously. Therefore, this study systematically infers central bank’s policy preference
parameters that are governed by a stochastic process and presents empirical effects of
stochastic policy regime changes.
In sum, this study employs forward-looking models that emphasize the role of private-
sector expectations in the transmission of monetary policy and estimates central bank’s
preference parameters in various endogenously determined policy regimes using the uni-
fied approach.
1.3 The Remainder of the Study
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is dedicated to an
application of the unified estimation approach to estimate a baseline model using U.S.
quarterly data from 1965:Q1 to 2001:Q4. It first presents reduced form structural equa-
tions describing the evolution of model variables, outlines the major features of the
model, and describes the policy objective function. Meanwhile, this chapter illustrates
the approach to find the rational expectation model solution, describes the algorithm for
computing the optimal monetary policy rule, and presents the econometric strategy for
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simultaneous estimation of model structure parameters, central bank preference param-
eters, and probability inferences of monetary policy regimes. Then Chapter 2 describes
the data and briefly presents stylized facts for U.S. monetary policy. Finally this chapter
estimates the model. The results are related to stylized facts of U.S. macroeconomic
history and studies in literature. This chapter also provides a formal assessment of the
monetary policy optimality hypothesis.
Chapter 3 applies the unified estimation methodology to estimate the baseline model
using extended U.S. quarterly data from 1965:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Similar to the previous
chapter, it starts with a brief description of the data and an overview of development
in U.S. monetary policy during the sample period. Then this chapter reports the esti-
mation results. Chapter 3 also evaluates the model’s ability to replicate stylized facts
of U.S. macroeconomic history and provides a formal assessment of the monetary policy
optimality hypothesis. Finally, this chapter reports results of counterfactual experiment
when alternative strategy of monetary policy conduct is considered.
Chapter 4 uses the methodology in previous chapters to estimate a model with oil
price and analyzes monetary policy of the Federal Reserve from 1965 through 2008. The
chapter first presents the major features of the new structural model that is used to
represent the constraints on the Federal Reserve’s optimization problem. Then it de-
rives reduced form equations describing the evolution of model variables and presents
the policy objective function that is to be estimated. This chapter then explains how
the estimation algorithm set out previously must be revised to account for changes in
the model. Chapter 4 describes the data and briefly presents their stylized facts. Finally
it estimates simultaneously the model structure parameters, central bank preference pa-
rameters and probability inferences of monetary policy regimes. The results are related
to stylized facts of U.S. macroeconomic history.
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Chapter 5 concludes and outlines possible extensions for future research. The Ap-
pendices provide technical details on model solution, estimation strategies, and model
derivations.
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Chapter 2
Revealing U.S. Monetary Policy
Regimes Between 1965 and 2001
Using a Baseline Model
This chapter presents a model based on the assumption that the Federal Reserve
conducts policy in an optimal way. The Federal Reserve’s optimal monetary policy is
subject to constraints controlled by behavior of private agents in the economy, and the
optimal monetary policy has a direct impact on the economy through the setting of
policy instrument. Therefore, the macro-economy and the optimization problem of the
Federal Reserve have to be estimated simultaneously. However, it is still useful to divide
the descriptions of the model and optimal monetary policy into two separate parts. The
macro-economy is first described without requiring the Federal Reserve to minimize its
loss function. Then the optimization problem of the Federal Reserve is derived, taking
the model economy as given.
2.1 The Model Economy
The baseline model used in this study is a forward-looking economic model used in
Salemi (2006). In the model, a central bank’s main objectives are to stabilize the time
paths of output and inflation by using the interest rate as its policy instrument. This
study denotes y as the output gap, which is the difference between output and its long
term growth path. This study also denotes pi and r as differences of inflation and the
interest rate from their target values, respectively. The stabilization of output means
keeping y close to zero. Stabilizations of inflation and the interest rate mean keeping
them close to their target paths.
The baseline model for y, pi, and r consists of an IS curve, a Phillips curve and a policy
rule for the short term interest rate. The model can be derived from a micro-founded New
Keynesian sticky-price model in which both households and firms are forward-looking.
The parameters of the IS schedule and Phillips curve are non-linear combinations of the
parameters of the micro-founded model. In line with Salemi (2006), the investigation
taken up in this study does not concern the deeper structural parameters in the model.
The model economy consists of the following expectation-augmented linear equations
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt − Etpit+1) + εy,t, (2.1)
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t, (2.2)
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t. (2.3)
yt, pit, and rt are defined in the previous paragraph. εpi,t, εy,t, and εr,t are shock distur-
bances.
Equation (2.1) takes the form of a New Keynesian IS curve linking output during
period t to its own expected future and lagged values, and to the value of ex ante real
interest rate. Equation (2.1) is obtained by combining the linearized Euler equation that
characterizes a representative household’s optimal consumption level and the market
clearing condition for output in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Clarida, Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999) show that the presence of expected future output in the IS equation
can be explained by the desire of households to smooth consumption. When households
expect higher consumption in the future, they consume more in the present, which raises
aggregate demand and introduces a positive relationship between current output and
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its expected future value. The presence of lagged output in the IS equation can be
explained by habit persistence. Habit formation and sticky price mechanism can cause
delays between decision making and consumption. Hence aggregate demand and output
adjust only partially such that output depends on a combination of its own lagged values,
see Svensson (2000). The inertial movements of consumption and aggregate output have
been commonly found to be important in rational expectation New Keynesian models,
and the habit specification in the model can help explain the sluggish movements. Fuhrer
(2000) finds that habit formation helps New Keynesian models replicate the observed
effects on real spending shocks of various kinds. Smets and Wouters (2005) find point
estimates for degree of habit formation are very close to unity in the U.S. and Euro area.
From an econometric perspective, Linde´ (2005) argues that the additional lags of output
are required to make the disturbance term in equation (2.1) white noise.
Equation (2.2) is a Phillips curve, in which both expected future and past inflation
help determine the current inflation rate. If the coefficient on lagged inflation becomes
zero and drops out of the specification, the equation becomes a new Phillips curve as
defined by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), Svensson (2000) and many others. The new
Phillips curve can be derived from a model where monopolistically competitive firms
adjust their prices in a sluggish way as suggested by Calvo (1983). A representative firm
adjusts its price to maximize expected profit by taking into account the restriction of
future price adjustment and expected future prices of its competitors. With staggered
price adjustment, the inflation rate depends on the representative firm’s marginal cost
of production and the expected future inflation rate. The new Phillips curve can be
obtained when the output gap is used as a proxy for marginal cost.
If both the coefficients on expected and lagged inflation are non-zero, the equation
becomes a hybrid Phillips curve that can be used to account for inflation persistence or
inertia. Several foundations have been proposed to account for the presence of lagged
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inflation in the Phillips curve. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) assume a fraction of the
firms that re-optimize in the current period must wait until the next period to change
their new price. Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) extend the Calvo mechanism to allow a fraction
of firms set their price at time t equal to last period’s average reset price plus the lagged
inflation rate. Lagged inflation may appear in the Phillips curve to account for other
economic factors. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) derive a Phillips curve with lagged inflation
as the result of wage contracts, and Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000) use lagged inflation
in the Phillips curve to account for serial correlation in supply shocks.
Equation (2.3) is the policy rule or reaction function that explains how the central
bank sets the short term interest rate. The equation takes a form of the Taylor (1993)
type reaction function and corresponds to the common practice of using the short term
interest rate as monetary policy instrument8. It can be seen that a disturbance term εr,t
is present in the policy rule. Hansen and Sargent (1980) explain why an error may be
in a policy rule. Dennis (2006) argues that the error term can capture some variables
that are omitted by econometricians since they tend to have less information than the
policymakers. Salemi (2006) interprets the error as a term that includes idiosyncratic
wisdom of the monetary policy authority. As a result, this disturbance term is commonly
referred to as the policy shock. The policy rule allows the central bank to react to all
the variables in the state vector, but only to lagged values of those variables. McCallum
(1997) argues that a central bank does not know the current output level and inflation rate
when it sets the interest rate. This does capture some broad features of data availability
on real GDP and CPI, which are released with a delay. A lagged interest rate term is
also included in the central bank’s reaction function to match the persistence in interest
8Sims and Zha (2006) argue that leaving money aggregate from the policy rule can be bias for
studying U.S. monetary policy in the post-war period because various money aggregates were essential
to monetary policymakers during the 1970s. Sims and Zha suggest that the Taylor-type rule may be
valuable for characterizing policy after 1980, but such a policy rule is not appropriate for studying other
historical spans.
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rate. Such format of a policy rule allows the central bank to change the interest rate
persistently therefore to spread “policy medicine” over time. This would allow for a
moderate response of interest rate to shocks hitting the economy. In line with Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Salemi (2006), the coefficients of the reaction function are
assumed to be fixed in a policy regime so that policy is time consistent. For now, this
section defers discussion of how the coefficients of the policy rule are chosen in an optimal
way by the central bank and turns attention to solution of the model.
The model with equations (2.1) – (2.3) is a system of linear expectation vector dif-
ference equations. The system can be rewritten equivalently in the following compact
representation
A

Etyt+1
Etpit+1
Xt
 = B

yt
pit
Xt−1
+D

εy,t
εpi,t
εr,t
 , (2.4)
where Xt = [yt pit it yt−1]′ is the state vector, A, B, and D are 6× 6, 6× 6, and 6× 3
coefficient matrices respectively. The elements in the coefficient matrices are non-linear
functions of the parameters of equations (2.1) – (2.3).
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Klein (2000) describe methods for solving systems
of linear expectation equations such as (2.4). The solution can express the model’s
endogenous variables in terms of the model’s exogenous and predetermined endogenous
variables9. Note that there are four predetermined variables in the state vector Xt. Thus,
if four of the generalized eigenvalues of coefficient matrix A lie outside the unit circle,
then the system (2.4) has a unique solution for the model that quite conveniently takes
9Appendix A provides details on using the Klein (2000) algorithm for computing a unique saddle
path solution for the model.
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the form as
Xt = GXt−1 + ϕt, (2.5)
where G is a 4 × 4 matrix with elements that are convolutions of the eigenvectors of
matrix A10. ϕt is the 4 × 1 vector of reduced-form errors with typical elements ϕkt,
k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and ϕ4t = 0. This study allows for the possibility that the errors may be
correlated. Let Ω be the 4× 4 covariance matrix of ϕt. As a result, the upper-left 3× 3
block of Ω is the covariance matrix of vector ϕkt, k ∈ {1, . . . , 3}, and the rest elements of
Ω are zeros. Let C be a 3×3 matrix that is the upper-triangular Choleski decomposition
of the non-zero block of Ω, and the elements C11, . . . , C33 is used in the Log Likelihood
estimation. Since the structure shocks are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and ϕkt,
k ∈ {1, . . . , 3} are linear combinations of the structure errors, ϕt is serially uncorrelated.
In summary, this study uses a rational expectation model that can be derived from
a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model with deep parameters that govern
private agents’ behavior. The macroeconomic structure explicitly considers that private
agents have rational expectation and they can react correspondingly when monetary
policy changes, hence the model specification responds to the Lucas (1976) critique and
the model parameters in equations (2.1) and (2.2) are structural.
2.2 The Optimal Simple Monetary Policy Rule
The model includes the central bank’s policy rule for setting the short term interest
rate, which is specified in equation (2.3). Conditional on the macroeconomic structure,
10If more than four of the generalized eigenvalues of A lie outside the unit circle, then the system has
no solution; if less than four of the generalized eigenvalues of A lie outside the unit circle, the solution
has multiple solutions. In the course of estimation, this study imposes the unique saddle-path solution
via a penalty function. The detailed description of estimation procedure that incorporates the model
solution algorithm and penalty function is shown in Appendix A.
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the central bank sets monetary policy in an optimal way to fulfil its objectives. This
study assumes that the monetary authority credibly commits to an optimal policy rule
in the sense that the coefficients of the policy rule c1 through c4 are chosen to minimize
the expected value of intertemporal loss function
Lt = Et
∞∑
k=0
δkX ′t+kWXt+k, (2.6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the central bank’s time rate of discount. W is a 4 × 4 matrix of
non-negative weights that determine the relative importance to the central bank on its
various stabilization objectives. W is positive semi-definite. Dennis (2006) suggests
that a discounted quadratic objective function together with linear policy constraints are
extremely powerful tools for analyzing central bank’s stochastic dynamic optimization
problems. Since Barro and Gordon (1983), a loss function formulation similar to equation
(2.6) is widely used as the objective function of central bank in literature. As a results,
the estimates obtained in this study can be easily interpreted and compared with many
others in the literature.
In this study, W is diagonal with non-zero elements wy, wpi, and wr on the main
diagonal and zeros everywhere else. The diagonal elements are weights which the central
bank places on stabilizing output, inflation, and the interest rate, respectively. Because
only the relative sizes of weights are identified, wpi is normalized to one. Rogoff (1985)
argues that it is desirable to appoint a more conservative central banker who places a
higher emphasis on stabilizing inflation than on output. Assenmacher-Wesche (2006)
illustrates that a central bank is commonly viewed as an independent one if the value of
relative weight on output is small. For simplicity, the central bank’s discount rate δ is
fixed at 0.990, which is a reasonable value for a quarterly time rate of discount and is
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widely used in literature11. In this study, the central bank sets its policy optimally with
full information on the true economic structure and model parameters12. In what follows,
a policy regime is a set of weights in loss function and the corresponding coefficients in
reaction function used to minimize expected loss. So¨delind (1999) calls a policy rule with
coefficients chosen to minimize expected loss function an “optimal simple rule”.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that under certain conditions, a loss function
similar to equation (2.6) is derived as the second order approximation to the discounted
intertemporal utility function of a representative household, and the elements of W are
nonlinear functions of deep parameters of the model. If the central bank sets the monetary
policy that maximizes a representative household’s utility, the parameters of the policy
rule are also nonlinear functions of the model parameters. However, following Salemi
(2006) this study does not impose the restriction of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
in the model. Although interest rate smoothing is commonly viewed as an important
objective of U.S. monetary policy, maximizing representative household utility does not
require stabilizing the interest rate. Second, this study treats equations (2.1) – (2.3) as
the structure of the economy rather than taking a stand on the specific model that gives
rise to (2.1) – (2.3). Therefore, in this study the elements ofW are parameters that carry
information on the objectives of central bank.
Why does it make sense to assume that the central bank commits to an optimal
simple rule? The advantages for a central bank to commit to a policy rule are well
known. In a study that is important to time-consistency literature, Kydland and Prescott
(1977) analyze distinction between policy rules and discretion. They refer a policy rule
as the optimal solution to a dynamic optimization, and a discretionary policy as the
11Imposition of an ex ante value to the discount factor is common in both real business cycle and
New Keynesian models since the discount factor is very difficult to be estimated directly.
12Svensson and Williams (2007b) study the optimization problem of a central bank when it can not
observe the true economic structure and learns as time passes.
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inconsistent solution. A central bank’s commitment to a rule can facilitate public’s
expectation formations of future monetary policy and of future inflation or output. The
public can understand and gain confidence in the central bank’s stabilization policy.
Therefore, monetary policy becomes more effective since its future course is predictable.
Commitment to a policy rule would allow the central bank to follow a guideline to future
decisions and adjust policy gradually. In a case with high inflation that is caused by a
supply shock, if a central bank aims at containing and reducing the rate of inflation, it
can raise interest rates moderately to disinflate gradually. For a central bank that lacks
commitment to a rule, a higher initial interest rate increase is required since the public
would not be sure that the central bank would maintain the increase.
Nonetheless, one should note that the optimal simple rule is different from the optimal
commitment policy. The optimal commitment policy supposes that monetary policymak-
ers guarantee that they will never default on any of their promises when choosing the
interest rate to minimize expected loss function. To set an optimal commitment policy,
at time zero the central bank evaluates all possible outcomes, decides how to react to
each, and promises to stick with the chosen set of reactions. So¨delind (1999) shows that
a state-space representation for the optimal commitment plan exists provided that the
state vector is augmented to include the co-state variables from the optimization. But
writing the optimal commitment plan as a function only of lagged values of output, in-
flation, and the interest rate gives an equation for the interest rate that depends on the
entire history of the state vector dating back to the time when policy is set.
This study assumes that the central bank follows an optimal simple rule rather than
the optimal commitment policy rule for two reasons. First, Woodford (2003) argues that
it is not feasible for a central bank to provide the public at the beginning with a complete
listing of relevant contingencies and it is thus difficult for the public to verify that the
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central bank is following the optimal commitment policy rather than engaging in discre-
tion. The public’s ability to predict central bank policy is improved if the central bank
commits to a rigid and simple rule. Therefore, it is more desirable for the central bank to
follow an optimal simple rule rather than the optimal commitment policy, see McCallum
(1997). Second, Atoian, Givens and Salemi (2003) study the relative performance of
optimal simple rules versus optimal commitment policy rules in a structural model that
is identical to the one used in this study. They find that when the central bank places
primary emphasis on inflation stabilization, loss under the optimal simple rule is nearly
as small as loss under optimal commitment.
Despite the benefits of commitment to a policy rule, Svensson (2003) cautions that
assuming a central bank commits to a simple policy rule is not attractive. The simple rule
does not allow for policy adjustment based on newly arrived information on the economic
mechanisms or shocks, therefore it seems unlikely that a central bank would be willing to
commit itself to an explicit and mechanical simple rule. In addition, although the simple
rule may be a good approximation to optimal policy under normal circumstances, it would
be sub-optimal under some unusual events. Svensson prefers an optimal commitment
“targeting” rule that specifies the target variables, the targets, and the loss function to
be minimized.
The policy rule considered in this study is less specific and mechanical than the one
objected to by Svensson (2003). The values of the coefficients that appear on the right-
hand-side of the policy rule are not specified in advance but depend on the economic
structure, and they are chosen to minimize central bank’s expected loss. Furthermore,
the policy rule is not assumed to hold exactly, but includes a disturbance term. The
form of the policy rule is also consistent with Svensson’s idea that policy makers respond
to forecasts of target variables since those forecasts lie in the space spanned by the state
vector. Lastly, this study considers explicitly the objectives of the central bank, the target
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variables, and the targets, which are consistent with the ideas that motivate targeting as
Svensson’s recommendations. On the other hand, this study makes no attempt to allow
for learning by the policymaker or to determine whether “unusual events” help explain
the evolution of the interest rate.
2.3 Computing the Optimal Simple Rule
In the standard linear quadratic dynamic optimization problem, the state transition
equation does not vary with the policy rule and one can compute the coefficients in the
policy rule that minimize central bank’s loss function by iterating the Ricatti equation to
convergence, see Sargent (1987). A short list of algorithms and applications would include
Backus and Driffill (1986), So¨delind (1999), Svensson (2000), Dennis (2004). However,
the appearances of forward-looking variables in the structure equations make it more
complicated to derive the coefficients for the optimal policy rule.
This study follows the approach used in Salemi (2006) to compute the central bank’s
expected loss in terms of the forecast error variances of endogenous variables. The ap-
proach decomposes the expected loss (2.6) into two parts:
Lt = trace
[
W
∞∑
k=1
δkEt(Xt+kX
′
t+k)
]
, (2.7)
= trace
[
W
∞∑
k=1
δk(Et(Xt+k − EtXt+k)(Xt+k − EtXt+k)′ + (EtXt+k)(EtXt+k)′)
]
,
= trace[W (Mt +Nt)],
where
Mt =
∞∑
k=1
δkEt(Xt+k − EtXt+k)(Xt+k − EtXt+k)′,
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and
Nt =
∞∑
k=1
δk(EtXt+k)(EtXt+k)
′.
Mt is the discounted sum of forecast error variances of X computed when policy is set.
Nt is the discounted sum of quadratic terms in expected departures of X from its target.
This study assumes that the monetary authority ignores Nt when it chooses its policy rule
either because the economy begins on its target path or because the monetary authority
follows the timeless perspective introduced by Woodford (1999). Because ϕt is serially
uncorrelated, using backward substitution Xt+k can be expressed in terms of period t
values of X and future shocks
Xt+k = G
kXt +G
k−1ϕt+1 + . . .+Gϕt+k−1 + ϕt+k.
Therefore, one can write the forecast error variances of Xt as
Et(Xt+k − EtXt+k)(Xt+k − EtXt+k)′ = Ω+GΩG′ + . . .+Gk−1Ω(Gk−1)′,
where Ω represents the covariance matrix of innovations ϕt in the model solution form.
In this study, a policy regime is defined as a set of preference parameters which central
bank chooses for minimizing the value of its loss function, and the covariance matrix of
shocks is assumed to differ in different policy regimes. Thus one should note that W and
Ω are both regime specific.
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An expression for Mt takes the following form
Mt = δΩ + δ
2(Ω +GΩG′) + . . . (2.8)
+δk+1(Ω +GΩG′ + . . .+Gk−1Ω(Gk−1)′) + . . . ,
=
δ
1− δ [Ω + δGΩG
′ + δ2G2Ω(G2)′ + . . .].
Therefore, the central bank’s expected loss can be expressed in terms of the forecast error
covariances of exogenous variables. Iterating on equation (2.8) provides a numerical value
for Mt, which can be substituted into equation (2.7) to numerically evaluate the central
bank’s objective function.
To compute expected loss associated with a set of policy rule coefficients, this study
computes the sequence of partial sum in (2.8) until it converges13. To find the optimal
policy, this study searches for the policy-rule coefficients that can minimize trace(WMt).
Salemi (2006) points out that the problem of choosing the optimal values of policy rule
parameters is complicated by the fact that private agents in the economy are forward-
looking. Equation (2.8) implies that the loss-minimizing policy-rule coefficients depend,
through G, on the parameters of equations (2.1) – (2.3). Because private agents in the
economy are forward looking, G depends on the policy-rule coefficients as well. There-
fore, the parameters of equations (2.1) – (2.3) and the policy-rule coefficients must be
computed simultaneously.
Atoian, Givens and Salemi (2003) provide an algorithm that is used to compute
the optimal values of policy rule coefficients which are chosen by the central bank to
minimize its loss function. First, for any given values of the structural parameter vector,
the matrix describing the policymaker’s preferences, and the variance-covariance matrix
of the reduced form shocks, one can choose some arbitrary initial values of the policy rule
13Iterations on the sequence of partial sum are performed until a convergence criterion is met: the
difference between two sequential iterations of the partial sum is less than 1× 10−7.
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coefficients and use equation (2.4) to compute the reduced form model solution. Given
G, one can evaluate the policy loss using equation (2.7). In the second step, one can
numerically compute partial derivative of the loss function with respect to each policy
rule coefficient while recomputing G for every change in policy coefficients to capture the
adjustment of private agents’ expectations to changes in monetary policy. In the final
step, the algorithm updates policy rule coefficients if doing so reduces policy loss. The
algorithm repeats the last two steps until it converges to the point in the parameter space
that yields the minimum value for the policy loss.
2.4 Inferring Monetary Policy Regimes
It is widely believed that monetary policymakers should display time-varying policy
preferences over time. One potential source of changing monetary policy is that monetary
policymakers would face different levels and variabilities of inflation and other economic
variables in different time spans. In the case of United States, monetary policymakers in
the Federal Reserve must contend with the high inflation that occurred in the 1970’s, the
disinflation in the 1980’s, several large oil price shocks, the geopolitical events, and the
recessions that occurred in the early 1980’s and 1990’s, early and late 2000’s. Thus, over
time the Federal Reserve may adjust its focus on different objectives hence change the
set of weights in loss function and the corresponding policy-rule coefficients. In order to
infer the central bank’s time-varying policy preferences, this study assumes that at each
period t there are nj monetary policy regimes and each policy regime can occur with
a certain probability. In a given monetary policy regime, the central bank can choose
a set of weights in the loss function and the corresponding coefficients in the reaction
function to minimize its expected loss. Hence each weight in the loss function can take
nj different values in period t, and each value corresponds to the policy regime jt, where
jt ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nj}.
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The transitions between policy regimes are modeled to follow a Markov-switching
process. The timing of each transition in the stochastic process of policy regimes is not
determined ex ante, but is estimated from the data. The policy regimes are assumed
to be independent of each other. An unobservable exogenous variable jt determines the
current regime. jt follows a Markov chain with a constant nj × nj transition matrix
P =

p11 · · · pnj1
... pjk
...
p1nj · · · pnjnj
 ,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switching from regime j at time t to
regime k at time t+1. Furthermore,
∑nj
k=1 pjk = 1 and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, . . . , nj}. Let
the nj vector pt ≡ (p1t, . . . , pnjt)′ denote the probability distribution of policy regimes in
period t, where pjt ≡ Pr(jt = j). Hence the probability distribution of policy regimes in
period t+ 1 is
pt+1 = Ppt. (2.9)
Why does it make sense to assume that the transitions between policy regimes follow
a stochastic process? Cooley, Leroy and Raymon (1984), Sims (1987), and Sims and
Zha (2006) argue that if monetary policymakers can contemplate changing policy, then
a monetary policy regime can recur. Given that there is a history of changing monetary
policy and changes in monetary policy are difficult to predict, it is best for private agents
to presume policy regimes can recur and ascribe probability distributions over the possible
policy regimes. Private agents’ expectations and decision rules should incorporate the
beliefs that policy regimes are not once-and-for-all and that returning to the old policy
regime is always possible. Beliefs of policy regime changes are used to study when and
how policy regime changes occur.
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Davig and Leeper (2007) and Chung, Davig and Leeper (2007) point out that modeling
monetary policy regime changes stochastically is especially important for the United
States. Monetary policy in the U.S. is largely determined by the confluence of economic
and political conditions, which fluctuate all the time. Furthermore, there is no good
mechanism that can bind the Federal Reserve’s action in the future, so it is very hard to
exclude the possibility of returning to inflationary policy even though the Federal Reserve
successfully brought down inflation. As a result, stochastic policy regime switching is an
assumption that is closer to the reality than the non-recurrent regime switching.
Although modeling the transitions between policy regimes with a stochastic process is
useful for capturing the complex behavior of central bank, it does not address the issue as
to what extent the probability distribution of a policy regime is affected by the economic
environment or other non-economic factors. This issue deserves a separate investigation,
which is beyond the scope of this study. Given that the high degree of uncertainty in
understanding the stochastic properties of economic environment, incorrectly modeling
the systematic relationship between economic structure and monetary policy is not nec-
essarily better than modeling the policy regime changes with a stochastic process. The
stochastic transitions between policy regimes can also help improve model tractability
and permit straightforward interpretations. At this stage, the specification of Markov
transitions between policy regimes is a starting point for building more sophisticated
models of monetary authority’s policy choice, and it can help develop intuitions of the
appropriate policy design.
2.5 Maximum Likelihood Estimation: SURF and SORF
The parameters of the model are collected into two groups. Collect the structural
parameters into vector V = {λ, a1, a2, b, α1, α2, β, C11, . . . , C33}, which contains
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the parameters of the IS equation, Phillips curve, and the elements in the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks. Collect the coefficients of the monetary
policy rule into vector ∆ = {c1, c2, c3, c4}.
In line with Salemi (2006), this study uses two estimation strategies. The first type
of econometric policy evaluation in this study estimates V and ∆ while treating ∆ as
unrestricted. This estimation strategy is referred as SURF: Structure estimation with an
Unrestricted Reaction Function. In the following sections, it can be seen that this study
reports SURF estimates of V and ∆ and analyzes policy with these estimates.
The hypothesis that the policy-rule coefficients minimize expected loss induces a
restriction function on the policy-rule coefficients, ∆ = g(V, W ). This study uses a
unified approach that estimates V and W subject to the restriction, ∆ = g(V, W ). This
estimation strategy is referred as SORF: Structure estimation with an Optimal Reaction
Function. In the following sections, it can be seen that this study reports SORF estimates
of V and W together with the implied value of ∆. Appendix A provides an explanation
of the algorithm used to compute SORF estimates. SORF estimates can allow one to
perform formal assessment of the monetary policy optimality hypothesis.
2.6 Data Description
The baseline model and the optimal-policy hypothesis are fitted to U.S. quarterly
data from 1965:Q1 to 2001:Q4 on output, inflation, and interest rates. Since this study
applies a rational expectation Keynesian model for policy analysis starting 1965, here the
monetary policymakers in the Federal Reserve are assumed to understand the forward-
looking nature of private agents’ behavior two decades before Lucas published his famous
critique on policy analysis14.
14This assumption is in line with Salemi (2006).
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The data used here are the same as those in Salemi (2006), the results of which estab-
lish a benchmark for this study. The raw data series, except for population, are drawn
from FRED, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database. Quarterly population
numbers are interpolations of annual values found in the 2002 Economic Report of the
President.
Output measure is real GDP (in 1996 chained dollars) divided by civilian population.
As illustrated in Salemi (2006), some undesirable effects were generated as real per capita
GDP growth was depressed throughout the late 1970’s, most of the 1980’s, and the early
1990’s. The economy restored its growth in the early 2000’s. Empirical implementation
of the model presented earlier requires stationary data. To induce stationarity, this study
fits a constant-coefficient time trend to the natural log of real GDP per capita. The trend
is used as a proxy for long run growth path of per capita output. Variable yt, the output
gap that is used in the structural model estimation, is the difference between the natural
logarithm of real GDP per capita and its long run trend. Such transformation of the
output variable is consistent with the assumption that the central bank aims to keep
output close to its long-run growth path.
The inflation rate is the annualized percentage change in the chained GDP deflator.
The inflation rate rose from 1965 to 1980, dropped dramatically between 1980 and 1985,
and continued to trend gradually downward between 1986 and 2001. The quarterly
interest rate is the annualized secondary market yield of three-month treasury bills.
The interest rate also followed a trend path that is similar to that of inflation. Salemi
(2006) suggests that it is not appealing to assume that there was only one constant
trend throughout the sample period. Therefore, target values for the inflation rate and
interest rate are obtained by fitting continuous, piecewise-linear trends that allow for
trend coefficient changes in 1980:Q1 and 1986:Q115 but trend coefficients in the inflation
15Given the changes in the target paths that occurred in 1980 and 1986, it is possible that there is a
policy regime prevailing between 1980 and 1985.
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rate and interest rate piecewise regressions are constrained to be the same. Variables pit
and rt are the residuals from the two trend regressions. These transformed series imply
that the central bank tries to minimize the variations of inflation and the interest rate
around their target paths.
The target-path assumptions on the inflation rate and interest rate imply that the
Federal Reserve acclimated itself to rising inflation during the 1960’s and 1970’s. The
paths also imply that the Federal Reserve rapidly decreased inflation target between
1980 and 1986 and then gradually lowered target inflation over the next 15 years. The
target-path assumptions on the inflation rate and interest rate are consistent with many
studies in the literature. Finally, the paths imply a constant target value for the real rate
of interest.
There is no evidence of a unit root in the time series of yt, pit, and rt, see results
in Salemi (2006). For yt, the hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 5% level
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with lag lengths 2 to 4. For pit and rt, the
hypothesis of a unit root can also be rejected at the 5% level using either the augmented
Dickey-Fuller or the Phillips-Perron test with lag lengths 0 through 4.
Because the model is forward-looking, changes in the policy rule will cause across-
regime changes in the parameters of the reduced form equations. But the results in many
studies, including Salemi (2006), suggest that there is not evidence of large changes in
reduced form parameters that could indicate a structural break in the sample period.
Salemi (2006) shows that there is no strong evidence that the coefficients of the yt and
pit equations changed in 1980. The p-values associated with the relevant F statistics are
0.420 for equation (2.1) and 0.490 for equation (2.2). The p-value associated with the
likelihood ratio statistic for the hypothesis of no shift in the parameters of either equation
is 0.380.
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As equations (2.7) and (2.8) indicate, loss-minimizing values of the policy-rule co-
efficients depend on the covariance matrix of shocks Ω as well as on the reduced form
parameters G16. Therefore, it is important to ask whether the Federal Reserve faced dif-
ferent distributions of shocks over time. The results of linear projections in Salemi (2006)
suggest that the covariance matrix of shocks should be different across policy regimes.
In summary, this study will estimate and test the model by varying the number of
policy regime from two to three. The parameters of equations (2.1) – (2.2) will be held
constant across policy regimes but the monetary policy and covariance matrix of shocks
would be allowed to change.
2.7 Econometric Evaluation of U.S. Monetary Policy
with Two Policy Regimes
This section applies the estimation approach described in the previous section to
estimate the structural model parameters in equations (2.1) – (2.3) jointly with the policy
preference parameters in equation (2.6). In this section, monetary policy is assumed to
switch between two regimes during the sample period. Therefore, in the estimation
algorithm, the policy parameters and policymaker’s preference parameters are allowed to
change in each regime.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present the probability inferences in SURF and SORF estimates
for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t throughout the sample
period. Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 report SURF and SORF estimates of model parameters
along with the value of the log likelihood function. To make inferences about the sig-
nificance of estimated parameters, this study reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio
test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter is zero. A similar
16While certainty equivalence does not hold for the optimal simple rule, Svensson and Woodford
(2003) make clear that it does hold for the optimal time-consistent policy.
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approach is used by Gallant, Hsu, and Tauchen (1999) and Salemi (2006). The reason of
using this approach is that the likelihood surface is highly non-smooth, so derivative-based
procedures that calculate the inverse of information matrix can not produce reasonable
estimates of standard errors.
2.7.1 Probability Inferences for Two Policy Regimes
From the estimations of the Markov-switching models one can obtain the probability
inferences for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t in the sample.
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 plot the SURF and SORF estimated probability series of being
in the two regimes for the Markov process governing the monetary policy respectively,
together with the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin and
end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research as shown in the vertical
grey areas. One should note that these recession determinations are made informally
on the basis of a large number of time series and are usually made some time after
the event, see Hamilton (1994). Although these business cycle dates were not used in
any way to estimate parameters or form inferences about the Markov transition process,
it is interesting that the traditional business cycle dates correspond fairly closely to the
switches of monetary policy as described by the SURF and SORF estimates in Figure 2.1
and Figure 2.2.
Regardless of whether the optimal-policy hypothesis is imposed, the estimates reveal
that monetary policy regime one prevailed roughly after the recession started, and policy
regime two prevailed during the expansionary periods. After the recession dates in 1970,
1975, 1980, and 2001, U.S. monetary policy is estimated to be in regime one, in which
the Federal Reserve quickly adjusted its policy instruments to fight recession. When the
economy got out of recession, U.S. monetary policy switched to regime two, in which the
primary goal of the Federal Reserve was to maintain low inflation rate and sustainable
output growth. As a result, it can be seen that regime two was dominant for most of
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the sample period including most of the late 1960’s, the latter half of the 1970’s, and the
entire period from the late 1980’s onward until the end of the sample period.
2.7.2 Estimates of Structural Parameters
The discussions here begin with the SURF structural parameters estimates, see Ta-
ble 2.1. A sizable value of parameter λ implies that expected future output plays an
important role in determining aggregate demand of household. Here the estimate of λ is
0.282 when the assumption of policy optimality is relaxed. While the estimate is sizable,
the p-value of the likelihood ratio test indicates that one can not reject the null hypoth-
esis that the true parameter value is very close to zero. Therefore, the estimate of λ in
SURF estimates implies that expected future output may not be an important factor in
affecting aggregate demand. The next two structural parameters are linked to the persis-
tent effects on output. The parameters on lagged outputs a1 and a2 are found to be 0.914
and −0.207. The estimate of a1 is statistically indifferent from one and the estimate of
a2 is significantly different from zero at any conventional confidence level. Hence these
estimates imply that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third, the estimate of b
is 0.022 without imposing the constraint of optimal reaction function. Despite the fact
that b is estimated to be quantitatively small, the estimate appears to be significant at
10% level. The estimate implies that changes in the interest rate do cause changes in
aggregate demand although the effect of interest rate on aggregate demand is relatively
insensitive. Fourth, turning to the parameters of the Phillips curve, one can note that
firms are substantially more backward-looking than forward-looking. The estimate of the
relative weight α1 is very small and is found to be highly insignificant, and estimate of
α2 is 0.534 and is found to be significantly different from zero. The findings here result
in a backward-looking Phillips curve and cast doubt on the sticky price mechanism of
Calvo. Fifth, the estimate of β is responsible for capturing the impact of business cycle
fluctuations on real price. The estimate of β is 0.080 and is found to be significant which
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implies that a positive output gap raises the inflation rate.
The SORF estimates differ in several important ways. When the policy optimality
is imposed, the estimate of λ is 0.184, which is smaller and still insignificant. Second,
the SORF estimate of b is larger and more precisely estimated than the estimate under
SURF, which imply that a change in the interest rate has a larger effect on aggregate
demand. Third, SORF estimates of both α1 and α2 are positive and highly significant,
which support for the forward-looking Phillips curve implied by the sticky price-setting
mechanism. In particular, one can not reject the hypothesis that α1 and α2 sum to one
as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Salemi (2006), and SORF estimates were obtained
with that restriction imposed. One can note that the past and future prices’ overlap in
the current price is somewhat skewed toward the future price. This finding is in general
accord with Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), who find that most of the U.S. firms are purely
forward-looking but a fraction are following a backward-looking rule of thumb. Fourth,
while still highly significant at any conventional confidence level, the SORF estimate of
β is much smaller implying that it is more difficult for the Federal Reserve to control
inflation by changing aggregate demand.
As the p-values reported in Table 2.1 indicate, some of the structural parameters, such
as α1 the parameter of the forward-looking term in the Phillips curve, are more precisely
estimated under SORF than under SURF. It is believed that a unified approach of joint
estimation of the structural model parameters with the parameters of the policymaker’s
objective function provides additional across equation restrictions that result in a more
precise estimation of the model parameters. Hence the SORF estimates more strongly
support a forward-looking Phillips curve. Castelnuovo (2003) argues that hybrid formu-
lation of the Phillips curve is crucial for appropriate identification of policy preferences.
Moreover, Salemi (2006) suggests that when the interest rate is highly persistent, the best
way to reconcile a persistent interest rate process and policy optimality is to hypothesize
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that both occurred in an economy where private agents are forward looking. The finding
of highly persistent interest rate in both regimes will be shown below.
2.7.3 Estimates of Preference Parameters and Test of Policy
Optimality
Table 2.2 reports estimation results for the preference parameters in two regimes
identified in U.S. monetary policy, and it also presents two sets of reaction function
coefficients for each policy regime: SURF estimates (obtained while treating coefficients
of the policy rule as free parameters), and SORF estimates (implied values of the policy
rule coefficients consistent with the policy optimality hypothesis). To interpret the results
on policy preference estimation, one should note that the relative weight on inflation
stabilization objective is normalized to one.
The results in Table 2.2 support several conclusions. First, one can notice that under
SORF the estimated values of wy and wr are very small implying that inflation stabi-
lization was the dominant objective of the Federal Reserve in both policy regimes. The
relative weights placed on output stabilization in two policy regimes are both 0.0020. The
weight wy in regime one is insignificant, while in regime two it is marginally significantly
different from zero at 10% level. The weight placed on interest rate stabilization is small
but significant in each regime, and the value of wr is slightly larger in the second regime
than that in the first regime. Given the normalization of the weights, the estimates of the
central bank’s preferences in both policy regimes suggest that in conducting its monetary
policy the Federal Reserve was far more concerned with keeping the inflation close to its
long run target path than it was with trying to stabilize output and interest rate around
their targets. Unlike many other central banks, the Federal Reserve Bank refrained from
attempting to fine-tune its policy to stabilize the real sector of the economy and focused
instead on the price stability. Second, there is clear evidence that the estimated and im-
plied policy-rule coefficient estimates in two regimes differ significantly and substantially
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from each other. The SURF coefficients on lagged inflation (c2) and lagged outputs (c1
and c4) are larger in magnitude and insignificant in the first policy regime but smaller
in magnitude and highly significant in the second regime. The SORF estimates of pol-
icy rule coefficients are larger in magnitude in the first policy regime than those in the
second regime. Third, all SORF estimates of the policy rule coefficients are greater in
magnitude than the SURF estimates in both regimes. This suggests that the Federal
Reserve responded consistently to inflation and output, which is discussed shortly.
How different are the estimated preferences here from the ones reported in other
studies? Compared to estimates of the weights in the Federal Reserve’s loss function
in the literature17, the results here are at the lower end for both wy and wr. Salemi
(2006) estimates a similar model, and he obtains a statistically insignificant estimate
0.0047 for wy and a significant estimate 0.013 for wr during the Volcker-Greenspan period
(1980 − 2001) and an insignificant estimate 0.0012 for wy and 0.0062 for wy during the
Martin-Burns period (1965−1980). Using a backward-looking model, Favero and Rovelli
(2003) estimate wy and wr directly from the first-order condition of the Federal Reserve’s
optimization problem and obtain small but statistically significant weights of 0.00125 for
wy and 0.0085 for wr during 1980 − 1998, and 0.00153 for wy and 0.0051 for wr during
1961− 1979. Ozlale (2003) gets estimates18 of 0.52 for output and 0.86 for interest rate
smoothing for the Greenspan period (1987− 1999), 0.47 for output and 0.76 for interest
rate smoothing for the Volcker period (1979 − 1987), and 1.12 for output and 0.91 for
interest rate smoothing for the Burns period (1970 − 1978). For the Federal Reserve,
Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) obtains estimates of 1.16 for wy and 0.75 for wr in one of
17One should note that the studies in literature use various economic models and empirical strate-
gies varying from unified approach to two-step approach to estimate weights in the central bank’s loss
function.
18Since Ozlale (2003) does not normalize the weight on inflation stabilization wpi to one, this study
reports the ratios of the weight on output to the weight on inflation (wy/wpi) and the weight on interest
rate smoothing to the weight on inflation (wr/wpi) based on Ozlale’s results.
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the two policy regimes defined in her paper, and estimates of 1.29 for wy and 0.94 for wr in
another policy regime. Dennis (2006) estimates a backward-looking model on U.S. data
from 1982 to 2000, and he shows a statistically insignificant estimate 2.941 for wy and a
significant estimate of 4.517 for wr. As a result, most of these studies report a high degree
of inflation stabilization in U.S. monetary policy, and all these studies find statistically
significant evidence of the Federal Reserve’s concerns with interest rate behavior.
Did the Federal Reserve set monetary policy in a way consistent with the definition
of optimal monetary policy used in this study? In light of Salemi (2006), a test of policy
optimality is a test of the hypothesis that SORF fits the data as well as SURF, that
is, the SORF and SURF policy rule coefficients are the same. The answer is no. In
each policy regime, there are four freely estimated parameters in the unrestricted policy
rule but only two freely estimated parameters, wy and wr, in the optimal policy rule, so
SORF implies four restrictions in total. As a result, the relevant likelihood ratio statistic
is 14.957 with a p-value 0.005. Thus the hypothesis that the policy rule coefficients that
fit the data best were those that minimized quadratic expected loss as defined in (2.6)
can be soundly rejected.
2.7.4 Interest Rate Smoothing
As can be seen in Table 2.2, the reaction-function coefficient for the lagged interest rate
is always large compared to the coefficients for inflation and output so that, according to
the definition provided by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), the Federal Reserve engages
in “interest rate smoothing”. This finding supports the widely held viewpoint that most
central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are very cautious when changing interest
rates. Brainard (1967) argues that large movements in interest rates can lead to lost of
credibility, if a policy intervention subsequently needs to be reversed. Cukierman (1989)
and Goodfriend (1991) suggest that too much volatility in interest rates is undesirable
because it may result in maturity mismatches between bank’s assets and liabilities, which
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would be disruptive for financial sector. Sack andWeiland (2000) provide three competing
explanations for interest rate smoothing. First, the Federal Reserve may realize that rules
with persistence are more effective for stabilizing output and inflation than rules without
persistence in economies where forward-looking expectations matter. Second, the Federal
Reserve may be uncertain about the accuracy of the data on which they rely to conduct
policy. Third, the Federal Reserve may be uncertain about the values of structural
parameters. Lansing (2002) cautions that smoothing can arise spuriously if the lagged
rate of interest is correlated with measurement errors in the data.
While the estimates in the reaction functions reported in Table 2.2 imply that the
Federal Reserve smooths interest rates, SORF estimates suggest that the Federal Reserve
placed little attention on interest rate stability in both policy regimes. Thus, in line with
Salemi (2006), the estimates here are consistent with Sack and Weiland’s first explanation
for smoothing. The large coefficient on the lagged interest rate can be explained by the
finding that forward-looking expectations are empirically important and the fact that
optimal policies require persistent responses to shocks.
2.7.5 Estimated Transition Probabilities
Table 2.3 gives SURF and SORF estimates for the transition probabilities for switch-
ing in two monetary policy regimes. As the p-values indicate, all transition probabilities
are precisely estimated. The probabilities on the diagonal of the transition matrix are
close to unity, which means that both policy regimes show high persistence – a feature
that is commonly seen in the estimation of Markov switching models, see Sims (1999)
and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006). For instance, the SURF estimates indicate that, if the
monetary policy is in regime one this period, there is a 89.6 percent probability that it
will be in regime one next period; if the monetary policy is in regime two this period,
there is a 94.4 percent probability that it will be in regime two next period. Similarly, the
SORF estimates indicate that, if the monetary policy is in regime one this period, there
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is a 87.7 percent probability that it will be in regime one next period; if the monetary
policy is in regime two this period, there is a 95.7 percent probability that it will be
in regime two next period. These suggest that changes in the monetary policy regime
will occur infrequently. Although these two policy regimes are persistent, the SURF and
SORF estimates show that they are not degenerate regimes. The p-values for p11 and
p22 are measured by the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the true value of
the transition probability is 0.995, meaning that there is nearly no switch back into the
regime prevailing at the beginning of the sample period. The test statistics reject the
hypothesis thus the SURF and SORF transition probabilities do not induce degenerate
policy regimes.
2.7.6 Comparison of Impulse Response Functions for Structural
Estimation
To check how much the model can explain the variation in the data, this section
compares the impulse response functions (IRF’s) implied by SURF and SORF. In line
with Salemi (2006), this study makes the hypothesis that monetary policy is conditioned
only on lagged values of output and inflation. In keeping with this hypothesis, this study
chooses y-pi-r as the within period causal ordering for the impulse response function.
The ordering implies that a shock to output affects only output contemporaneously, a
shock to inflation affects both inflation and output contemporaneously, and a shock to
the interest rate affects all variables contemporaneously. The ordering makes difference
because of the contemporaneous correlation between output and the interest rate in both
policy regimes. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present the IRF’s for regimes one and two. The shade
areas in the figures are 95% confidence intervals computed with parametric Bootstrap
39
method19.
The figures show clearly that the SURF and SORF estimates share many features of
the impulse response functions. For instance, SURF and SORF estimates all imply that
a positive shock to output keeps output above its trend for more than 30 quarters. Both
imply that a positive shock to inflation produces moderate inflation persistence with
inflation returning to trend in about six quarters. Both imply that a positive inflation
shock causes output to fall below trend for a substantial period of time. SURF and
SORF IRF’s all show that the interest rate rises quickly after a positive output shock
and remains above trend for at least ten quarters.
There are differences in the impulse response functions. SURF estimates imply that
the interest rate increases then falls gradually after a positive inflation shock in regime
one and rises then falls below trend after ten quarters in regime two. SORF estimates
imply that the interest rate rises quickly then returns to trend after about ten quarters
in regime one and rises then remains above trend for a long time after a positive inflation
shock in regime two. A second difference is related to the first. SORF estimates imply
that the inflation response to a positive output shock is far smaller than implied by the
SURF estimates.
Comparing the IRF’s suggest that actual and optimal responses of the interest rate
to output shocks were nearly the same in policy regime one but they were quite different
in regime two. Therefore, in policy regime one, SURF and SORF estimates imply that
inflation resulting from positive output shocks would be dampened completely. In policy
regime two, SURF estimates imply that a positive output shock causes interest rate to rise
above trend for a very long time, and SORF estimates imply that a positive output shock
first causes interest rate to rise quickly then fall below trend after about ten quarters.
19This study simulates data by supplying sequences of random disturbances to the reduced form
solution of the estimated model. These shocks are drawn from the zero mean multivariate normal
distributions with variance-covariance matrices identical to those estimated for each of the two policy
regimes.
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The comparison also implies that actual interest rate responses to inflation shocks were
not optimal. A loss-minimizing policy would have raised interest rate more after inflation
shocks in both regimes one and two.
Figure 2.5 compares the responses of output and inflation to an interest rate shock.
The policy rule equation residuals are positively correlated with the IS and Phillips
curve equation residuals in both policy regimes. On the maintained hypothesis that the
monetary policy reacts to economic conditions only with a lag, this correlation between
must be due either to responses of output and inflation to an interest rate surprise or
to responses of output, inflation, and interest rate to an un-modeled shock. Following
Salemi (2006), to obtain the model’s prediction of responses of output and inflation to
a pure interest rate shock, this study ignores the contemporaneous correlations when
computing the IRF’s reported in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 shows that in both regimes SURF and SORF estimates can account for
the “hump-shaped” response of output to an interest rate surprise. In policy regime
one, SURF peak occurs about ten quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak
occurs about five quarters after the shock. In policy regime two, both SURF and SORF
peaks occur about ten quarters after the interest rate shock. Both SURF and SORF
estimates show that the inflation rate declines immediately after an interest rate shock
and remains below trend for many quarters. SORF estimates imply a much more smaller
inflation response than do SURF estimates, especially in policy regime one.
2.8 Econometric Evaluation of U.S. Monetary Policy
with Three Policy Regimes
This section applies the estimation approach described earlier to estimate the struc-
tural model parameters in equations (2.1) – (2.3) jointly with the policy preference pa-
rameters in equation (2.6). In this section, monetary policy is assumed to switch among
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three regimes during the sample period. Therefore, in the estimation algorithm, the
policy parameters and policymaker’s preference parameters are allowed to change across
three policy regimes. In addition, comparing results in this section and the previous
section allows a test for the existence of a third policy regime.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 present the probability inferences in SURF and SORF estimates
for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t throughout the sample
period. Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 report SURF and SORF estimates of model parameters
along with the value of the log likelihood function. To make inferences about the sig-
nificance of estimated parameters, this study reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio
test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter is zero. A similar
approach is used by Gallant, Hsu, and Tauchen (1999) and Salemi (2006). The reason of
using this approach is that the likelihood surface is highly non-smooth, so derivative-based
procedures that calculate the inverse of information matrix can not produce reasonable
estimates of standard errors.
2.8.1 Probability Inferences for Three Policy Regimes
From the estimations of the Markov-switching models one also obtain the probability
inferences for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t in the sample.
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 plot the SURF and SORF estimated probability series of being
in the three regimes for the Markov process governing the monetary policy respectively,
together with the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin and
end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research as shown in the vertical
grey areas. One should note that these recession determinations are made informally
on the basis of a large number of time series and are usually made some time after the
event, see Hamilton (1994). Although these business cycle dates were not used in any
way to estimate parameters or form inferences about the Markov transition process, it
is interesting that the traditional business cycle dates are fairly related to the switches
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of monetary policy between the three regimes as described by the SURF and SORF
estimates in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7.
Both SURF and SORF estimates show that policy regime one is a special regime
that only prevailed between 1979 and 1984. During this period, the Federal Reserve
successfully reduced high inflationary pressure in the U.S., and this period of time is
commonly known as the Volcker disinflation period. Both Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7
show that the special regime one prevailed only during the disinflation period and nowhere
else20. Regime two is a regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into
during the expansionary periods, and regime three is a regime which the monetary policy
switched into after the recession happened. When the economy came out of recession,
U.S. monetary policy switched to regime two, in which the primary goal of the Federal
Reserve was to maintain low inflation rate and sustainable output growth. As a result, it
can be seen that regime two was dominant for most of the sample period, including most
of the late 1960’s, the latter half of the 1970’s, and the entire period from the late 1980’s
onward until the end of the sample period. During the recession periods in 1970, 1975,
1982, and 2001, monetary policy in the U.S. is estimated to switch into regime three, in
which the Federal Reserve adjusted its policy instruments quickly to fight recession.
2.8.2 Estimates of Structural Parameters
The discussions here begin with the SURF structural parameters estimates, see Ta-
ble 2.4. A sizable value of parameter λ implies that expected future output plays an
important role in determining aggregate demand of household. Here the estimate of λ
is 0.270 when the assumption of policy optimality is relaxed. While the estimate is siz-
able, the p-value of the likelihood ratio test indicates that one can not reject the null
hypothesis that the true parameter value is zero. Therefore, the estimate of λ in SURF
20Although regime one only prevailed during 1979 − 1984, estimates of the three-regime transition
matrix in Table 2.6 do not suggest that regime one is a degenerate regime.
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estimates implies that expected future output is not an important factor in affecting ag-
gregate demand. The next two structural parameters are linked to the persistent effects
on output. The parameters on lagged outputs a1 and a2 are found to be sizable and they
are 0.940 and −0.221, respectively. The estimate of a1 is statistically indifferent from one
and the estimate of a2 is significantly different from zero at any conventional confidence
level. Hence these estimates imply that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third,
the estimate of b is 0.022 without imposing the constraint of optimal reaction function.
Despite the fact that b is estimated to be quantitatively small, the estimate appears to be
significant at marginal 10% level. The estimate implies that changes in the interest rate
do cause changes in aggregate demand although the effect of interest rate on aggregate
demand is relatively insensitive. Fourth, turning to the parameters of the Phillips curve,
one can note that firms are substantially more backward-looking than forward-looking.
The estimate of the relative weight α1 is very small and is found to be highly insignifi-
cant, and estimate of α2 is 0.544 and is found to be significantly different from zero. The
findings here result in a backward-looking Phillips curve and cast doubt on the sticky
price mechanism of Calvo. Fifth, the estimate of β is responsible for capturing the impact
of business cycle fluctuations on real price. The estimate of β is 0.066 and is found to be
significant which implies that a positive output gap raises the inflation rate.
The SORF estimates differ in several important ways. When the policy optimality
is imposed, the estimate of λ is 0.278, which is nearly the same as SURF estimate but
is highly significant. Hence SORF estimate of λ implies that expected future output
is an important factor in determining aggregate demand. Second, the SORF estimate
of b is smaller but is more precisely estimated than the estimate under SURF, which
imply that a change in the interest rate has a smaller effect on aggregate demand. Third,
SORF estimates of both α1 and α2 are positive and highly significant, which support
for the forward-looking Phillips curve implied by the sticky price-setting mechanism. In
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particular, one can not reject the hypothesis that α1 and α2 sum to one as in Fuhrer and
Moore (1995) and Salemi (2006), and SORF estimates were obtained with that restriction
imposed. One can note that the past and future prices’ overlap in the current price is
somewhat skewed toward the future price. This finding is in general accord with Gal´ı
and Gertler (1999), who find that most of the U.S. firms are purely forward-looking but a
fraction are following a backward-looking rule of thumb. Fourth, while highly significant
at any conventional confidence level, the SORF estimate of β is much smaller implying
that it is more difficult for the Federal Reserve to control inflation by changing aggregate
demand.
As the p-values reported in Table 2.4 indicate, some of the structural parameters, such
as λ and α1 the parameters of the forward-looking terms in the IS schedule and Phillips
curve, are more precisely estimated under SORF than under SURF. It is believed that a
unified approach of joint estimation of structural model parameters with the parameters
of the policymaker’s objective function provides additional across equation restrictions
that result in a more precise estimation of the model parameters. Hence the SORF
estimates more strongly support the assumption that private agents are forward looking.
Castelnuovo (2003) argues that hybrid formulation of the Phillips curve is crucial for
appropriate identification of policy preferences. Moreover, Salemi (2006) suggests that
when the interest rate is highly persistent, the best way to reconcile a persistent interest
rate process and policy optimality is to hypothesize that both occurred in an economy
where private agents are forward looking. The finding of highly persistent interest rate
in all regimes will be shown below.
2.8.3 Estimates of Preference Parameters and Test of Policy
Optimality
Table 2.5 reports estimation results for the preference parameters in three policy
regimes identified in U.S. monetary policy, and it also presents two sets of reaction
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function coefficients for each policy regime: SURF estimates (obtained while treating
coefficients of the policy rule as free parameters), and SORF estimates (implied values of
the policy rule coefficients consistent with the policy optimality hypothesis). To interpret
the results on policy preference estimation, one should note that the relative weight on
inflation stabilization objective is normalized to one.
One can notice that, under SORF the estimated values of wy and wr are very small
implying that inflation stabilization was always the dominant objective of the Federal
Reserve in all three policy regimes. Policy regime one is an interesting case, covering
the period of 1979-1984, during the Volcker disinflation period. Looking at the estimates
describing the Federal Reserve’s preferences during policy regime one, the estimate of
wy is 0.0010 and the likelihood ratio test can not reject the null hypothesis that the
true weight is zero. The estimate of wr is 0.0017, and it is significantly different from
zero. Given the normalization of the weights, this finding suggests that in conducting its
monetary policy the Federal Reserve was far more concerned with keeping the inflation
close to its long run target path than it was with trying to stabilize output and interest
rate around their targets. Indeed, in policy regime one, both SURF and SORF estimates
show that the policy rule coefficient on lagged inflation c3 is very sizable, and the SURF
estimate of c3 is significantly different from zero. While being significant, the interest rate
stabilization objective appears to be of secondary importance to the Federal Reserve in
policy regime one. The estimates of preferences in policy regime one are consistent with
the historical evidence. As described earlier, in this special regime the Federal Reserve
faced high level of inflation, and its sole objective was to reduce inflation substantially.
In policy regime two, inflation stabilization was still the dominant objective. The
estimates of the policy preferences in this policy regime suggest that the Federal Reserve
Bank had been conducting its policy in the manner consistent with the policy used during
economic expansionary periods. A large weight was assigned to inflation stabilization,
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and very small weights were placed on both output and interest rate stabilizations. In-
deed, the estimate of wy is 0.0045 which is statistically significant at any conventional
confidence level. The estimated policy weight placed on the interest rate stabilization
objective wr is 0.0061 and is significantly different from zero. Interest rate smoothing
became a more important objective in policy regime two than in policy regime one. As
pointed out previously, in this expansionary regime the Federal Reserve would put more
concerns on potential exacerbate inflation situation and use instrumental interest rates
wisely. Switching into policy regime two would result in a low level of inflation.
In policy regime three, the normalization of the weights suggests that keeping the
inflation close to its long run target path was far more important for the Federal Reserve
than stabilizing output and the interest rate. The estimate of wy in this regime is 0.0087
and is the largest among three policy regimes. The likelihood ratio test for wy strongly
rejects the null hypothesis that the true weight is zero. In addition, in policy regime
three, both SURF and SORF estimates show that the policy rule coefficient on lagged
output c1 is sizable. The estimate of wr in this regime is 0.0046 and is highly significant.
However, the interest rate stabilization objective was not as important as the output
stabilization objective for the Federal Reserve in policy regime three.
There is clear evidence that the estimated and implied policy-rule coefficient esti-
mates in three regimes differ significantly and substantially from each other. First, the
coefficient on lagged output (c1) is negative in policy regime one but sizable and positive
in regimes two and three. The coefficient on lagged inflation (c2) is large and positive
in regime one but small in regimes two and three. The coefficient on lagged two output
(c4) is sizable and positive in regime one but negative in policy regimes two and three.
Second, SORF estimate of the policy rule coefficient on lagged inflation is positive in
all regimes and larger than the SURF estimate in regimes two and three. This suggests
that the Federal Reserve should have responded more strongly to inflation than it did in
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regimes two and three, which will be discussed shortly.
How different are the estimated preferences here from the ones reported in other
studies? Compared to estimates of the weights in the Federal Reserve’s loss function in
the literature21, the results here are at the lower end for wy an wr. Salemi (2006) estimates
a similar model, and he obtains a statistically insignificant estimate 0.0047 for wy and a
significant estimate 0.013 for wr during the Volcker-Greenspan period (1980− 2001) and
an insignificant estimate 0.0012 for wy and 0.0062 for wy during the Martin-Burns period
(1965 − 1980). Using a backward-looking model, Favero and Rovelli (2003) estimate
wy and wr directly from the first-order condition of the Federal Reserve’s optimization
problem and obtain small but statistically significant weights of 0.00125 for wy and 0.0085
for wr during 1980−1998, and 0.00153 for wy and 0.0051 for wr during 1961−1979. Ozlale
(2003) gets estimates22 of 0.52 for output and 0.86 for interest rate smoothing for the
Greenspan period (1987− 1999), 0.47 for output and 0.76 for interest rate smoothing for
the Volcker period (1979−1987), and 1.12 for output and 0.91 for interest rate smoothing
for the Burns period (1970−1978). For the Federal Reserve, Assenmacher-Wesche (2006)
obtains estimates of 1.16 for wy and 0.75 for wr in one of the two policy regimes defined in
her paper, and estimates of 1.29 for wy and 0.94 for wr in another policy regime. Dennis
(2006) estimates a backward-looking model on U.S. data from 1982 to 2000, and he shows
a statistically insignificant estimate 2.941 for wy and a significant estimate of 4.517 for
wr. As a result, most of these studies report a high degree of inflation stabilization in
U.S. monetary policy, and all these studies find statistically significant evidence of the
Federal Reserve’s concerns with interest rate behavior.
21One should note that the studies in literature use various economic models and empirical strate-
gies varying from unified approach to two-step approach to estimate weights in the central bank’s loss
function.
22Since Ozlale (2003) does not normalize the weight on inflation stabilization wpi to one, this study
reports the ratios of the weight on output to the weight on inflation (wy/wpi) and the weight on interest
rate smoothing to the weight on inflation (wr/wpi) based on Ozlale’s results.
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Did the Federal Reserve set monetary policy in a way consistent with the definition
of optimal monetary policy used in this study? In light of Salemi (2006), a test of policy
optimality is a test of the hypothesis that SORF fits the data as well as SURF, that is,
the SORF and SURF policy rule coefficients are the same. The answer is no. In each
policy regime, there are four freely estimated parameters in the unrestricted policy rule
but only two freely estimated parameters, wy and wr, in the optimal policy rule, so SORF
implies six restrictions. As a result, the relevant likelihood ratio statistic is 12.511 with a
p-value 0.051. Thus the hypothesis that the policy rule coefficients that fit the data best
were those that minimized quadratic expected loss as defined in (2.6) can be rejected.
2.8.4 Interest Rate Smoothing
As can be seen in Table 2.5, the reaction-function coefficient for the lagged interest
rate is large compared to the coefficients for inflation and output so that, according to
the definition provided by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), the Federal Reserve engages
in “interest rate smoothing”. This finding supports the widely held viewpoint that most
central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are very cautious when changing interest
rates. Brainard (1967) argues that large movements in interest rates can lead to lost of
credibility, if a policy intervention subsequently needs to be reversed. Cukierman (1989)
and Goodfriend (1991) suggest that too much volatility in interest rates is undesirable
because it may result in maturity mismatches between bank’s assets and liabilities, which
would be disruptive for financial sector. Sack andWeiland (2000) provide three competing
explanations for interest rate smoothing. First, the Federal Reserve may realize that rules
with persistence are more effective for stabilizing output and inflation than rules without
persistence in economies where forward-looking expectations matter. Second, the Federal
Reserve may be uncertain about the accuracy of the data on which they rely to conduct
policy. Third, the Federal Reserve may be uncertain about the values of structural
parameters. Lansing (2002) cautions that smoothing can arise spuriously if the lagged
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rate of interest is correlated with measurement errors in the data.
While the estimates in the reaction functions reported in Table 2.5 imply that the
Federal Reserve smooths interest rates, SORF estimates suggest that the Federal Reserve
placed small weight on interest rate stability in all three policy regimes. Thus, in line with
Salemi (2006), the estimates here are consistent with Sack and Weiland’s first explanation
for smoothing. The large coefficient on the lagged interest rate can be explained by the
finding that forward-looking expectations are empirically important and the fact that
optimal policies require persistent responses to shocks.
2.8.5 Estimated Transition Probabilities
Table 2.6 gives SURF and SORF estimates for the transition probabilities for switch-
ing in three monetary policy regimes. As the p-values indicate, most transition probabil-
ities are precisely estimated. The probabilities on the diagonal of the transition matrix
are close to unity, which means that all policy regimes show high persistence23– a feature
that is commonly seen in the estimation of Markov switching models, see Sims (1999)
and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006). For instance, both SURF and SORF estimates indi-
cate that, if the monetary policy is in regime one this period, there is a 94.1 percent
probability that it will be in regime one next period; similarly, if the monetary policy is
in regime three this period, there is a 94.1 percent probability that it will be in regime
three next period. These suggest that changes in the monetary policy regime will occur
infrequently. However, all policy regimes except one in both SURF and SORF estimates
are not degenerate regimes. The p-values for SURF and SORF diagonal probabilities
p11, p22, and p33 are measured by the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the true
value of the transition probability is 0.995, meaning that there is nearly no switch back
into the regime prevailing at the beginning of the sample period. The test statistic for
23To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are highly persistent, in the estimation they
were restricted to be no less than 0.900.
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SURF estimate of p22 can not reject the hypothesis thus the policy regime two in SURF
estimates is a degenerate regime.
2.8.6 Test of a Third Regime in U.S. Monetary Policy
Was there a third regime in U.S. monetary policy? A comparison between models
with two-regime and three-regime monetary policy is helpful in answering the question.
This study uses likelihood ratio test statistic to test the hypothesis that the two-regime
models fit the data as well as the three-regime models. Therefore, one likelihood ratio test
statistic tests the two-regime SURF model against the three-regime SURF model, and
the other likelihood ratio test statistic is a test of the two-regime SORF model against
the three-regime SORF model.
There are eight more freely estimated parameters in the model with three-regime
unrestricted policy rule than those in the two-regime SURF model. Thus the two-regime
SURF model implies eight restrictions. The test statistic for a likelihood ratio test of
the three-regime SURF against the two-regime SURF would lie in 29.939, which implies
a p-value that is less than 0.001. For the test of the three-regime SORF model versus
the two-regime SORF model, the two-regime SORF implies six restrictions, and the
likelihood ratio test statistic is 32.385 implying a p-value that is less than 0.001. The
tests thus support the three-regime models over the two-regime models. The hypothesis
that the models that fit the data best were those in which the monetary policy follows a
two-regime Markov-switching process can be soundly rejected.
2.8.7 Comparison of Impulse Response Functions for Structural
Estimation
To check how much the model can explain the variation in the data, this section
compares the impulse response functions (IRF’s) implied by SURF and SORF. In line
with Salemi (2006), this study makes the hypothesis that monetary policy is conditioned
only on lagged values of output and inflation. In keeping with this hypothesis, this study
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chooses y-pi-r as the within period causal ordering for the impulse response function. The
ordering implies that a shock to output affects only output contemporaneously, a shock to
inflation affects both inflation and output contemporaneously, and a shock to the interest
rate affects all variables contemporaneously. The ordering makes difference because of the
contemporaneous correlation between output and the interest rate in all policy regimes.
Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 present the IRF’s for all three regimes. The shade areas in the
figures are 95% confidence intervals computed with parametric Bootstrap method24.
The figures show clearly that the SURF and SORF estimates share many features
of the impulse response functions. For instance, SURF and SORF estimates all imply
that a positive shock to output keeps output above its trend for more than 30 quarters.
Both SURF and SORF IRF’s show that a positive shock to inflation produces moderate
inflation persistence with inflation returning to trend in about six quarters.
There are significant differences in the impulse response functions across three policy
regimes. In regimes one and two, both SURF and SORF estimates imply that the interest
rate increases then falls gradually to trend after a positive inflation shock; in policy regime
three, SURF estimates show that the interest rate falls then increases gradually to trend
after a positive inflation shock, and SORF estimates show that interest rate falls first,
increases slightly above trend then decreases gradually to trend after 20 quarters. Since
policy regime one is the Volcker disinflation regime, the interest rate responds positively
to a positive inflation shock, and the responses are much larger than those in regimes
two and three. The comparisons also imply that the actual interest rate responses to
inflation were not optimal. A loss-minimizing policy would have raised the interest rate
more in all policy regimes. A second difference is somewhat related to the first. In all
three regimes SORF estimates imply that the inflation response to a positive output
24This study simulates data by supplying sequences of random disturbances to the reduced form
solution of the estimated model. These shocks are drawn from the zero mean multivariate normal
distributions with variance-covariance matrices identical to those estimated for each of the three policy
regimes.
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shock is far smaller than implied by the SURF estimates.
Comparing the IRF’s suggest that actual and optimal responses of the interest rate to
output shocks were not the same in all three policy regimes. In regime one the interest
rate increases initially then falls and returns to trend after a negative output shock,
while in regimes two and three the interest rate falls then rises to trend gradually after a
negative output shock. Therefore, in policy regime one, SURF and SORF estimates imply
that inflation would be dampened completely. In policy regime two, SURF estimates
imply that a negative output shock causes interest rate to decrease below trend for 20
quarters. Because regime one is the special Volcker disinflation regime, the primary goal
of the Federal Reserve was to decrease inflation. While regime three is a recessionary
regime, the Federal Reserve would like to maintain output growth hence the interest rate
responses are greater than those in regimes one and two.
A fourth difference is that, in regime one a positive inflation shock causes output to
increase then fall to or under trend gradually; in policy regimes two and three, a positive
inflation shock causes output to fall below trend for a substantial period of time.
Figure 2.11 compares the responses of output and inflation to an interest rate shock.
The policy rule equation residuals are correlated with the IS and Phillips curve equation
residuals in both policy regimes. On the maintained hypothesis that the monetary policy
reacts to economic conditions only with a lag, this correlation between must be due either
to responses of output and inflation to an interest rate surprise or to responses of output,
inflation, and interest rate to an un-modeled shock. Following Salemi (2006), to obtain
the model’s prediction of responses of output and inflation to a pure interest rate shock,
this study ignores the contemporaneous correlations when computing the IRF’s reported
in Figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11 shows that in all three regimes SURF and SORF estimates can account
for the “hump-shaped” response of output to an interest rate surprise. In policy regime
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one, SURF peak occurs about six quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak
occurs about eight quarters after the shock. In policy regime two, both SURF and
SORF peaks occur about 13 quarters after the interest rate shock. In policy regime
three, SURF peak occurs about 11 quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF
peak occurs about 18 quarters after the shock. Both SURF and SORF estimates show
that the inflation rate declines immediately after an interest rate shock and remains
below trend for many quarters. SORF estimates imply a much smaller inflation response
than do SURF estimates, especially in policy regime three. Because regime three is a
recessionary regime, the Federal Reserve would like to maintain output growth hence the
inflation responses are smaller than those in regimes one and two.
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Figure 2.1: Probabilistic Inference for the Two-Regime Unrestricted Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model
is estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The vertical shade
areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 2.2: Probabilistic Inference for the Two-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model is
estimated subjected to the restriction that the reaction function minimizes expected loss.
The vertical shade areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were
determined to begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime One
Output Gap Response to Output Gap Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Output Gap Response to Inflation Shock
 
 
0 10 20 30
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
SURF
SORF
Inflation Response to Output Gap Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
Inflation Response to Inflation Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Interest Rate Response to Output Gap Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Interest Rate Response to Inflation Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Two
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Interest Rate Shock
for the Model with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 2.6: Probabilistic Inference for the Three-Regime Unrestricted Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model
is estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The vertical shade
areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 2.7: Probabilistic Inference for the Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model is
estimated subjected to the restriction that the reaction function minimizes expected loss.
The vertical shade areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were
determined to begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime One
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Two
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 2.10: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Three
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 2.11: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Interest Rate Shock
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Table 2.1: Estimates of Model Parameters for the Model
with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
Estimation with Estimation with
Unrestricted Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SURF SORF
Model Significance Significance
Parameters Estimate (p-value) Estimate (p-value)
λ 0.282 0.769 0.184 0.571
a1 0.914 0.8944 1.091 0.1414
a2 -0.207 < 0.001 -0.298 < 0.001
b 0.022 0.090 0.025 < 0.001
α1 0.0003 1.000 0.5775 < 0.001
α2 0.534 < 0.001 0.4235 < 0.001
β 0.080 0.002 0.0002 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1513.114 1505.636
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model parameters that
are in the first two equations of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the reaction
function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction func-
tion minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values reported in this table are assumed to remain the
same for two policy regimes. The policy rule coefficients of the interest rate
equation (c1 − c4) are allowed to change across regimes. Estimates for param-
eters of the reaction function are reported in Table 2.2.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter
is 0.
4. The p-value reported in this case is for a test of the hypothesis that a1 = 1.
5. Estimation is conducted subject to the restriction α2 = 1− α1.
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Table 2.2: Policy Rule Coefficient Estimates for the Model
with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
Reaction Function SURF SORF
Coefficients Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Regime One c1 0.288 0.157 0.392 —
c2 0.102 0.459 0.312 —
c3 0.868 < 0.001 0.877 —
c4 -0.306 0.130 -0.407 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0020 0.693
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0032 < 0.001
Regime Two c1 0.217 0.001 0.301 —
c2 0.097 0.050 0.151 —
c3 0.918 < 0.001 0.934 —
c4 -0.185 0.008 -0.314 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0020 0.130
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0064 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1513.114 1505.636
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the policy rule coeffi-
cients that are in the third equation of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the re-
action function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the
reaction function minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve. The
values of the reaction function coefficients reported for SORF are those
derived jointly by the model parameters, the loss function weights, and
the requirement that the policy rule minimizes loss. The policy rule co-
efficients are allowed to change across regimes.
2. Loss function weights measure the relative importance to the Federal
Reserve of stabilizing output and the interest rate. Here, the weight on
stabilizing inflation is normalized to 1.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the
parameter is 0.
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Table 2.3: Transition Matrix Estimates for the Model
with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
Transition SURF SORF
Probabilities Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
p11 0.896 0.0014 0.877 0.0014
p21 0.056 < 0.001 0.043 < 0.001
p12 0.104 < 0.001 0.123 < 0.001
p22 0.944 0.0014 0.957 0.0114
Log Likelihood 1513.114 1505.636
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the
probability parameters of the following transition matrix
which the monetary policy follows.
P =
[
p11 p21
p12 p22
]
,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switch-
ing from regime j at time t to regime k at time t + 1,∑2
k=1 pjk = 1, and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, 2}. SURF es-
timation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the
reaction function. SORF estimation requires that the pa-
rameters of the reaction function minimize the loss function
of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values are assumed to remain the
same for two policy regimes, while the policy rule coeffi-
cients of the interest rate equation are allowed to change
across regimes.
3. Parameter-estimate significance for an off-diagonal proba-
bility of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis
that the true value of the parameter is 0.
4. Parameter-estimate significance for a diagonal probability
of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that
the true value of the parameter is 0.995.
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Table 2.4: Estimates of Model Parameters for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Estimation with Estimation with
Unrestricted Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SURF SORF
Model Significance Significance
Parameters Estimate (p-value) Estimate (p-value)
λ 0.270 1.000 0.278 0.036
a1 0.940 1.0004 0.963 0.2904
a2 -0.221 < 0.001 -0.254 < 0.001
b 0.022 0.137 0.010 < 0.001
α1 0.00005 0.986 0.5955 < 0.001
α2 0.544 < 0.001 0.4055 < 0.001
β 0.066 0.010 0.0004 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1528.084 1521.828
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model parameters that
are in the first two equations of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the reaction
function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction func-
tion minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values reported in this table are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes. The policy rule coefficients of the interest rate
equation (c1 − c4) are allowed to change across regimes. Estimates for param-
eters of the reaction function are reported in Table 2.5.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter
is 0.
4. The p-value reported in this case is for a test of the hypothesis that a1 = 1.
5. Estimation is conducted subject to the restriction α2 = 1− α1.
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Table 2.5: Policy Rule Coefficient Estimates for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Reaction Function SURF SORF
Coefficients Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Regime One c1 -0.388 0.160 -0.290 —
c2 1.088 < 0.001 0.760 —
c3 0.629 0.007 0.814 —
c4 0.250 0.008 0.347 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0010 0.199
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0017 < 0.001
Regime Two c1 0.220 1.000 0.237 —
c2 0.115 < 0.001 0.146 —
c3 0.927 < 0.001 0.931 —
c4 -0.197 1.000 -0.229 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0045 < 0.001
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0061 < 0.001
Regime Three c1 0.425 1.000 0.693 —
c2 -0.038 1.000 0.159 —
c3 0.934 < 0.001 0.930 —
c4 -0.414 < 0.001 -0.677 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0087 < 0.001
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0046 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1528.084 1521.828
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the policy rule coeffi-
cients that are in the third equation of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the re-
action function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the
reaction function minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve. The
values of the reaction function coefficients reported for SORF are those
derived jointly by the model parameters, the loss function weights, and
the requirement that the policy rule minimizes loss. The policy rule co-
efficients are allowed to change across regimes.
2. Loss function weights measure the relative importance to the Federal
Reserve of stabilizing output and the interest rate. Here, the weight on
stabilizing inflation is normalized to 1.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the
parameter is 0.
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Table 2.6: Transition Matrix Estimates for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Transition SURF SORF
Probabilities Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
p11 0.9414 < 0.0015 0.9414 < 0.0015
p21 0.010 < 0.001 0.010 < 0.001
p31 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
p12 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
p22 0.9564 1.0005 0.9654 0.0055
p32 0.059 1.000 0.059 < 0.001
p13 0.059 1.000 0.059 < 0.001
p23 0.034 0.024 0.025 0.012
p33 0.9414 < 0.0015 0.9414 < 0.0015
Log Likelihood 1528.084 1521.828
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the
probability parameters of the following transition matrix
which the monetary policy follows.
P =
 p11 p21 p31p12 p22 p32
p13 p23 p33
 ,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switch-
ing from regime j at time t to regime k at time t + 1,∑3
k=1 pjk = 1, and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. SURF
estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the
reaction function. SORF estimation requires that the pa-
rameters of the reaction function minimize the loss function
of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes, while the policy rule coeffi-
cients of the interest rate equation are allowed to change
across regimes.
3. Parameter-estimate significance for an off-diagonal proba-
bility of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis
that the true value of the parameter is 0.
4. To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are
highly persistence, in the estimation they were restricted to
be no less than 0.900.
5. Parameter-estimate significance for a diagonal probability
of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that
the true value of the parameter is 0.995.
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Chapter 3
Revealing U.S. Monetary Policy
Regimes Between 1965 and 2008
Using a Baseline Model
This chapter extends the previous chapter in a way which estimates the same model
as the previous chapter with updated data for the period 1965:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Now
there are seven more years of data which allow one to examine the Greenspan years more
thoroughly. The longer time period covers the latest recession date in 2008, which was
determined to begin by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
3.1 Data Description
This and the following sections describe what happens when this study takes the
model and policy hypothesis to U.S. quarterly data from 1965:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Since this
study applies a rational expectation Keynesian model for policy analysis starting 1965, in
line with Salemi (2006) the monetary policymakers in the Federal Reserve are assumed
to understand the forward-looking nature of private agents’ behavior two decades before
Lucas published his famous critique on policy analysis.
The raw data, except for population, come from FRED, the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis database. Quarterly population numbers are interpolations of annual values
found in the 2010 Economic Report of the President. Output measure is real GDP (in
1996 chained dollars) divided by civilian population. The long run growth path of per
capita output is estimated by fitting a constant-coefficient time trend to the natural
log of real GDP per capita, see Figure 3.1. Variable yt, the output gap, is the difference
between the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita and its trend. Such transformation
of the output variable is consistent with the assumption that the central bank aims to
keep output close to its long-run growth path.
The measure of target output in this study reflects the assumptions that there is a
normal average growth path for the economy and this linear trend tends to vary little
over time. The computation of target output is based on purely statistical measure de-
rived from historical data. One should notice that output gap can also be constructed
using more involved statistical and econometric methods suggested by modern theory.
Orphanides (2000), Orphanides and Williams (2002), and Ghysels, Swanson, and Callan
(2002) argue that monetary policy should be analyzed using potential output that is
estimated by central bank contemporaneously. They caution that if the Federal Reserve
stimulated the economy in response to slow output growth only to conclude later that
potential output growth had also slowed, one working with revised data would misun-
derstand Federal Reserve’s motives. Nonetheless, measuring target output with a trend
may avoid pitfalls that are associated with more complicated models of potential output.
This study assumes that the Federal Reserve perceives potential output as a constant-
coefficient time trend and it knows the true value of the trend coefficient. In reality,
monetary policymakers may use varied trend coefficient through time or more compli-
cated models to measure potential output, hence the estimate of yt here may differ from
that of the Federal Reserve.
The inflation rate is the annualized percentage change in the chained GDP deflator.
Figure 3.1 shows that the inflation rate rose from 1965 to 1980, dropped dramatically
between 1980 and 1985, and continued to trend gradually downward between 1986 and
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2008. The quarterly interest rate is the annualized secondary market yield of three-month
treasury bills. Figure 3.1 shows that the interest rate also followed a trend path that
is similar to that of inflation. Target values for the inflation rate and interest rate are
obtained by fitting continuous, piecewise-linear trends that allow for trend coefficient
changes in 1980:Q1 and 1986:Q1 but trend coefficients in the inflation rate and interest
rate piecewise regressions are constrained to be the same. The resulting target paths
are displayed in Figure 3.1. Variables pit and rt are the residuals from the two trend
regressions. These transformed series imply that the central bank tries to minimize the
variation of inflation and the interest rate around their target paths.
The target-path assumptions on the inflation rate and interest rate imply that the
Federal Reserve acclimated itself to rising inflation during the 1960’s and 1970’s, rapidly
decreased inflation target between 1980 and 198625, and then gradually lowered target
inflation through 2008. The paths imply a constant target value for the real rate of
interest. Alternatively one can hypothesize that the Federal Reserve set constant target
values for the inflation and interest rate over time, so target values for the inflation
rate and interest rate were constant and equal to sample average values. Salemi (2006)
cautions that this alternative hypothesis is unattractive because it implies that the actual
values of inflation rate and interest rate were below their targets after the fourth quarter
of 1991 and a superior policy thereafter would have raised the inflation rate. Hence, the
approach used in this study to estimate target values for output, inflation and the interest
rate is more reasonable. However, none of the previously-mentioned two hypotheses
are perfect. It would be ideal to estimate the target values along with other model
parameters, but it is beyond the scope of this study.
As equations (2.7) and (2.8) indicate, loss-minimizing values of the policy-rule co-
efficients depend on the covariance matrix of shocks Ω as well as on the reduced form
25Given the changes in the target paths that occurred in 1980 and 1986, it is possible that there is a
policy regime prevailing between 1980 and 1985.
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parameters G26. Therefore, it is important to ask whether the Federal Reserve faced
different distributions of shocks over time. One can see clearly from Figure 3.1 that
volatilities of variables were especially large in the middle of the sample from 1970’s to
1980’s, then they declined subsequently27. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the co-
variance matrix of shocks used to capture the volatilities should differ in different policy
regimes. Sims and Zha (2006) and Liu, Waggoner and Zha (2007) suggest that allow-
ing for heteroscedasticity in shock variances can improve the Markov-switching model
fit considerably. In this study the covariance matrix of shocks is assumed to switch
simultaneously with the monetary policy28.
This study also assumes that the coefficients of the yt and pit equations remain un-
changed in different monetary policy regimes. Because the model is forward-looking,
changes in the policy rule will cause across-regime changes in the parameters of the
reduced form equations. But this study maintains the assumption that there is not ev-
idence of large changes in structural equation parameters because many studies in the
literature, including Salemi (2006), use statistical tests to show no evidence of parameter
instability in U.S. economy during the post-war period.
In summary, this study will estimate and test the model by varying the number of
policy regime from two to three. The parameters of equations (2.1) – (2.2) will be held
26While certainty equivalence does not hold for the optimal simple rule, Svensson and Woodford
(2003) make clear that it does hold for the optimal time-consistent policy.
27The decline in the volatilities of real GDP and inflation in the last two decades in the U.S. has been
dubbed the Great Moderation, which may have been the most important macroeconomic event in the
last half century.
28The covariance matrix of shocks and monetary policy thus follow the same Markov-switching pro-
cess. Alternatively, one can follow Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) to assume that the covariance matrix
follows a Markov-switching process which is independent of the Markov-switching process for monetary
policy. Another less restrictive assumption would be that one or more shocks could be in one regime
while one or more others could be in another regime, and such a setup would require specifying a tran-
sition matrix for each structural shock. Both alternative assumptions would increase the number of free
parameters substantially and make estimation difficult. Thus, the assumption used in this study can
keep the number of parameters to be estimated tractable and avoid over-fitting the data.
75
constant across policy regimes but the monetary policy and covariance matrix of shocks
would be allowed to change.
3.2 Econometric Evaluation of U.S. Monetary Policy
with Two Policy Regimes
This section applies the estimation approach described in the previous chapter to
estimate the structural model parameters in equations (2.1) – (2.3) jointly with the policy
preference parameters in equation (2.6). In this section, monetary policy is assumed to
switch between two regimes during the sample period. Therefore, in the estimation
algorithm, the policy parameters and policymaker’s preference parameters are allowed to
change in each regime.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present the probability inferences in SURF and SORF estimates
for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t throughout the sample
period. Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 report SURF and SORF estimates of model parameters
along with the value of the log likelihood function. To make inferences about the signifi-
cance of estimated parameters, this study reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio test
statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter is zero.
3.2.1 Probability Inferences for Two Policy Regimes
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 plot the SURF and SORF estimated probability series of
being in the two regimes for the Markov process governing the monetary policy respec-
tively, together with the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research as shown in the vertical
grey areas. Although these business cycle dates were not used in any way to estimate
parameters or form inferences about the Markov transition process, the traditional busi-
ness cycle dates correspond fairly closely to the switches of monetary policy as described
by the SURF and SORF estimates in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
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The findings here are consistent with those in the previous chapter. Regardless of
whether the optimal-policy hypothesis is imposed, the estimates reveal that monetary
policy regime one prevailed roughly after the recession started, and policy regime two
prevailed during the expansionary periods. Both SURF and SORF continue to detect
the switches from the expansionary regime to the recessionary regime in U.S. monetary
policy, especially the switches that occurred in the recent recession dates of 2001 and 2008
during the newly included seven more years. Furthermore, policy regime two prevailed
in most of the additional seven years. Therefore after the recession dates in 1970, 1975,
1980, 1990, 2001, and 2008, U.S. monetary policy is estimated to be in regime one,
in which the Federal Reserve adjusted its policy instruments quickly to fight recession.
When the economy got out of recession, U.S. monetary policy switched to regime two,
in which the primary goal of the Federal Reserve is to maintain low inflation rate and
sustainable output growth. As a result, it can be seen that regime two was dominant for
most of the sample period including most of the late 1960’s, the latter half of the 1970’s,
and the entire period from the late 1980’s onward until the end of the sample period.
3.2.2 Estimates of Structural Parameters
Table 3.1 reports the structural parameters estimated with the extended dataset.
Both SURF and SORF estimates are very close to their Table 2.1 counterparts. Log
likelihood values are higher than those in the previous chapter but SURF log likelihood
remains significantly larger than SORF log likelihood.
When the assumption of policy optimality is relaxed, the current estimate of λ is 0.337,
which is a bit larger than its earlier estimate. While the estimate is sizable, the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test indicates that one can not reject the null hypothesis that the
true parameter value is zero. This is in line with the results in Table 2.1. Therefore, the
estimate of λ again implies that expected future output may not be an important factor
in affecting aggregate demand. The next two structural parameters are linked to the
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persistent effects on output. The parameters on lagged outputs a1 and a2 are currently
found to be 0.844 and −0.190, which are smaller in magnitude than their counterparts
in the previous chapter. The estimate of a1 is statistically indifferent from one and the
estimate of a2 is significantly different from zero at any conventional confidence level,
which are consistent with the earlier findings. The estimates here imply that shocks have
sustained effects on output. Third, the estimate of b is 0.009. In contrast to its earlier
estimate, the current estimate of b is not only quantitatively smaller, but it appears to
be insignificant at any level. Thus, the estimate implies that changes in the interest rate
may not cause changes in aggregate demand and the effect of interest rate on aggregate
demand is relatively insensitive. Fourth, turning to the parameters of the Phillips curve,
one can note that firms are substantially more backward-looking than forward-looking.
The estimate of the relative weight α1 is very small and is found to be highly insignificant,
and the estimate of α2 is 0.584 and is found to be significantly different from zero. The
current estimates of α1 and α2 are a little larger than their earlier estimates. The findings
here again result in a backward-looking Phillips curve and cast doubt on the sticky price
mechanism of Calvo. Lastly, the estimate of β is responsible for capturing the impact of
business cycle fluctuations on real price. The current estimate of β is 0.042 and is found
to be not significant, which implies that a positive output gap may not raise the inflation
rate. In contrast, the earlier estimate of β is larger and significantly different from zero
implying that a positive output gap does raise the inflation rate.
SORF produces almost identical estimates of the structural parameters to their Ta-
ble 2.1 counterparts. The current estimate of λ is 0.211, which is a little larger than
its earlier estimate. The estimate of λ is still insignificant. Thus, the estimate of λ
again implies that expected future output may not be an important factor in affecting
aggregate demand. The current estimates of a1 and a2 are very close to their earlier
counterparts. The estimate of a1 is statistically indifferent from one, and the estimate of
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a2 is significantly different from zero at any conventional confidence level. The estimates
again imply that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third, the current estimate
of b is close to its earlier estimate. Furthermore, the estimate of b is larger and more
precisely estimated than the estimate under SURF, which imply that a change in the
interest rate has a larger effect on aggregate demand. Fourth, estimates of both α1 and
α2 are positive and highly significant, which support for the forward-looking Phillips
curve implied by the sticky price-setting mechanism. In particular, the current estimate
of α1 is a bit larger than its earlier estimate, while α2 is smaller than the earlier estimate.
Again, one can not reject the hypothesis that α1 and α2 sum to one as in Fuhrer and
Moore (1995) and Salemi (2006), and SORF estimates were obtained with that restric-
tion imposed. One can note that the past and future prices’ overlap in the current price
is somewhat skewed toward the future price. This finding is in general accord with the
earlier finding. Finally, the current estimate of β is very close to its earlier estimate and
still highly significant at any conventional confidence level. In line with the finding in
the previous chapter, the SORF estimate of β is much smaller than its SURF estimate
implying that it is more difficult for the Federal Reserve to control inflation by changing
aggregate demand.
As the p-values reported in Table 3.1 indicate, some of the structural parameters, such
as α1 the parameter of the forward-looking term in the Phillips curve, are more precisely
estimated under SORF than under SURF, which is consistent with the conclusion in the
previous chapter. It is believed that a unified approach of joint estimation of structural
model parameters with the parameters of the policymaker’s objective function provides
additional across equation restrictions that result in a more precise estimation of the
model parameters. Hence the SORF estimates more strongly support a forward-looking
Phillips curve. Castelnuovo (2003) argues that hybrid formulation of the Phillips curve
is crucial for appropriate identification of policy preferences. Moreover, Salemi (2006)
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suggests that when the interest rate is highly persistent, the best way to reconcile a
persistent interest rate process and policy optimality is to hypothesize that both occurred
in an economy where private agents are forward looking. The finding of highly persistent
interest rate in both regimes will be shown below.
3.2.3 Estimates of Preference Parameters and Test of Policy
Optimality
Table 3.2 reports estimation results for the preference parameters of both two regimes
identified in U.S. monetary policy, and it also presents two sets of reaction function
coefficients for each policy regime: SURF estimates (obtained while treating coefficients
of the policy rule as free parameters), and SORF estimates (implied values of the policy
rule coefficients consistent with the policy optimality hypothesis). To interpret the results
on policy preference estimation, one should note that the relative weight on inflation
stabilization objective is normalized to one.
As Table 3.2 shows, both SURF and SORF produce similar estimates of the cen-
tral bank’s preference parameters and policy-rule coefficients to their earlier Table 2.2
counterparts. First, in both policy regimes SORF estimates of wy and wr are very small
implying that inflation stabilization was still the most important policy objective of the
Federal Reserve. The relative weights placed on output stabilization in two policy regimes
are both 0.0022. The weight wy in regime one is insignificant, while in regime two it is
marginally significantly different from zero at 10% level. The weight placed on interest
rate stabilization is small but significant in each regime, and the value of wr is slightly
larger in the second regime than that in the first regime. These findings are in accord
with those in the previous chapter. Given the normalization of the weights, the esti-
mates suggest that in conducting its monetary policy the Federal Reserve was far more
concerned with keeping the inflation close to its long run target path than it was with
trying to stabilize output and interest rate around their targets. Second, both SURF
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and SORF continue to show that the estimated policy-rule coefficient estimates in two
regimes differ significantly and substantially from each other. The SURF coefficients
on lagged inflation (c2) and lagged outputs (c1 and c4) are larger in magnitude in the
first policy regime but smaller in magnitude in the second regime. The SURF coefficient
on lagged interest rate (c3) is smaller in the first policy regime but larger in the second
regime. Third, all SORF estimates of the policy rule coefficients are greater in magnitude
than the SURF estimates in both regimes except c3 in regime two. This suggests that
the Federal Reserve responded consistently to inflation and output, which is in line with
the earlier conclusion.
Did the Federal Reserve set monetary policy in a way consistent with the definition
of optimal monetary policy used in this study? In light of Salemi (2006), a test of policy
optimality is a test of the hypothesis that SORF fits the data as well as SURF, that
is, the SORF and SURF policy rule coefficients are the same. The answer is no. In
each policy regime, there are four freely estimated parameters in the unrestricted policy
rule but only two freely estimated parameters, wy and wr, in the optimal policy rule, so
SORF implies four restrictions in total. As a result, the relevant likelihood ratio statistic
is 9.782 with a p-value 0.044. Thus the hypothesis that the policy rule coefficients that fit
the data best were those that minimized quadratic expected loss as defined in (2.6) can
be soundly rejected. This conclusion is consistent with the one in the previous chapter.
3.2.4 Interest Rate Smoothing
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the reaction-function coefficient for the lagged interest rate
is always large compared to the coefficients for inflation and output so that, according to
the definition provided by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), the Federal Reserve engages
in “interest rate smoothing”. This finding supports the widely held viewpoint that most
central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are very cautious when changing interest
rates. While the estimates in the reaction functions reported in Table 3.2 imply that the
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Federal Reserve smooths interest rates, SORF estimates suggest that the Federal Reserve
placed little attention on interest rate stability in both policy regimes. Thus, in line with
the previous chapter, the estimates here are consistent with Sack and Weiland (2000)’s
explanation for interest rate smoothing. The large coefficient on the lagged interest
rate can be explained by the finding that forward-looking expectations are empirically
important and the fact that optimal policies require persistent responses to shocks.
3.2.5 Estimated Transition Probabilities
Table 3.3 presents SURF and SORF estimates for the transition probabilities for
switching in two monetary policy regimes. Both SURF and SORF produce similar es-
timates of the transition matrices to the results in Table 2.3. The current estimates of
probabilities on the diagonal of the transition matrix are a bit larger than their earlier
estimates, and they are again close to unity implying that both policy regimes are highly
persistent. The SURF estimates indicate that, if the monetary policy is in regime one
this period, there is a 91.7 percent probability that it will be in regime one next period;
if the monetary policy is in regime two this period, there is a 95.6 percent probability
that it will be in regime two next period. Similarly, the SORF estimates indicate that,
if the monetary policy is in regime one this period, there is a 91.8 percent probability
that it will be in regime one next period; if the monetary policy is in regime two this
period, there is a 97.1 percent probability that it will be in regime two next period. These
suggest that changes in the monetary policy regime will occur infrequently.
Both SURF and SORF estimates show that these two policy regimes are not degen-
erate regimes, which is in line with the earlier findings. The p-values for p11 and p22 are
measured by the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the true value of the tran-
sition probability is 0.995, meaning that there is nearly no switch back into the regimes
prevailing at the beginning of the sample period. The test statistic for SURF estimate of
p11 is significant 1% level and the one for p22 is marginally significant at 10% level. By
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contrast, the earlier estimates show that SURF estimates of p11 and p22 are significant
at 1% level, and the test statistics for SORF estimates of p11 and p22 are both signif-
icant at 1% level. The test statistics reject the hypothesis thus the SURF and SORF
transition probabilities do not induce degenerate policy regimes. In sum, the important
findings associated with the two-regime monetary policy are robust to estimations using
the updated dataset with seven more years data.
3.2.6 Comparison of Impulse Response Function for Structural
Estimation
To check how much the model can explain the variation in the data, this section
compares the impulse response functions (IRF’s) implied by SURF and SORF. In line
with Salemi (2006), this study makes the hypothesis that monetary policy is conditioned
only on lagged values of output and inflation. In keeping with this hypothesis, this study
chooses y-pi-r as the within period causal ordering for the impulse response function.
The ordering implies that a shock to output affects only output contemporaneously, a
shock to inflation affects both inflation and output contemporaneously, and a shock to
the interest rate affects all variables contemporaneously. The ordering makes difference
because of the contemporaneous correlation between output and the interest rate in both
policy regimes. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present the IRF’s for regimes one and two. The shade
areas in the figures are 95% confidence intervals computed with parametric Bootstrap
method.
The figures show clearly that the SURF and SORF estimates share many features
of the impulse response functions. For instance, SURF and SORF estimates all imply
that a positive shock to output keeps output above its trend for more than 30 quarters.
Both imply that a positive shock to inflation produces moderate inflation persistence
with inflation returning to trend in about six quarters. SURF and SORF IRF’s all show
that the interest rate rises quickly after a positive output shock and remains above trend
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for at least ten quarters.
There are differences in the impulse response functions. In regime one, SURF and
SORF estimates imply that the interest rate increases quickly then falls gradually after a
positive inflation shock; in regime two, SURF and SORF estimates imply that the interest
rate rises slightly then falls to trend slowly after a positive inflation shock. Because regime
one is the recessionary regime, the primary goal of the Federal Reserve was to maintain
output growth and the interest rate responded more strongly to an inflation shock than
it did in regime two. A second difference is related to the first. SORF estimates imply
that the inflation response to a positive output shock is far smaller than implied by the
SURF estimates because the SORF interest rate response to a positive inflation shock is
larger than the SURF interest rate response.
Comparing the IRF’s suggest that actual and optimal responses of the interest rate
to output shocks were nearly the same in policy regime one but they were quite different
in regime two. Therefore, in policy regime one, SURF and SORF estimates imply that
inflation resulting from positive output shocks would be dampened completely. In policy
regime two, SURF estimates imply that a positive output shock causes interest rate to
rise above trend for a very long time, and SORF estimates imply that a positive output
shock first cause interest rate to rise quickly then fall below trend after about ten quarters.
In regime two, SORF estimates imply that inflation caused by positive output shocks
would be dampened completely.
The fourth difference is, both SURF and SORF estimates imply that in regime one a
positive inflation shock causes output to increase slightly then fall under trend gradually;
in policy regime two, a positive inflation shock causes output to fall below trend for a
substantial period of time. The comparison also implies that actual interest rate responses
to inflation shocks were not optimal. A loss-minimizing policy would have raised interest
rate more after inflation shocks in both regimes one and two.
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Figure 3.6 compares the responses of output and inflation to an interest rate shock.
The policy rule equation residuals are positively correlated with the IS and Phillips
curve equation residuals in both policy regimes. On the maintained hypothesis that the
monetary policy reacts to economic conditions only with a lag, this correlation between
must be due either to responses of output and inflation to an interest rate surprise or
to responses of output, inflation, and interest rate to an un-modeled shock. Following
Salemi (2006), to obtain the model’s prediction of responses of output and inflation to
a pure interest rate shock, this study ignores the contemporaneous correlations when
computing the IRF’s reported in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6 shows that in both regimes SURF and SORF estimates can account for
the “hump-shaped” response of output to an interest rate surprise29. In policy regime
one, SURF peak occurs about ten quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak
occurs about seven quarters after the shock. In policy regime two, both SURF and
SORF peaks occur about ten quarters after the interest rate shock. Both SURF and
SORF estimates show that the inflation rate declines immediately after an interest rate
shock and remains below trend for many quarters. SORF estimates imply a more smaller
inflation response than do SURF estimates, especially in policy regime one.
29As Table 3.1 shows, the estimates of the coefficients for the interest rate in the IS schedule and the
output gap in the Phillips curve are very small, which makes one believe that monetary policy is not
possible. Thus, this study also analyzes the effects of monetary policy rule if it would have not responded
to lagged terms of output and inflation. In the reaction function, this study sets ci = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, 4}
and keeps c3 at its estimated value. With the new parameterizations, both SURF and SORF estimates
show that the impulse responses to an interest rate shock are very close to those obtained with the
original monetary policy rule. The results suggest that output and inflation are still very responsive to a
shock in the interest rate, and the small values of the coefficients on the interest rate in the IS schedule
and on the output gap in the Phillips curve still play an important role in accounting for the responses.
Therefore, it is possible for the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy effectively during the sample
period.
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3.3 Econometric Evaluation of U.S. Monetary Policy
with Three Policy Regimes
This section applies the estimation approach described in the previous chapter to
estimate the structural model parameters in equations (2.1) – (2.3) jointly with the policy
preference parameters in equation (2.6). In this section, monetary policy is assumed to
switch between three regimes during the sample period. Therefore, in the estimation
algorithm, the policy parameters and policymaker’s preference parameters are allowed
to change in each policy regime. In addition, comparing results in this section and the
previous section allows a test for the existence of a third policy regime.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 present the probability inferences in SURF and SORF estimates
for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t throughout the sample
period. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.8 report SURF and SORF estimates of model parameters
along with the value of the log likelihood function. To make inferences about the signifi-
cance of estimated parameters, this study reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio test
statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter is zero.
3.3.1 Probability Inferences for Three Policy Regimes
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 plot the SURF and SORF estimated probability series of
being in the three regimes for the Markov process governing the monetary policy respec-
tively, together with the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research as shown in the vertical
grey areas. Although these business cycle dates were not used in any way to estimate
parameters or form inferences about the Markov transition process, the traditional busi-
ness cycle dates are fairly related to the switches of monetary policy between the three
regimes as described by the SURF and SORF estimates in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8.
The findings here are consistent with those in the previous chapter. Both SURF and
SORF estimates show that policy regime one is still a special regime that only prevailed
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between 1979 and 1984. During this period, the Federal Reserve successfully reduced
high inflationary pressure in the U.S., and this period of time is commonly known as the
Volcker disinflation period. Both Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show that the special regime
one prevailed only during the disinflation period and nowhere else30. Regime two is a
regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into during the expansion-
ary periods, and regime three is a regime which the monetary policy switched into after
the recession happened. Both SURF and SORF continue to detect the switches from the
expansionary regime to the recessionary regime in U.S. monetary policy, especially the
switches that occurred in the recent recession dates of 2001 and 2008 during the newly
included seven more years. Furthermore, policy regime two prevailed in most of the
additional seven years. When the economy came out of recession, U.S. monetary policy
switched to regime two, in which the primary goal of the Federal Reserve was to maintain
low inflation rate and sustainable output growth. As a result, it can be seen that regime
two was dominant for most of the sample period including most of the late 1960’s, the
latter half of the 1970’s, and the entire period from the late 1980’s onward until the end
of the sample period. During the recession periods in 1970, 1975, 1982, 1990, 2001, and
2008, monetary policy in the U.S. is estimated to switch into regime three, in which the
Federal Reserve adjusted its policy instruments quickly to fight recession.
3.3.2 Estimates of Structural Parameters
Table 3.4 reports the structural parameters estimated with the extended dataset.
Both SURF and SORF estimates are close to their Table 2.4 counterparts. Log likelihood
values are higher than those in the previous chapter, and SURF log likelihood remains
larger than SORF log likelihood.
When the assumption of policy optimality is relaxed, the current estimate of λ is
30Although regime one only prevailed during 1979 − 1984, estimates of the three-regime transition
matrix in Table 3.8 do not suggest that regime one is a degenerate regime.
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0.379, which is larger than its earlier estimate. While the estimate is sizable, the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test indicates that one can not reject the null hypothesis that the
true parameter value is zero. This is in line with the results in Table 2.4. Therefore, the
estimate of λ in SURF estimates again implies that expected future output may not be
an important factor in affecting aggregate demand. The next two structural parameters
are linked to the persistent effects on output. The parameters on lagged outputs a1 and
a2 are currently found to be sizable: 0.789 and −0.173 respectively, which are smaller
in magnitude than their counterparts in the previous chapter. The estimate of a1 is
statistically indifferent from one and estimate of a2 is significantly different from zero at
any conventional confidence level, which are consistent with the earlier findings. Hence
these estimates imply that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third, the estimate
of b is 0.005 without imposing the constraint of optimal reaction function. The estimate
of b is smaller than its earlier estimate. Despite the fact that b is estimated to be
quantitatively small, the estimate appears to be significant at marginal 5% level. The
current estimate implies that changes in the interest rate do cause changes in aggregate
demand although the effect of interest rate on aggregate demand is relatively insensitive.
Fourth, turning to the parameters of the Phillips curve, one can note that firms are
substantially more backward-looking than forward-looking. The estimate of the relative
weight α1 is small and is found to be insignificant, and the estimate of α2 is 0.581 and
is found to be insignificantly different from zero. The current estimates of α1 and α2
are larger than their earlier estimates. The findings here again result in a backward-
looking Phillips curve. Lastly, the estimate of β is responsible for capturing the impact
of business cycle fluctuations on real price. The estimate of β is 0.026, which is smaller
than the earlier estimate. The estimate of β is found to be significant at any conventional
confidence level which implies that a positive output gap raises the inflation rate. This
finding is in line with the results in Table 2.4.
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SORF also produces close estimates of the structural parameters to their Table 2.4
counterparts. The current estimate of λ is 0.362. In contrast to its earlier estimate, the
current estimate of λ is not only quantitatively larger, but it appears to be significantly
different from zero at any conventional level. Furthermore, the SORF estimate of λ
is nearly the same as its SURF estimate. Thus the current estimate of λ implies that
expected future output is an important factor in determining aggregate demand. Second,
the current estimates of a1 and a2 are smaller in magnitude than their earlier counterparts.
The estimate of a1 is now statistically different from one, and the estimate of a2 is
significantly different from zero at any conventional confidence level. The estimates
again imply that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third, the current estimate of
b is a little smaller than its earlier estimate. Furthermore, the estimate of b is a bit larger
and more precisely estimated than the estimate under SURF, which imply that a change
in the interest rate has a larger effect on aggregate demand. Fourth, SORF estimates of
both α1 and α2 are positive and highly significant, which support for the forward-looking
Phillips curve implied by the sticky price-setting mechanism. In particular, the current
estimates of α1 and α2 are very close to their earlier estimates. α1 is a bit larger than its
earlier estimate, while α2 is smaller than the earlier estimate. Again, one can not reject
the hypothesis that α1 and α2 sum to one as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Salemi
(2006), and SORF estimates were obtained with that restriction imposed. One can note
that the past and future prices’ overlap in the current price is somewhat skewed toward
the future price. This finding is in general accord with the earlier finding. Finally, the
current estimate of β is the same as its earlier estimate and still highly significant at any
conventional confidence level. In line with the finding in the previous chapter, the SORF
estimate of β is much smaller than its SURF estimate implying that it is more difficult
for the Federal Reserve to control inflation by changing aggregate demand.
As the p-values reported in Table 3.4 indicate, some of the structural parameters,
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such as λ and α1 the parameters of the forward-looking terms in the IS schedule and
Phillips curve, are more precisely estimated under SORF than under SURF, which is
consistent with the conclusion in the previous chapter. It is believed that a unified ap-
proach of joint estimation of structural model parameters with the parameters of the
policymaker’s objective function provides additional across equation restrictions that re-
sult in a more precise estimation of the model parameters. Hence the SORF estimates
more strongly support the assumption that private agents are forward looking. Casteln-
uovo (2003) argues that hybrid formulation of the Phillips curve is crucial for appropriate
identification of policy preferences. Moreover, Salemi (2006) suggests that when the in-
terest rate is highly persistent, the best way to reconcile a persistent interest rate process
that is resulted from an optimal monetary policy is that both occurred in an economy
where private agents are forward looking. The finding of highly persistent interest rate
in all regimes will be shown below.
3.3.3 Estimates of Preference Parameters and Test of Policy
Optimality
Table 3.5 reports estimation results for the preference parameters of three policy
regimes identified in U.S. monetary policy, and it also presents two sets of reaction
function coefficients for each policy regime: SURF estimates (obtained while treating
coefficients of the policy rule as free parameters), and SORF estimates (implied values of
the policy rule coefficients consistent with the policy optimality hypothesis). To interpret
the results on policy preference estimation, one should note that the relative weight on
inflation stabilization objective is normalized to one.
As Table 3.5 shows, both SURF and SORF produce similar estimates of the central
bank’s preference parameters and policy-rule coefficients to their earlier Table 2.5 coun-
terparts. In all three policy regimes under SORF, the estimated values of wy and wr are
very small implying that inflation stabilization was always the dominant objective of the
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Federal Reserve. Policy regime one is a special regime that only prevailed during the
Volcker disinflation period, covering the period of 1979-1984. Looking at the estimates
describing the Federal Reserve’s preferences in policy regime one, the estimate of wy is
0.00003 and the likelihood ratio test can not reject the null hypothesis that the true
weight is zero. The weight placed on interest rate stabilization is 0.0014 and significantly
different from zero. The value of wr in the first regime is the smallest among three policy
regimes. These findings are in accord with those in the previous chapter. Given the nor-
malization of the weights, this finding suggests that in conducting its monetary policy
the Federal Reserve was far more concerned with keeping the inflation close to its long
run target path than it was with trying to stabilize output and interest rate around their
targets. Indeed, in policy regime one, both SURF and SORF estimates show that the
policy rule coefficient on lagged inflation c3 is very sizable, and the SURF estimate of c3
is significantly different from zero. While being significant, the interest rate stabilization
objective appears to be of secondary importance to the Federal Reserve in policy regime
one. The estimates of preferences in policy regime one are consistent with the historical
evidence. As described earlier, in this special regime the Federal Reserve faced high level
of inflation, and its sole objective was to reduce inflation substantially.
In policy regime two, inflation stabilization was still the dominant objective. The
estimates of the policy preferences in this policy regime suggest that the Federal Reserve
Bank had been conducting its policy in the manner consistent with the policy used during
economic expansionary periods. A large weight was assigned to inflation stabilization,
and very small weights were placed on both output and interest rate stabilizations. In-
deed, the estimate of wy is 0.0025 which is statistically significant at any conventional
confidence level. The estimated policy weight placed on the interest rate stabilization ob-
jective wr is 0.0046 and is significantly different from zero. These findings are consistent
with those in the previous chapter. Interest rate smoothing became a more important
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objective in policy regime two than in policy regime one. As pointed out previously,
in this expansionary regime the Federal Reserve would put more concerns on potential
exacerbate inflation situation and use instrumental interest rates wisely. Switching into
policy regime two would result in a low level of inflation.
In policy regime three, the normalization of the weights suggests that keeping the
inflation close to its long run target path was far more important for the Federal Reserve
than stabilizing output and the interest rate. The estimate of wy in this regime is
0.0079 and is the largest among three policy regimes. The likelihood ratio test for wy
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the true weight is zero. In addition, in policy
regime three, both SURF and SORF estimates show that the policy rule coefficient on
lagged output c1 is sizable. The estimate of wr in this regime is 0.0042 and is highly
significant. These findings are in accord with those in the previous chapter. The interest
rate stabilization objective was not as important as the output stabilization objective for
the Federal Reserve in policy regime three.
There is clear evidence that the estimated and implied policy-rule coefficient esti-
mates in three regimes differ significantly and substantially from each other. First, the
coefficient on lagged output (c1) is negative in policy regime one but sizable and positive
in regimes two and three. The coefficient on lagged inflation (c2) is large and positive
in regime one but small in regimes two and three. The coefficient on lagged two output
(c4) is sizable and positive in regime one but negative in policy regimes two and three.
Second, SORF estimate of the policy rule coefficient on lagged inflation is positive in
all regimes and larger than the SURF estimate in regime three. This suggests that the
Federal Reserve should have responded more strongly to inflation than it did in regimes
one and two, which is in line with the earlier conclusion.
One potential cause of changing policy-rule coefficient estimates is that monetary
policymakers would face different variabilities of inflation and other economic variables
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in different policy regimes. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report SURF and SORF estimates of
variance-covariance matrices of disturbances in three policy regimes respectively. One can
see that structural shocks changed jointly across policy regimes. Both SURF and SORF
estimates show that in the special Volcker disinflation regime, the variances of output
and the policy shocks are the largest. This finding is consistent with the conclusion
in Sims and Zha (2006). In the second regime during the expansionary periods, the
shock variances of output, inflation, and the interest rate are the smallest among all
policy regimes. In policy regime three, shock variance of inflation turns out the be the
largest reflecting several economic disruptions, e.g. large oil shocks, happened during
the beginning of the recessionary periods. By comparing the covariances of shocks, both
SURF and SORF estimates show that the correlation between output and inflation was
positive in policy regime one, but became negative in policy regimes two and three.
SURF estimates show that inflation and the interest rate were negatively correlated in
policy regime one, while they were positively correlated under SORF estimates. The
comparison implies that the actual monetary policy used in policy regime one was not
optimal.
Did the Federal Reserve set monetary policy optimally with three policy regimes? In
light of Salemi (2006), a test of policy optimality is a test of the hypothesis that SORF
fits the data as well as SURF, that is, the SORF and SURF policy rule coefficients
are the same. In each policy regime, there are four freely estimated parameters in the
unrestricted policy rule but only two freely estimated parameters, wy and wr, in the
optimal policy rule, so SORF implies six restrictions. As a result, the relevant likelihood
ratio statistic is 2.488 with a p-value 0.870. In contrast to the conclusion in the previous
chapter, the hypothesis that the policy rule coefficients that fit the data best were those
that minimized quadratic expected loss as defined in (2.6) can not be rejected. Hence, the
estimations using the updated dataset show that the Federal Reserve did set monetary
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policy optimally with three policy regimes.
3.3.4 Interest Rate Smoothing
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the reaction-function coefficient for the lagged interest
rate is always large compared to the coefficients for inflation and output so that, accord-
ing to the definition provided by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), the Federal Reserve
engages in “interest rate smoothing”. This finding supports the widely held viewpoint
that most central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are very cautious when chang-
ing interest rates. While the estimates in the reaction functions reported in Table 3.5
imply that the Federal Reserve smooths interest rates, SORF estimates suggest that the
Federal Reserve placed small weight on interest rate stability in all three policy regimes.
Thus, in line with the previous chapter, the estimates here are consistent with Sack and
Weiland’s explanation for smoothing. The large coefficient on the lagged interest rate can
be explained by the finding that forward-looking expectations are empirically important
and the fact that optimal policies require persistent responses to shocks.
3.3.5 Estimated Transition Probabilities
Table 3.8 presents SURF and SORF estimates for the transition probabilities for
switching in three monetary policy regimes. Both SURF and SORF produce similar
estimates of the transition matrices to the results in Table 2.6. As the p-values indicate,
all transition probabilities are precisely estimated. The probabilities on the diagonal of
the transition matrix are close to unity, which means that all policy regimes show high
persistence31. The SURF estimates indicate that, if the monetary policy is in regime one
this period, there is a 93.4 percent probability that it will be in regime one next period;
if the monetary policy is in regime three this period, there is a 93.5 percent probability
31To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are highly persistent, in the estimation they
were restricted to be no less than 0.900.
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that it will be in regime three next period. Similarly, the SORF estimates indicate that,
if the monetary policy is in regime one this period, there is a 94.1 percent probability
that it will be in regime one next period; if the monetary policy is in regime three this
period, there is a 92.3 percent probability that it will be in regime three next period.
These suggest that changes in the monetary policy regime will occur infrequently.
Both SURF and SORF estimates show that all policy regimes except one are not
degenerate regimes, which is in line with the earlier findings. The p-values for SURF and
SORF diagonal probabilities p11, p22, and p33 are measured by the likelihood ratio test
for the hypothesis that the true value of the transition probability is 0.995, meaning that
there is nearly no switch back into the regimes prevailing at the beginning of the sample
period. The test statistic for SURF estimate of p22 can not reject the hypothesis thus
the policy regime two in SURF estimates is a degenerate regime. In sum, the important
findings associated with the three-regime monetary policy are robust to estimations using
the updated dataset with seven more years data.
3.3.6 Test of a Third Regime in U.S. Monetary Policy
Was there a third regime in U.S. monetary policy? A comparison between models
with two-regime and three-regime monetary policy is helpful in answering the question.
This study uses likelihood ratio test statistic to test the hypothesis that the two-regime
models fit the data as well as the three-regime models. Therefore, one likelihood ratio
statistic tests the two-regime SURF model against the three-regime SURF model, and
the other likelihood ratio test statistic is a test of the two-regime SORF model against
the three-regime SORF model.
There are eight more freely estimated parameters in the model with three-regime
unrestricted policy rule than those in the two-regime SURF model. Thus the two-regime
SURF implies eight restrictions. The test statistic for a likelihood ratio test of the three-
regime SURF against the two-regime SURF would lie in 30.654, which implies a p-value
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that is less than 0.001. For the test of the three-regime SORF model versus the two-
regime SORF model, the two-regime SORF implies six restrictions, and the likelihood
ratio test statistic is 33.868 implying a p-value that is less than 0.001. The tests thus
support the three-regime models over the two-regime models. The hypothesis that the
models that fit the data best were those in which the monetary policy follows a two-regime
Markov-switching process can be soundly rejected.
3.3.7 Comparison of Impulse Response Function for Structural
Estimation
To check how much the model can explain the variation in the data, this section
compares the impulse response functions (IRF’s) implied by SURF and SORF. In line
with Salemi (2006), this study makes the hypothesis that monetary policy is conditioned
only on lagged values of output and inflation. In keeping with this hypothesis, this study
chooses y-pi-r as the within period causal ordering for the impulse response function. The
ordering implies that a shock to output affects only output contemporaneously, a shock to
inflation affects both inflation and output contemporaneously, and a shock to the interest
rate affects all variables contemporaneously. The ordering makes difference because of the
contemporaneous correlation between output and the interest rate in all policy regimes.
Figures 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 present the IRF’s for all three regimes. The shade areas in
the figures are 95% confidence intervals computed with parametric Bootstrap method.
The figures show clearly that the SURF and SORF estimates share many features
of the impulse response functions. For instance, SURF and SORF estimates all imply
that a positive shock to output keeps output above its trend for more than 30 quarters.
Both SURF and SORF IRF’s show that a positive shock to inflation produces moderate
inflation persistence with inflation returning to trend in about six quarters.
There are significant differences in the impulse response functions across three policy
regimes. In regimes one and two, both SURF and SORF estimates imply that the interest
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rate increases then falls gradually to trend after a positive inflation shock; in policy regime
three, SURF estimates show that the interest rate falls then increases gradually to trend
after a positive inflation shock, and SORF estimates show that interest rate increases
slightly above trend then decreases gradually to trend after 20 quarters. Since policy
regime one is the Volcker disinflation regime, the interest rate responds positively to a
positive inflation shock, and the responses are much larger than those in regimes two and
three. The comparisons also imply that the actual interest rate response to inflation was
not optimal in regimes one and three but it was very close to optimal in regime two. A
loss-minimizing policy would have raised the interest rate more in policy regimes one and
three. A second difference is somewhat related to the first. In all three regimes SORF
estimates imply that the inflation response to a positive output shock is smaller than
implied by the SURF estimates.
Comparing the IRF’s suggest that actual and optimal responses of the interest rate to
output shocks were not the same in all three policy regimes. In regime one the interest
rate increases initially then falls and returns to trend after a negative output shock,
while in regimes two and three the interest rate falls then rises to trend gradually after
a negative output shock. Therefore, in policy regime one, SURF and SORF estimates
imply that inflation would be dampened completely. In policy regimes two and three,
both SURF and SORF estimates imply that a negative output shock causes interest
rate to decrease below trend for 20 quarters. Because regime one is the special Volcker
disinflation regime, the primary goal of the Federal Reserve was to decrease inflation.
While regime three is a recessionary regime, the Federal Reserve would like to maintain
output growth hence the interest rate responses are greater than those in regimes one
and two.
A fourth difference is that, in regime one a positive inflation shock causes output to
increase then fall to or under trend gradually; in policy regimes two and three, a positive
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inflation shock causes output to fall below trend for a substantial period of time.
Figure 3.12 compares the responses of output and inflation to an interest rate shock.
The policy rule equation residuals are correlated with the IS and Phillips curve equation
residuals in both policy regimes. On the maintained hypothesis that the monetary policy
reacts to economic conditions only with a lag, this correlation between must be due either
to responses of output and inflation to an interest rate surprise or to responses of output,
inflation, and interest rate to an un-modeled shock. Following Salemi (2006), to obtain
the model’s prediction of responses of output and inflation to a pure interest rate shock,
this study ignores the contemporaneous correlations when computing the IRF’s reported
in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12 shows that in all three regimes SURF and SORF estimates can account
for the “hump-shaped” response of output to an interest rate surprise32. In policy regime
one, SURF peak occurs about five quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak
occurs about ten quarters after the shock. In policy regime two, both SURF and SORF
peaks occur about 13 quarters after the interest rate shock. In policy regime three, SURF
peak occurs about 11 quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak occurs about
ten quarters after the shock. Both SURF and SORF estimates show that the inflation
rate declines immediately after an interest rate shock and remains below trend for many
quarters. SORF estimates imply a larger inflation response than do SURF estimates
in policy regime one. Because regime one is a special disinflation regime, the Federal
32As Table 3.4 shows, the estimates of the coefficients for the interest rate in the IS schedule and the
output gap in the Phillips curve are very small, which makes one believe that monetary policy is not
possible. Thus this study also analyzes the effects of monetary policy rule if it would have not responded
to lagged terms of output and inflation. In the reaction function, this study sets ci = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2, 4}
and keeps c3 at its estimated value. With the new parameterizations, both SURF and SORF estimates
show that the impulse responses to an interest rate shock are very close to those obtained with the
original monetary policy rule. The results suggest that output and inflation are still very responsive to a
shock in the interest rate, and the small values of the coefficients on the interest rate in the IS schedule
and on the output gap in the Phillips curve still play an important role in accounting for the responses.
Therefore, it is possible for the Federal Reserve to conduct monetary policy effectively during the sample
period.
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Reserve would like to decrease inflation hence the SORF inflation responses are larger
than those implied by SURF estimate.
3.3.8 A Counterfactual Analysis
This section considers the possibility that the Federal Reserve does not put any em-
phasis on output stability. To check this alternative specification, this study first restricts
the value of weight on output stabilization to zero in all three policy regimes33. This study
then estimates the counterfactual model under the assumption that monetary policy is
loss-minimizing. Figure 3.13 presents the probability inferences in SORF estimates for
the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t throughout the sample pe-
riod. Tables 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 report SORF estimates of model parameters along with
the value of the log likelihood function. For convenience of comparison with estimates,
the tables also show SORF estimates for the original three-regime model.
Figure 3.13 plots the SORF estimated probability series of being in the three regimes
for the Markov process governing the monetary policy respectively, together with the
dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin and end according to the
National Bureau of Economic Research as shown in the vertical grey areas. The SORF
estimated probability series for the counterfactual model are consistent with those ob-
tained in the original model. SORF estimates show that policy regime one is still a special
regime that only prevailed during the Volcker disinflation period between 1979 and 1984,
and nowhere else. Regime two is a regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy
switched into during the expansionary periods, and regime three is a regime which the
monetary policy switched into during the recessionary periods. SORF estimates for the
counterfactual model continue to detect the switches from the expansionary regime to
the recessionary regime in U.S. monetary policy.
33This study continues to impose wpi = 1 as a normalization. Thus there is only one free element in
the symmetric weight matrix of the central bank.
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Table 3.9 reports the structural parameters for the counterfactual model. One can
notice that log likelihood value is significantly lower than that in the original model.
The SORF estimates differ from their counterparts in the original model in several im-
portant ways. The current estimate of λ is 0.197, which is quantitatively smaller than
its counterpart in the original model. The next two structural parameters are linked to
the persistent effects on output. The parameters on lagged outputs a1 and a2 are cur-
rently found to be sizable: 1.099 and −0.300 respectively, which are larger in magnitude
than their counterparts in the original model. Third, the estimate of b is 0.001, which is
smaller than its counterpart. Fourth, the estimate of β is responsible for capturing the
impact of business cycle fluctuations on real price. The estimate of β is 0.0006, which
is a bit larger than its counterpart. SORF estimates of both α1 and α2 are positive,
which support for the forward-looking Phillips curve implied by the sticky price-setting
mechanism. In particular, the current estimates of α1 and α2 are close to their coun-
terparts. The estimate of α1 is a little larger, while the estimate of α2 is a bit smaller.
Again, SORF estimates were obtained with the restriction that α1 and α2 sum to one as
in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Salemi (2006). One can note that the past and future
prices’ overlap in the current price is somewhat skewed toward the future price. This
finding is in general accord with the earlier finding.
Table 3.10 reports estimation results for the preference parameters of three policy
regimes identified in U.S. monetary policy, and it also presents implied values of the policy
rule coefficients consistent with the policy optimality hypothesis. To interpret the results
on policy preference estimation, one should note that in this counterfactual analysis the
relative weight on output stabilization is restricted to zero and the weight on inflation
stabilization objective is normalized to one. As Table 3.10 shows, in all three policy
regimes, estimate of the weight placed by the Federal Reserve on interest rate stabilization
is smaller than its counterpart in the original model and the estimated values of wr is
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very small, which imply that inflation stabilization was always the dominant objective of
the Federal Reserve. Looking at the Federal Reserve’s preferences in policy regime one,
the weight placed on interest rate stabilization is 0.0009, which is the smallest among
three policy regimes. This finding is in accord with that in the original model. The
estimate of preference in policy regime one is consistent with the historical evidence. As
described earlier, in this special regime the Federal Reserve faced high level of inflation,
and its sole objective was to reduce inflation substantially. In policy regime two, the
policy preferences suggest that the Federal Reserve Bank had been conducting its policy
in the manner consistent with the policy used during economic expansionary periods. A
large weight was assigned to inflation stabilization, and a very small weight was placed
on interest rate stabilization. The estimated policy weight placed on the interest rate
stabilization objective wr is 0.0015. This finding echoes the result in previous section.
Interest rate smoothing became a more important objective in policy regime two than
in policy regime one. As pointed out previously, in this expansionary regime the Federal
Reserve would put more concerns on potential exacerbate inflation situation and use
instrumental interest rates wisely. In policy regime three, the normalization of the weights
suggests that keeping the inflation close to its long run target path was far more important
for the Federal Reserve than stabilizing the interest rate. The estimate of wr in this regime
is 0.0009 and is the same as that in regime one.
There is clear evidence that the implied policy-rule coefficient estimates in all regimes
differ substantially from their counterparts in the original model. First, in all three
policy regimes, the policy rule coefficients on lagged output c1 and c4 become smaller
in magnitude. This suggests that the Federal Reserve responded less strongly to output
than it did in the original model, which is in line with the restriction imposed by the
counterfactual analysis. Second, in all three policy regimes, the policy rule coefficient on
the lagged interest rate c3 becomes very sizable and is larger than its counterpart. In
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addition, the values of c3 are nearly the same across policy regimes in the counterfactual
model. This finding is consistent with the previous result that the estimated policy
weight placed on the interest rate stabilization objective is reasonably close to each other
in three regimes. Third, the coefficient on lagged inflation (c2) is smaller in all three
policy regimes.
Did the Federal Reserve stabilize output when conducting it optimal policy actions?
A formal likelihood ratio test between the counterfactual and original models with three-
regime monetary policy is helpful in answering the question. This study tests the hypoth-
esis that the counterfactual model fits the data as well as the original model. There are
three more freely estimated parameters in the original model with three-regime optimal
policy rule than the counterfactual SORF model. Thus the counterfactual model places
three restrictions. The test statistic for a likelihood ratio test of the original three-regime
SORF against the counterfactual three-regime SORF would lie in 16.537, which implies
a p-value that is 0.001. The test thus supports the original model over the counterfactual
model. The hypothesis that the model that fits the data best was that in which the
policymakers in the central bank do not wish to stabilize output can be soundly rejected.
Table 3.11 presents SORF estimates for the transition probabilities of the counter-
factual model in three monetary policy regimes. SORF produces very similar estimates
of the transition matrix to the results in the original model. The probabilities on the
diagonal of the transition matrix are close to unity, which means that all policy regimes
show high persistence34. The SORF estimates for the counterfactual model indicate that,
if the monetary policy is in regime one this period, there is a 93.9 percent probability
that it will be in regime one next period; if the monetary policy is in regime three this
period, there is a 92.4 percent probability that it will be in regime three next period. In
sum, these findings are consistent with those in the original model.
34To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are highly persistent, in the estimation they
were restricted to be no less than 0.900.
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This exercise also compares the impulse response functions (IRF’s) implied by SORF
estimations of the counterfactual and original models. Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 present
the IRF’s of output and inflation for all three regimes. The figures show clearly SORF
estimates for the counterfactual model imply that in response to a positive output shock,
output, inflation, and the interest rate react more strongly and persistently than their
counterparts implied by the original model in all three policy regimes. Second, IRF’s of
the counterfactual model show that a positive shock to inflation produces almost identical
inflation persistence as implied by the original model. Response of inflation to its own
shock returns to trend in about six quarters.
There are significant differences in the impulse response functions across three policy
regimes. In regime one, counterfactual SORF estimates imply that output responds more
strongly and persistently to a positive inflation shock than implied by the original model.
In the counterfactual model, output increases then remains above trend for a very long
time after a positive inflation shock; while in the original model, output increases then
falls below trend after about eight quarters. In policy regime two, both counterfactual and
original SORF estimates imply that output falls immediately and remains below trend
after a positive inflation shock, but the response of output in the counterfactual model is a
bit larger and more persistent than in the original model. In regime three, counterfactual
SORF estimates imply that output falls below trend after a positive inflation shock, and
the response of output is almost identical to that implied by the original model. A second
difference is related to response of the interest rate to a positive inflation shock. In regime
one, counterfactual SORF estimates imply that response of the interest rate to a positive
inflation shock is smaller than implied by the original model, but the interest rate remains
above trend for a substantial period of time. In policy regime two, counterfactual SORF
estimates imply that the interest rate responds less aggressively to a positive inflation
shock than implied by the original model. In the counterfactual model, the interest rate
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falls gradually below trend after a positive inflation shock; while in the original model,
output increases then falls gradually to trend. In policy regime three, both counterfactual
and original SORF estimates imply that the interest rate rises and decreases gradually
to trend after a positive inflation shock, and the response in the counterfactual model is
very close to that in the original model.
Figure 3.17 compares the responses of output and inflation to an interest rate shock
implied by the counterfactual and original models. Counterfactual SORF estimates show
that in all three policy regimes the response of output to an interest rate surprise is much
smaller than implied by the original model, and counterfactual SORF peak occurs a very
long period time after the interest rate shock. The counterfactual SORF estimates also
imply larger and more persistent inflation and the interest rate responses than do original
model estimates in all policy regimes. These results are consistent with the restriction
imposed by this counterfactual exercise. Because the policymakers in the central bank
are assumed to put no emphasis on output stabilization, the SORF output responses
are smaller and inflation responses are larger than those implied by the original SORF
estimates.
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Figure 3.1: Actual and Target Values of Variables
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Figure 3.2: Probabilistic Inference for the Two-Regime Unrestricted Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model
is estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The vertical shade
areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 3.3: Probabilistic Inference for the Two-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model is
estimated subjected to the restriction that the reaction function minimizes expected loss.
The vertical shade areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were
determined to begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime One
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Two
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Interest Rate Shock
for the Model with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 3.7: Probabilistic Inference for the Three-Regime Unrestricted Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model
is estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The vertical shade
areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 3.8: Probabilistic Inference for the Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model is
estimated subjected to the restriction that the reaction function minimizes expected loss.
The vertical shade areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were
determined to begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime One
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Two
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Three
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
115
Figure 3.12: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Interest Rate Shock
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 3.13: Probabilistic Inference for the Counterfactual Model
with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the counterfactual New Key-
nesian model is estimated subjected to the restriction that the reaction function minimizes
expected loss. The vertical shade areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic
recessions were determined to begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Counterfactual Model with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
in
Regime One
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of the counter-
factual model solution form, which are labeled counterfactual SORF. For convenience of
comparison, the figure also shows impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of
the original three-regime model, which are labeled as original SORF. The IRFs are based
on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated subject to the restriction that
the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central bank.
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Figure 3.15: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Counterfactual Model with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
in
Regime Two
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of the counter-
factual model solution form, which are labeled counterfactual SORF. For convenience of
comparison, the figure also shows impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of
the original three-regime model, which are labeled as original SORF. The IRFs are based
on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated subject to the restriction that
the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central bank.
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Figure 3.16: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Counterfactual Model with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
in
Regime Three
Output Gap Response to Output Gap Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Output Gap Response to Inflation Shock
 
 
0 10 20 30
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Counterfactual SORF
Original SORF
Inflation Response to Output Gap Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.0025
0
0.0025
Inflation Response to Inflation Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Interest Rate Response to Output Gap Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Interest Rate Response to Inflation Shock
0 10 20 30
−0.01
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
The figure presents impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of the counter-
factual model solution form, which are labeled counterfactual SORF. For convenience of
comparison, the figure also shows impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of
the original three-regime model, which are labeled as original SORF. The IRFs are based
on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated subject to the restriction that
the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central bank.
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Interest Rate Shock
for the Counterfactual Model with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of the counter-
factual model solution form, which are labeled counterfactual SORF. For convenience of
comparison, the figure also shows impulse response functions implied by SORF estimates of
the original three-regime model, which are labeled as original SORF. The IRFs are based
on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated subject to the restriction that
the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central bank.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of Model Parameters for the Model
with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
Estimation with Estimation with
Unrestricted Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SURF SORF
Model Significance Significance
Parameters Estimate (p-value) Estimate (p-value)
λ 0.337 1.000 0.211 0.306
a1 0.844 0.8794 1.052 0.4574
a2 -0.190 < 0.001 -0.291 < 0.001
b 0.009 1.000 0.023 < 0.001
α1 0.0006 0.964 0.5985 < 0.001
α2 0.584 < 0.001 0.4025 < 0.001
β 0.042 0.356 0.0003 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1822.702 1819.851
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model parameters that
are in the first two equations of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the reaction
function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction func-
tion minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values reported in this table are assumed to remain the
same for two policy regimes. The policy rule coefficients of the interest rate
equation (c1 − c4) are allowed to change across regimes. Estimates for param-
eters of the reaction function are reported in Table 3.2.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter
is 0.
4. The p-value reported in this case is for a test of the hypothesis that a1 = 1.
5. Estimation is conducted subject to the restriction α2 = 1− α1.
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Table 3.2: Policy Rule Coefficient Estimates for the Model
with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
Reaction Function SURF SORF
Coefficients Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Regime One c1 0.284 0.097 0.325 —
c2 0.125 0.003 0.296 —
c3 0.866 < 0.001 0.872 —
c4 -0.326 1.000 -0.334 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0022 0.510
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0029 < 0.001
Regime Two c1 0.223 0.001 0.323 —
c2 0.118 0.033 0.170 —
c3 0.939 < 0.001 0.927 —
c4 -0.203 0.002 -0.338 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0022 0.103
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0045 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1822.702 1819.851
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the policy rule coeffi-
cients that are in the third equation of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the re-
action function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the
reaction function minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve. The
values of the reaction function coefficients reported for SORF are those
derived jointly by the model parameters, the loss function weights, and
the requirement that the policy rule minimizes loss. The policy rule co-
efficients are allowed to change across regimes.
2. Loss function weights measure the relative importance to the Federal
Reserve of stabilizing output and the interest rate. Here, the weight on
stabilizing inflation is normalized to 1.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the
parameter is 0.
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Table 3.3: Transition Matrix Estimates for the Model
with Two-Regime Monetary Policy
Transition SURF SORF
Probabilities Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
p11 0.917 0.0144 0.918 0.0024
p21 0.044 0.021 0.029 < 0.001
p12 0.083 < 0.001 0.082 0.002
p22 0.956 0.1194 0.971 0.0114
Log Likelihood 1822.702 1819.851
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the
probability parameters of the following transition matrix
which the monetary policy follows.
P =
[
p11 p21
p12 p22
]
,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switch-
ing from regime j at time t to regime k at time t + 1,∑2
k=1 pjk = 1, and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, 2}. SURF es-
timation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the
reaction function. SORF estimation requires that the pa-
rameters of the reaction function minimize the loss function
of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values are assumed to remain the
same for two policy regimes, while the policy rule coeffi-
cients of the interest rate equation are allowed to change
across regimes.
3. Parameter-estimate significance for an off-diagonal proba-
bility of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis
that the true value of the parameter is 0.
4. Parameter-estimate significance for a diagonal probability
of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that
the true value of the parameter is 0.995.
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Table 3.4: Estimates of Model Parameters for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Estimation with Estimation with
Unrestricted Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SURF SORF
Model Significance Significance
Parameters Estimate (p-value) Estimate (p-value)
λ 0.379 1.000 0.362 0.001
a1 0.789 0.7664 0.830 0.0314
a2 -0.173 < 0.001 -0.197 < 0.001
b 0.005 0.042 0.006 < 0.001
α1 0.002 0.238 0.6065 < 0.001
α2 0.581 1.000 0.3945 < 0.001
β 0.026 < 0.001 0.0004 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1838.029 1836.785
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model parameters that
are in the first two equations of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the reaction
function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction func-
tion minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values reported in this table are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes. The policy rule coefficients of the interest rate
equation (c1 − c4) are allowed to change across regimes. Estimates for param-
eters of the reaction function are reported in Table 3.5.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter
is 0.
4. The p-value reported in this case is for a test of the hypothesis that a1 = 1.
5. Estimation is conducted subject to the restriction α2 = 1− α1.
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Table 3.5: Policy Rule Coefficient Estimates for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Reaction Function SURF SORF
Coefficients Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Regime One c1 -0.566 < 0.001 -0.539 —
c2 1.127 0.046 0.800 —
c3 0.598 0.069 0.871 —
c4 0.391 < 0.001 0.537 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.00003 0.244
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0014 < 0.001
Regime Two c1 0.272 < 0.001 0.229 —
c2 0.167 0.004 0.164 —
c3 0.935 0.004 0.934 —
c4 -0.272 < 0.001 -0.224 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0025 0.002
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0046 < 0.001
Regime Three c1 0.409 0.013 0.588 —
c2 -0.028 1.000 0.133 —
c3 0.959 0.003 0.937 —
c4 -0.389 < 0.001 -0.563 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0079 0.001
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0042 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1838.029 1836.785
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the policy rule coeffi-
cients that are in the third equation of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the re-
action function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the
reaction function minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve. The
values of the reaction function coefficients reported for SORF are those
derived jointly by the model parameters, the loss function weights, and
the requirement that the policy rule minimizes loss. The policy rule co-
efficients are allowed to change across regimes.
2. Loss function weights measure the relative importance to the Federal
Reserve of stabilizing output and the interest rate. Here, the weight on
stabilizing inflation is normalized to 1.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the
likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the
parameter is 0.
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Table 3.6: Variance-Covariance Matrices of Shocks for the Model
with Three-Regime Unrestricted Monetary Policy
(a) Regime One
y pi r
y 1.961× 10−4 0.595× 10−4 1.067× 10−4
pi 0.595× 10−4 1.284× 10−4 −0.052× 10−4
r 1.067× 10−4 −0.052× 10−4 3.658× 10−4
(b) Regime Two
y pi r
y 0.299× 10−4 −0.100× 10−4 0.061× 10−4
pi −0.100× 10−4 0.499× 10−4 0.071× 10−4
r 0.061× 10−4 0.071× 10−4 0.185× 10−4
(c) Regime Three
y pi r
y 1.054× 10−4 −0.209× 10−4 0.099× 10−4
pi −0.209× 10−4 2.373× 10−4 0.278× 10−4
r 0.099× 10−4 0.278× 10−4 0.661× 10−4
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of
the variance-covariance matrices across three policy
regimes when the reduced form of the New Keyne-
sian model is estimated with an unrestricted reac-
tion function for the interest rate.
2. The values are in the upper-left 3 × 3 block of the
covariance matrix of shocks, and the rest elements
of the covariance matrix of shocks are zeros.
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Table 3.7: Variance-Covariance Matrices of Shocks for the Model
with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
(a) Regime One
y pi r
y 1.768× 10−4 0.534× 10−4 1.252× 10−4
pi 0.534× 10−4 1.173× 10−4 0.003× 10−4
r 1.252× 10−4 0.003× 10−4 4.856× 10−4
(b) Regime Two
y pi r
y 0.298× 10−4 −0.106× 10−4 0.056× 10−4
pi −0.106× 10−4 0.472× 10−4 0.068× 10−4
r 0.056× 10−4 0.068× 10−4 0.154× 10−4
(c) Regime Three
y pi r
y 0.994× 10−4 −0.181× 10−4 0.205× 10−4
pi −0.181× 10−4 2.567× 10−4 0.468× 10−4
r 0.205× 10−4 0.468× 10−4 0.762× 10−4
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of
the variance-covariance matrices across three policy
regimes when the reduced form of the New Keyne-
sian model is estimated subjected to the restriction
that the reaction function minimizes expected loss.
2. The values are in the upper-left 3 × 3 block of the
covariance matrix of shocks, and the rest elements
of the covariance matrix of shocks are zeros.
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Table 3.8: Transition Matrix Estimates for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Transition SURF SORF
Probabilities Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
p11 0.9344 0.0885 0.9414 0.0215
p21 0.010 1.000 0.000 1.000
p31 0.058 0.261 0.019 0.011
p12 0.033 0.010 0.000 1.000
p22 0.9794 1.0005 0.9624 0.0165
p32 0.007 < 0.001 0.058 < 0.001
p13 0.033 0.004 0.059 < 0.001
p23 0.011 0.043 0.038 0.008
p33 0.9354 0.0425 0.9234 < 0.0015
Log Likelihood 1838.029 1836.785
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the
probability parameters of the following transition matrix
which the monetary policy follows.
P =
 p11 p21 p31p12 p22 p32
p13 p23 p33
 ,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switch-
ing from regime j at time t to regime k at time t + 1,∑3
k=1 pjk = 1, and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. SURF
estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the
reaction function. SORF estimation requires that the pa-
rameters of the reaction function minimize the loss function
of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes, while the policy rule coeffi-
cients of the interest rate equation are allowed to change
across regimes.
3. Parameter-estimate significance for an off-diagonal proba-
bility of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis
that the true value of the parameter is 0.
4. To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are
highly persistence, in the estimation they were restricted to
be no less than 0.900.
5. Parameter-estimate significance for a diagonal probability
of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that
the true value of the parameter is 0.995.
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Table 3.9: Estimates of Model Parameters for the Counterfactual Model
with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
Original Model Counterfactual Model
Estimated with Estimated with
Optimal Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SORF SORF
Model
Parameters Estimate Estimate
λ 0.362 0.197
a1 0.830 1.099
a2 -0.197 -0.300
b 0.006 0.001
α1 0.6063 0.6163
α2 0.3943 0.3843
β 0.0004 0.0006
Log Likelihood 1836.785 1828.516
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model parameters that
are in the first two equations of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction function mini-
mize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values reported in this table are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes. The optimal policy rule coefficients of the interest
rate equation (c1 − c4) are allowed to change across regimes. Estimates for
parameters of the reaction function are reported in Table 3.10.
3. Estimation is conducted subject to the restriction α2 = 1− α1.
4. For convenience of comparison with estimates, the table also reports SORF es-
timates for parameters of the original three-regime model as shown in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.10: Policy Rule Coefficient Estimates for the Counterfactual Model
with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
Original Model Counterfactual Model
Estimated with Estimated with
Optimal Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SORF SORF
Reaction Function Coefficients Coefficient Coefficient
State One c1 -0.539 -0.212
c2 0.800 0.405
c3 0.871 0.993
c4 0.537 0.239
Loss Function Wt. on y 0.00003 0.03
Loss Function Wt. on r 0.0014 0.0009
State Two c1 0.229 0.228
c2 0.164 0.061
c3 0.934 0.994
c4 -0.224 -0.200
Loss Function Wt. on y 0.0025 0.03
Loss Function Wt. on r 0.0046 0.0015
State Three c1 0.588 0.514
c2 0.133 0.108
c3 0.937 0.994
c4 -0.563 -0.479
Loss Function Wt. on y 0.0079 0.03
Loss Function Wt. on r 0.0042 0.0009
Log Likelihood 1836.785 1828.516
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of central bank preference parameters
and implied policy rule coefficients. SORF estimation requires that the parameters
of the reaction function minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + εpi,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4yt−2 + εr,t.
The values of the reaction function coefficients reported for SORF are those derived
jointly by the model parameters, the loss function weights, and the requirement that
the policy rule minimizes loss. The policy rule coefficients are allowed to change
across regimes.
2. Loss function weights measure the relative importance to the Federal Reserve of
stabilizing output and the interest rate. Here, the weight on stabilizing inflation is
normalized to 1.
3. Estimation reported here is obtained under the assumption that the policymakers in
the central bank do not wish to stabilize output (wy = 0.0).
4. For convenience of comparison with estimates, the table also reports SORF estimates
for preference parameters and implied policy rule coefficients of the original three-
regime model as shown in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.11: Transition Matrix Estimates for the Counterfactual Model
with Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
Original Model Counterfactual Model
Estimated with Estimated with
Optimal Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SORF SORF
Transition
Probabilities Estimate Estimate
p11 0.9413 0.9393
p21 0.000 0.000
p31 0.019 0.019
p12 0.000 0.002
p22 0.9623 0.9573
p32 0.058 0.058
p13 0.059 0.059
p23 0.038 0.043
p33 0.9233 0.9243
Log Likelihood 1836.785 1828.516
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the probability parameters of the
following transition matrix which the monetary policy follows.
P =

p11 p21 p31
p12 p22 p32
p13 p23 p33
 ,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switching from regime j at time
t to regime k at time t + 1,
∑3
k=1 pjk = 1, and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. SORF
estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction function minimize the loss
function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values are assumed to remain the same for three policy regimes,
while the policy rule coefficients of the interest rate equation are allowed to change
across regimes.
3. To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are highly persistence, in the
estimation they were restricted to be no less than 0.900.
4. For convenience of comparison with estimates, the table also reports SORF estimates
for transition matrix of the original three-regime model as shown in Table 3.8.
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Chapter 4
Revealing U.S. Monetary Policy
Regimes Between 1965 and 2008
Using a Model with Oil Price
In order to check the robustness of the findings presented earlier to variation in the
structural model, this study considers a more complex model economy with oil price and
investigates how the Federal Reserve weighted the trade-offs among stabilizing inflation,
output, and the interest rate when confronting oil price fluctuations. The new model can
be derived from a micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with oil
as an input in the production process.
Oil is an important production factor that is used in every industry to some extent,
and it can not be easily substituted by other factors in production process. Furthermore,
the market price of oil has fluctuated considerably throughout the post-war period. The
price of oil was raised significantly during the energy crises of 1973 and 1979, then it
fell dramatically starting in 1981. In the 2000’s, and until the middle of 2008, the
price of oil increased to a record high, but it collapsed by the end of the same year.
In 2009, oil prices began to increase from a low point and returned to the level of the
late 1970’s. High volatility of oil prices can have serious effects on the economy: an
increase in oil prices causes an increase in inflation and subsequently leads to a decrease in
output. Hamilton (1983) suggests that oil price increases are responsible for the increased
volatility of the U.S. economy during the 1970’s, especially for the heightened inflation
and the decline in output growth. The heavy dependence on oil and sustained changes in
oil prices pose a difficult challenge for monetary policymakers on how to simultaneously
achieve low inflation and stable output growth. Montoro (2010) shows that on one
hand, if central bank focuses exclusively on the recessive effects of oil prices and tries to
stabilize output, this would generate inflation. On the other hand, if central bank focuses
exclusively on neutralizing the impact of the oil prices on inflation through a contractive
monetary policy, the sluggish price responses to changes in output would imply a large
drop in output. Work by Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (2004) suggests that monetary
policymakers have historically leaned towards keeping inflation at bay, at the cost of a
greater slowdown in economic activity following an oil price shock. Leduc and Sill (2004)
show that theoretically in the absence of distortions other than price stickiness, price
stability is the best overall policy prescription in response to oil price shocks, even if that
leads to a large drop in output35. Acknowledging the existing literature discussed above,
there appears to be little or no formal research that estimates preference parameters of
central bank on different policy objectives in the dynamic responses of the economy to
observable oil price changes.
This study presents an attempt to estimate explicitly central bank’s preference param-
eters in an oil-producing economy that depends, to an important degree, on oil prices for
its economic performance and stability. In doing so, this study first derives analytically a
micro-founded New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with oil as
a production input for intermediate goods. The New Keynesian framework has become
the standard workhorse of monetary analysis over the past decade and allows an explicit
micro-founded modeling of the transmission channels. Since oil is difficult to substitute in
35The theoretical result stands out that optimal monetary policy should aim at replicating the real
allocation under flexible prices, which features constant markups and no inflation. Blanchard and Gal´ı
(2007) suggest there is a “divine coincidence”, an absence of trade-off between stabilizing inflation and
stabilizing the “welfare relevant” output gap.
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production, this study uses a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production func-
tion to capture the low substitutability of oil. A low elasticity of substitution between
labor and oil also indicates a high dependence on oil. The analytical results then boil
down to a model economy where monetary policy affects aggregate demand through a
conventional interest rate channel and inflation through a Phillips curve specification.
The model determines the equilibrium relationship among the output gap, the inflation
rate, the real oil price, and the short-maturity interest rate controlled by the central bank.
This study uses the model to estimate the preference parameters of the Federal Reserve
that are assumed to vary across different policy regimes. While sharing many charac-
teristics with the previously-studied baseline model, the new model with oil price has a
more complex relationship between structural parameters. Furthermore, the structural
parameters of the model are still subject to the condition that the policy equation min-
imizes a well-defined loss function. Therefore, the macro-economy and the optimization
problem of the Federal Reserve are estimated simultaneously.
Since the Federal Reserve’s optimal monetary policy is subject to constraints con-
trolled by behavior of private agents in the economy and the optimal monetary policy
has a direct impact on the economy through the setting of policy instrument, it is useful
to divide the descriptions of the model and optimal monetary policy into two separate
parts. The macro-economy is first described without requiring the Federal Reserve to
minimize its loss function. Then the optimization problem of the Federal Reserve is
derived, taking the model economy as given.
4.1 The Model Economy
In the model, a central bank’s main objectives are to stabilize the time paths of
output and inflation by changing the interest rate. This study denotes y as the output
gap, which is the difference between output and its long term growth path. This study
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also denotes pi and r as differences of inflation and the interest rate from their target
values, respectively. The stabilization of output means keeping keep y close to zero.
Stabilizations of inflation and the interest rate mean keeping them close to their target
paths.
4.1.1 Summary of Model Equations
The model with oil price consists of an IS curve, a Phillips curve, an autoregressive
process of oil price, and a policy rule for the short term interest rate. The model can
be derived from an underlying dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model based on
optimizing agents, and the model equations are the concentration of economic content in
the DSGE model that is discussed shortly. In that sense, the model is structural. While
the model emphasizes the role of forward-looking behavior and rational expectations, it
also incorporates a substantial degree of persistence in the form of multiple lags of output
and inflation. In line with Salemi (2006), the investigation taken up in this study does
not concern the deeper structural parameters in the model.
The model economy consists of the following linearized equations
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt − Etpit+1) + εy,t, (4.1)
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + ηqt + εpi,t, (4.2)
qt = ρ1qt−1 + εq,t, (4.3)
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4qt−1 + c5yt−2 + εr,t. (4.4)
The complete model characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of four variables: yt, pit, qt,
and rt. qt is defined as the real oil price. yt, pit, and rt carry the same definitions presented
in previous paragraph. Each variable is expressed as deviation from its own trend. The
stochastic variables εpi,t, εy,t, εq,t, and εr,t are serially uncorrelated shocks that account
for exogenous variations in aggregate supply, aggregate demand, oil price, and monetary
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policy, respectively.
Equation (4.1) is loosely consistent with a linearized Euler condition characterizing
the optimal consumption in a dynamic general equilibrium setting. The equation links
output during period t to its own expected future and lagged values, and to the value
of ex ante real interest rate. b measures the inverse relationship between current output
and the real interest rate which reflects intertemporal substitution on the optimization
of households. Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) show that the presence of expected
future output in the IS equation can be explained by the desire of households to smooth
consumption. The presence of lagged output in the IS equation can be explained by habit
persistence. Habit formation can cause delays between decision making and consumption.
Hence aggregate demand and output adjust only partially such that output depends on
a combination of its own lagged values, see Svensson (2000).
Equation (4.2) is a Phillips curve governing the dynamic behavior of inflation. The
specification that oil is used as an input for producing intermediate goods makes current
inflation depend on the real oil price36. The Phillips curve also has the appearance of
inflation being partly “backward looking” in spite of the fact that firms are rational
and forward looking. Therefore, equation (4.2) takes the form of a hybrid forward- and
backward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve. If the coefficients on lagged inflation
and real oil price become zero and drop out of the specification, the equation reduces to
the purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve analyzed by Gal´ı and Gertler
(1999) that links inflation to expected future inflation and output gap.
Equation (4.3) describes the process for the real oil price. In this study, oil price
movement is derived to be in the form of a first-order autoregressive driving process,
which is in line with many studies, e.g., Kim and Loungani (1992), Leduc and Sill (2004),
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005), and De Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005). Therefore,
36Details of deriving the Phillips curve as equation (4.2) can be found in Appendix B.
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macroeconomic variables are affected by the oil supply disruption through higher oil
prices. Hamilton (1983) suggests that oil price changes prior to 1973 were likely to be
exogenous due to oil commissions that insulated the oil prices from movements in oil
demand. Montoro (2010) also suggests that during the 1970’s and through the 1990’s
the major source of oil price hikes seemed to be on the international supply side, either
because of attempts to gain more oil revenue or supply interruptions due to geopolitical
events, such as Iranian Revolution and the first Gulf war. However, many studies argue
that in the 2000’s the high price of oil is more related to international demand side37.
It would be ideal to use an open economy model with endogenous oil price to estimate
preference parameters of the Federal Reserve. This is a case worth exploring, which this
study leaves for further research.
Equation (4.4) is the policy rule or reaction function that explains how the central
bank sets the short term interest rate. The linearized equation takes a form of the Taylor
(1993) type reaction function and corresponds to the common practice of using the short
term interest rate as monetary policy instrument by most central banks. The reaction
function also features intrinsic persistence in the policy rate, because such persistence
allows monetary policy to achieve a given degree of stabilization with less volatile short-
term interest rate. The persistence feature of policy rule is actually followed by many
central bank, see Sack and Weiland (2000). Dennis (2006) argues that the error term
εr,t can capture some variables that are omitted by econometricians since they tend to
have less information than the policymakers. Salemi (2006) interprets the disturbance
as a term that includes idiosyncratic wisdom of the monetary policy authority. In line
with Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Salemi (2006), the coefficients of the reaction
37Within a global economic setting, a list of articles find evidence in support of endogenous responses
of the real price of oil to the global macroeconomic conditions, see e.g., Barsky and Kilian (2004),
Hamilton (2005), Woodford (2007), Kilian (2008), and Kilian (2009). These studies argue that there
are additional transmission channels that cause oil prices to affect the macroeconomic variables and all
major real oil price increases since the mid-1970’s can be traced to increased global aggregate demand.
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function are assumed to be fixed in a policy regime so that policy is time consistent.
4.1.2 Theoretical Framework
The model equations described in the previous section can be derived from a micro-
founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The theoretical model specifi-
cation is similar to the New Keynesian models of Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta (2007)
and Montoro (2010), which allow price stickiness and oil as a low-substitutable input in
the production process of intermediate goods. Furthermore, oil supply is assumed to be
exogenous, and it follows a first-order autoregressive process. In the context of this study,
the model offers an explicit specification of the channels through which commodity prices
affect the behavior of households and firms. In particular, an increase in the price of oil
raises the price of factor input and production costs, hence reduces the purchasing power
of household income and consumption. Therefore, an increase in the price of oil has a
negative impact on both supply and demand. If central bank focuses exclusively on the
recessive effects of oil prices and tries to stabilize output, this would generate inflation.
On the other hand, if central bank focuses exclusively on neutralizing the impact of the
oil prices on inflation through a contractive monetary policy, the sluggish price responses
to changes in output would imply a large decrease in output.
The underlying New Keynesian DSGE model consists of a continuum of households,
final goods producers, oil producers, and intermediate goods producers. Oil is used as
an input in the production of intermediate goods, and oil is a homogenous commodity
supplied to intermediate goods producers by oil producers. The oil producers produce
oil only, and they take the oil price as given when choosing their production level. The
intermediate goods are differentiated and imperfect substitutes for each other in pro-
duction, so the intermediate goods firms are monopolistically competitive. Prices for
intermediate goods are adjusted infrequently, which are set according a variant of the
mechanism in Calvo (1983). It is assumed that at each period a fraction of firms are
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not able to re-optimize prices and they use a rule of thumb to set their prices. Final
goods are produced with intermediate goods, and they are used for consumption and oil
production. Households consume goods and supply labor. Each household has a specific
labor skill that is only hired by the corresponding intermediate good producer. Labor
market is assumed to be perfect competitive, so no household has market power over the
wage. Firms and households maximize intertemporal profit and utility respectively over
an infinite planning horizon.
The model illustrates the direct and indirect effects of oil price and of sticky pricing
mechanism on production costs, and consequently on consumption, output, and inflation.
In what follows, different sectors of the model are described briefly. Appendix B describes
the full model and its linearization around the steady state in detail, and sums up a
smaller and simpler set of equations as presented previously.
The Households
The economy has a continuum of households on the unit interval. A representative
household i ∈ [0, 1] maximizes the expected inter-temporal discounted utility function
defined over consumption Ct and labor Lt
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
[
C1−σt−t0
1− σ −
L1+νt−t0
1 + ν
]
, (4.5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor, σ and ν are the household’s
preference parameters. σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ ∈ (0,∞). ν
is the elasticity of labor supply, ν ∈ (0,∞). One can see that the household’s utility
is additively separable in consumption and labor supplied. The additive separability is
needed to derive a conventional specification for the model’s IS relationship that excludes
term involving employment. Each household is endowed with one unit of potential work-
time every period which it supplies inelastically to the labor market.
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The budget constraint for a typical household is given by
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
= WtLt +Bt−1 + Γt + Tt, (4.6)
The household receives labor incomeWtLt, whereWt is the nominal wage. It also receives
Γt the share of the representative household on total nominal profits created by firms,
and Tt transfers from the government, respectively. The household uses these funds to
finance consumption Ct, which costs Pt per unit. There is a private financial bond in
the economy. In every period t, a household purchases bond Bt, where Bt is the end of
period nominal bond holdings. Rt is the nominal gross interest rate.
Taking price and nominal wage as given, a representative household maximizes life-
time utility (4.5) with respect to Ct, Lt, and Bt, subject to budget constraint (4.6).
The set of first order conditions from the household optimization problem is reported in
Appendix B.
Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of final goods producers of mass one, indexed by f ∈ [0, 1]
that operate in an environment of perfect competition. Each final good producer uses
intermediate goods as inputs, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] to produce final consumption good
with the following technology
Yt(f) =
[ ∫ 1
0
Yt(z)
ε−1
ε dz
] ε
ε−1
, (4.7)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
Yt represents the aggregate level of output
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(f)df. (4.8)
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This final good producer’s profit maximization leads to the demand for each interme-
diate good
Yt(z) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−ε
Yt, (4.9)
where Pt(z) is the price of intermediate good z, Pt is the price of the final good.
Since the final goods are sold in a perfectly competitive market. Competition drives
the final good producer’s profits to zero in the equilibrium. The aggregate price level is
equal to the marginal cost of the final good producer and is given by:
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
1−εdz
] 1
1−ε
. (4.10)
Oil Producers
A representative household owns a continuum of oil firms, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] that
operate in a perfect competitive market38. Each firm produces a quantity Xt(j) of oil
according to the technology
Xt(j) = ZtIt(j), (4.11)
where Zt is a component of aggregate productivity common to all oil firms, and the
input It(j) is purchased from the final goods producers as is the consumption of the
representative household.
The aggregate productivity of the oil sector, Zt, is assumed to vary according to a
38Alternatively, many studies assume that oil is extracted with no cost by the government, which
supplies all demanded quantities of oil to the firms at the given price. The government then transfers
the proceeds in a lump sum fashion to the households, see e.g. Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta (2007),
Natal (2009), and Montoro (2010).
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stationary AR(1) stochastic process in logs
ln(Zt) = ln(Z) + ρ ln(Zt−1) + εz,t, (4.12)
where coefficient ρ measures the persistence in the process, and εz,t is the shock process.
As a result, 1/Zt measures the real marginal cost of all oil firms.
The produced oil is sold at the real price Qt, which oil producers take as given. Hence,
Qt = 1/Zt, and the real oil price, Qt, also follows an AR(1) process in logs
ln(Qt) = ln(Q) + ρ ln(Qt−1) + εq,t, (4.13)
where Q is the steady state level of oil price and εq,t is Gaussian white noise.
Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] that
operate in a monopolistic competitive market. Each firm specializes in production of a
single differentiated good using CES technology with two inputs of production, labor Lt
and oil Mt
Yt(z) =
[
(1− α)(Lt(z))
ψ−1
ψ + α(Mt(z))
ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
, (4.14)
where ψ represents the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between labor and oil
inputs, α denotes the share of oil in the production function. Generally, ψ is assumed to
be less than one. Following Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta (2007) and Montoro (2010),
this study uses this production function in order to capture the fact that oil has few
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substitutes39.
Since the intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another in producing
final good, a representative firm in the intermediate goods sector can sell its output in
a monopolistically competitive market and can set a price for its product by taking the
demand schedule as given. Given a level of production, an intermediate good producer
chooses labor and oil demands to minimize its total cost. When labor and oil markets
clear, the firm’s optimal choices for labor and oil lead to its marginal cost.
The intermediate goods producing firms’ pricing decisions are subject to price friction.
This study uses a sticky price mechanism that is extended from the Calvo (1983) model
by Gal´ı and Gertler (1999). Gal´ı and Gertler assume that in each period t a fraction
θ ∈ (0, 1) of firms are not able to re-optimize their prices Pt(z) while the rest are. Among
the firms that can reset their prices, a fraction ω ∈ (0, 1) of the price setters use a “rule of
thumb”, which is based on past price developments; a fraction (1−ω) of the price setters
optimize their prices in an optimal forward-looking manner and take into account that
their prices may be effective for more than one period. Those firms that follow the “rule
of thumb” set their prices equal to last period’s average price set by their competitors
plus the lagged inflation rate. The fractions θ and ω are the same for all firms, and they
are constant over time.
The Linearized Model
This section presents the log-linear approximation of the model framework. The log-
linearized model gives a more compact representation of the economic structure. The
39Since oil has few substitutes, an appealing functional form to capture this feature is the CES
production function. Therefore, there is a complementary relationship between both inputs. As in
Leduc and Sill (2004), the increase in oil price would exclude substitution and uniformly reduce both oil
and labor demand. The CES production function also offers a flexible form for the degree of substitution
between oil and labor. Notice that when ψ = 1, the production function collapses to the standard Cobb-
Douglas function as the one used by Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007): Yt(z) = (Lt(z))1−αMαt , which considers
labor and oil to be substitutes. Hence an increase in oil price triggers a substitution of labor for oil under
flexible relative factor prices.
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optimal consumption path for households is determined by the Euler equation, which
is obtained by combining the first order conditions for consumption, labor, and bond
holdings together with market clearing condition for output. The aggregate demand
component of the model is described by the IS equation. This study assumes a symmetric
equilibrium, so consumption will be equal across all households. In log-linearized form,
the IS curve is the following reduced form equation40,41
xt = λEtxt+1 + a1xt−1 + a2xt−2 − b(rt − Etpit+1) + εx,t. (4.15)
The IS equation is a standard Euler equation relating the expected change in output gap
to the interest rate, lags of output gap, as well as to the expected inflation depreciation.
xt is the efficient output gap, which is the difference between the sticky price level of
output and its corresponding efficient level, xt = yt − yEt , where yEt denotes the log
deviation of the efficient level of output defined in Appendix B. The IS equation also
contains a stochastic disturbance εx,t which relates to output shocks. In the equation,
the endogenous variables are output gap xt, inflation rate pit, interest rate rt.
Taking wages and final goods prices as given, intermediate goods producing firms set
their prices to solve their profit maximization problems subject to the staggered pricing
mechanism as in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999). The price optimization problem determines the
optimal price for firm z. In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods producing
firms in period t make identical decisions. It can be shown that a representative interme-
diate good producer’s optimal price setting decision and the final good price index lead
40In what follows, lower case letter denotes log deviation from steady state value of the corresponding
upper case letter.
41Reduced form coefficients in the equation are defined in Appendix B.
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to the log-linearized Phillips curve equation
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βxt + ηqt + εpi,t. (4.16)
The α1 parameter determines the degree of firms’ forward-looking behavior in their price
settings. The specification of the Phillips curve allows for potential source of inflation
persistence observed in the data. The equation states that inflation in the model depends
on its own lagged value as well as inflation persistence coming from the expected future
inflation, which appear to be capable of generating significant inflation inertia. This
specification of the Phillips curve equation implies that inflation is higher when output is
above its efficient level because firms start exploiting their monopolistic market power by
demanding higher prices. The responsiveness of inflation to excess demand is measured
by β. Inflation dynamics are also affected by the real oil price, and the magnitude of
variation in the inflation in response to fluctuation in the real oil price is measured by η.
Monetary Authority
To complete the model, this study needs to specify a monetary policy rule for the
central bank. It should be noticed that the model framework used here is different from
the baseline setup of the model economy in previous chapters. Here oil is used as a
raw-material input to intermediate goods production. Therefore, the economy is subject
to oil shocks that can significantly affect business cycle fluctuations. This new feature
can lead the central bank to face a more complicated problem than its counterpart in the
baseline model. As a result, the complications cause the central bank to explicitly take
into account real oil price when designing and implementing its monetary policy rule.
Monetary policy also has an impact on the supply side of the economy, since variations
in the real oil price affect the real cost of production.
The central bank’s monetary policy rule is described by a reaction function after
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log-linearization
rt = c1xt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4qt−1 + c5xt−2 + εr,t. (4.17)
Note that the reaction function is amended with a term of output gap with two-period lag.
The central bank adjusts its instrument interest rate in response to deviation of output,
inflation, and real oil price from their target values. This study hypothesizes that, from
the policymaker’s point of view, variations of real oil price convey the complementary
information on inflation. The specific format of the rule is chosen to allow the central
bank to react effectively to shocks that originate within the economy.
One can also note that, to be fully operational, monetary policy is assumed to utilize
only information that can be realistically considered as available to the monetary author-
ity at the time of decision-making. McCallum (1997) argues that central bank does not
know current output level and inflation when it sets the interest rate. This does capture
some broad features of data availability on real GDP and CPI, which are released with a
delay. Therefore, the policy rule allows the central bank to react only to lagged values of
those variables. A lagged interest rate term is also included in the central bank’s reaction
function to match the persistence in interest rate. Such format of a policy rule allows the
central bank to change the interest rate persistently therefore to spread “policy medicine”
over time. This would allow for a moderate response of interest rate to shocks hitting
the economy. εr,t, an exogenous policy shock, is added to the reaction function. The
disturbance term can be interpreted as the unsystematic component of monetary policy.
4.1.3 Model Solution
The model with equations (4.1) – (4.4) is a system of linear expectation vector dif-
ference equations. It is straightforward to rewrite the system equations in the following
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form
A

Etyt+1
Etpit+1
Xt

= B

yt
pit
Xt−1

+DSt, (4.18)
where Xt = [yt pit rt qt yt−1 qt−1]′ is a vector of state variables, St = [εy,t εpi,t εq,t εr,t]′
is a vector of structural shocks, and where matrices A, B, and D are 8 × 8, 8 × 8, and
8× 4, respectively.
To find a reduced form solution for the model, this study applies the algorithm sug-
gested by Klein (2000) where the solution for the model’s endogenous variables is ex-
pressed in terms of the model’s exogenous variables. If the number of unstable eigenval-
ues equals the number of non-predetermined variables, then there exists a unique saddle
path solution for the model that may be written as a first-order vector autoregression
Xt = GXt−1 + ϕt, (4.19)
where G is the reduced form model solution. ϕt is the 6×1 vector of reduced-form errors
with typical elements ϕkt, k ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, and ϕ5t = 0, ϕ6t = 0. For the model used in
this study, a unique saddle path solution exists if there are six stable and two unstable
eigenvalues. This study allows for the possibility that the errors may be correlated. Let
Ω be the 6× 6 covariance matrix of ϕt. As a result, the upper-left 4× 4 block of Ω is the
covariance matrix of vector ϕkt, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, and the rest elements of Ω are zero. Let
C be a 4× 4 matrix that is the upper-triangular Choleski decomposition of the non-zero
block of Ω, and the elements C11, . . . , C44 is used in the Log Likelihood estimation. Since
the structure shocks are assumed to be serially uncorrelated and ϕkt, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} are
linear combinations of the structure errors, ϕt is serially uncorrelated.
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In summary, this study uses a rational expectation model that is derived from a
micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model with deep parameters that govern
private agents’ behavior. The macroeconomic structure explicitly considers that private
agents have rational expectation and they can react correspondingly when monetary
policy changes, hence the model specification responds to the Lucas (1976) critique and
the model parameters in equations (4.1) and (4.2) are structural.
4.2 The Optimal Simple Monetary Policy Rule
The central bank uses policy rule specified in equation (4.4) to set the short term
interest rate. Conditional on the macroeconomic structure, the central bank sets mone-
tary policy in an optimal way to stabilize output, inflation, and the interest rate. This
study assumes that the monetary authority credibly commits to an optimal policy rule
in the sense that the coefficients of the policy rule c1 through c5 are chosen to minimize
the expected value of intertemporal loss function
Lt = Et
∞∑
k=0
δkX ′t+kWXt+k, (4.20)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the central bank’s time rate of discount. W is a 6 × 6 matrix of
non-negative weights that determine the relative importance to the central bank of its
various stabilization objectives.
In this study, W is diagonal with non-zero elements wy, wpi, and wr on the main diag-
onal and zeros everywhere else. Because only the relative sizes of weights are identified,
wpi is normalized to one. The central bank’s discount rate δ is fixed at 0.990, which is
a reasonable value for a quarterly time rate of discount. In this study, the central bank
sets its policy optimally with full information on the true economic structure and model
parameters.
This study uses the algorithm described previously to compute the optimal values of
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policy rule coefficients which are chosen to minimize the loss function.
4.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation: SURF and SORF
The parameters of the model are collected into two groups. Collect the structural
parameters into vector V = {λ, a1, a2, b, α1, α2, β, η, ρ1, C11, . . . , C44}, which
contains the parameters of the IS equation, Phillips curve, the evolution process of the real
oil price, and the elements in the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks.
Collect the coefficients of the monetary policy rule into vector ∆ = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}.
This study still uses two estimation strategies. The first type of econometric policy
evaluation is SURF, which estimates V and ∆ while treating ∆ as unrestricted. The
second estimation strategy is SORF, which maintains the hypothesis that the policy-rule
coefficients are chosen optimally to minimize expected loss hence induces a restriction
function on the policy-rule coefficients, ∆ = g(V, W ). As a result, SORF estimates V
and W subject to the restriction, ∆ = g(V, W ).
Both SURF and SORF use the algorithm of Klein (2000) described earlier to compute
the solution for the model, which is then used to compute predicted values for Xt in
equation (4.19) and to compute residuals and log likelihood. Because the Klein algorithm
may try values of V and ∆ that do not have a unique solution for the rational expectation
system, the maximand used in the SURF and SORF estimations is log likelihood minus
a penalty value. Let J1 through J8 be the eigenvalues of matrix A in equation (4.18)
sorted in ascending order. If a unique saddle path exists, then |Jk| > 1 for k = 1 and 2
and |Jk| < 1 for k = 3, . . . , 8. Let Ik be the indicator function that equals 0 if the root
condition is satisfied for the kth root and 1 if it is not. Thus the penalty function is
Penalty = p¯
8∑
k=1
Ik(|Jk| − 1)2,
where p¯ is a constant chosen to guarantee that the value of Penalty is large relative
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to log likelihood. If the root condition is satisfied, Penalty = 0. If it is not satisfied,
Penalty is a smooth, positive function of the difference between out-of-bounds roots and
1.
Having obtained the model solution, this study uses the Markov-switching algorithm
described in previous chapters to conduct SURF and SORF estimations.
4.4 Data Description
The model and the optimal-policy hypothesis are fitted to U.S. quarterly data from
1965:Q1 to 2008:Q4. Since this study applies a rational expectation Keynesian model
for policy analysis starting 1965, in line with previous chapters, the monetary policy-
makers in the Federal Reserve are assumed to understand the forward-looking nature
of private agents’ behaviors two decades before Lucas published his famous critique on
policy analysis.
The macroeconomic variables include output gap, inflation, the real oil price, and the
short term interest rate. The raw data, except for population, come from FRED, the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database. Quarterly population numbers are interpo-
lations of annual values found in the 2010 Economic Report of the President. As described
in the previous chapter, output measure is real GDP (in 1996 chained dollars) divided
by civilian population. The long run growth path of output per capita is estimated by
fitting a constant-coefficient time trend to the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita.
Variable yt, the output gap, is the difference between the natural logarithm of real GDP
per capita and its trend. The inflation rate is the annualized percentage change in the
chained GDP deflator. The quarterly interest rate is the annualized secondary market
yield of three-month treasury bills. Target values for the inflation rate and interest rate
are obtained by fitting continuous, piecewise-linear trends that allow for trend coefficient
changes in 1980:Q1 and 1986:Q1 while trend coefficients in the inflation rate and interest
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rate are constrained to be the same. Variables pit and rt are the residuals from the two
trend regressions.
The real oil price is computed by deflating the Producer Price Index in Fuels and
Related Products by the inflation rate. Figure 4.1 plots the level of real oil price from
1965:Q1 to 2010:Q142. As the figure shows, there is no obvious evidence of a trend for the
real oil price, although one could argue that it will not return to the mean any time soon.
The dynamics of inflation seem to be closely related to those of the real oil price. One
can observe that persistent increases in inflation as well as increases in the real oil price
following two oil shocks in the 1970’s. From 1981, one can see a steady decline in inflation
accompanied by a persistent drop in the real oil price. From the early 1990’s until 1999,
there is a small downward trend in both inflation and the real oil price. From 2000 on
one can observe a remarkably upward trend in the real oil price and a moderate increase
in inflation. As a result, the movements in the real oil price may yield some information
on the dynamics of the inflation rate during the sample period. This evidence motivates
the development of the mechanism that is highlighted in the previous section to generate
a link between inflation and real oil price in a New Keynesian framework. Instead of
measuring variable qt by the level of real oil price, this study uses the difference between
the percentage change of real oil price and its long run trend43. The growth rate of real
oil price and its trend are also plotted in Figure 4.1.
42To show trend in the level of real oil price, this study plots a longer sample period than the one
used in the estimation of the structural model and optimal monetary policy.
43Earlier estimations suggest that results obtained using the percentage change of real oil price are
considerably better than those obtained using the level of real oil price. Measuring oil prices by the
growth rate of real oil prices can also be found in e.g. Herrera and Pesavento (2009).
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4.5 Econometric Evaluation of U.S. Monetary Policy
with Three Policy Regimes
This section applies the estimation approach described earlier to estimate the struc-
tural model parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.4) jointly with the policy preference pa-
rameters in equation (4.20). In this section, monetary policy is assumed to switch among
three regimes during the sample period. Therefore, in the estimation algorithm, the pol-
icy parameters and policymaker’s preference parameters are allowed to change in each
regime.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the probability inferences in SURF and SORF estimates
for the monetary policy prevailing in each regime for each date t throughout the sample
period. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 report SURF and SORF estimates of model parameters
along with the value of the log likelihood function. To make inferences about the signifi-
cance of estimated parameters, this study reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio test
statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter is zero.
4.5.1 Probability Inferences for Three Policy Regimes
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 plot the SURF and SORF estimated probability series
of being in the three regimes for the Markov process governing the monetary policy
respectively, together with the dates at which economic recessions were determined to
begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research as shown in
the vertical grey areas. Although these business cycle dates were not used in any way
to estimate parameters or form inferences about the Markov transition process, it is
interesting that the traditional business cycle dates are fairly related to the switches
of monetary policy between the three regimes as described by the SURF and SORF
estimates in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.
Both SURF and SORF estimates show that policy regime one is a special regime
that only prevailed during the deep post-war recessions began in 1973, 1980, 1981, and
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2007. These recessions were unusually deep and long44. The 1973, 1980, and 2007
recessions also featured large spikes in oil prices near the beginning of the recession45.
Therefore, all these deep recessions took place in a context of high inflation that made
the Federal Reserve set its primary policy goal to bring down high inflation and hesitate
to aggressively reduce interest rates to stimulate economic activity. Policy regime two
is a regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into during the post-
1985 expansionary periods and mild recessions in 1990 and 2000. These two recessions
were among the mildest and shortest recessions since the Second World War46. Policy
regime three is a regime which the monetary policy switched into during the pre-1985
expansionary periods and mild recession in 197047. As a result, it can be seen that regimes
two and three were dominant for most of the sample. Regime two included the entire
period from 1985 onward until the end of the sample. Regime three included most of
the pre-1985 period. When U.S. monetary policy switched into regime two or three, the
primary goal of the Federal Reserve was to maintain low inflation rate and sustainable
output growth.
44During the 1973, 1981, and 2007 recessions, output lost as measured by the decline in real gross
domestic product (GDP) was at least a cumulative 2 percent. These deep recessions lasted at least
16 months, which were longer than the rest of post-war recessions. The median length of all post-war
recessions is 9.5 months. The NBER declared that the 2007 recession ended at June 2009, so the most
recent recession lasted 18 months, which turns out to be the longest in the post-war period.
45The recessions of 1973 and the early 1980’s are remembered for their large oil shocks caused by the
1973 and 1979 energy crises. At the beginning of the 2007 recession, especially from January 2007 to
July 2008, crude oil price rose from 51 dollars per barrel to a record high of 129 dollars per barrel.
46For the recession of early 1990’s, real GDP declined by a cumulative 1.3 percent, and the length of
recession is 6 months. During the recession beginning in 2000, real GDP fell by a cumulative 0.2 percent,
and the duration is 8 months. Hence, these two recessions were brief and shallow.
47During the recession beginning in 1970, real GDP fell by a cumulative 0.6 percent, and the duration
is 11 months. Hence, this recession was relatively mild.
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4.5.2 Estimates of Structural Parameters
The discussions here begin with the SURF structural parameters estimates, see Ta-
ble 4.1. A sizable value of parameter λ implies that expected future output plays an
important role in determining aggregate demand of household. Here the estimate of λ is
0.432 when the assumption of policy optimality is relaxed. While the estimate is sizable,
the p-value of the likelihood ratio test indicates that one can not reject the null hypothe-
sis that the true parameter value is zero. Therefore, the estimate of λ in SURF estimates
implies that expected future output is not an important factor in affecting aggregate de-
mand. The next two structural parameters are linked to the persistent effects on output.
The parameters on lagged outputs a1 and a2 are found to be sizable: 0.700 and −0.134,
respectively. The estimate of a1 is statistically indifferent from one and the estimate of
a2 is significantly different from zero at any conventional confidence level. Hence these
estimates imply that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third, the estimate of b
is 0.003 without imposing the constraint of optimal reaction function. Despite the fact
that b is estimated to be quantitatively small, the estimate appears to be significant at
any conventional confidence level. The estimate implies that changes in the interest rate
do cause changes in aggregate demand although the effect of interest rate on aggregate
demand is relatively insensitive. Fourth, turning to the parameters of the Phillips curve,
one can note that firms are substantially more backward-looking than forward-looking.
The estimate of the relative weight α1 is very small and is found to be highly insignificant,
and the estimate of α2 is 0.564 and is found to be significantly different from zero. The
findings here result in a backward-looking Phillips curve and cast doubt on the sticky
price mechanism of Calvo. Fifth, the estimate of β is responsible for capturing the impact
of business cycle fluctuations on real price. The estimate of β is 0.020 and is found to
be not significantly different from zero which implies that a positive output gap may not
raise the inflation rate. Sixth, a sizeable value of parameter η implies that real oil price
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can significantly affect the overall inflation level. The estimate of η is 0.090, which is
relatively small but is found to be highly significant. Thus the estimate implies that an
increase in real oil price can raise the inflation rate. Finally, in the evolution process of
real oil price, it can be seen that real oil price follows a stationary autoregressive pro-
cess. The estimate of persistence parameter ρ1 is 0.108 and is just at the edge of 15%
significance level, which implies that there is a small positive correlation between real oil
prices from time period to time period.
When the policy optimality is imposed, the SORF estimate of λ is 0.422, which is
nearly the same as the SURF estimate. The estimate of λ is still found to be highly
insignificant implying that expected future output does not play an important role in
determining aggregate demand of household. Second, the SORF estimates of a1 and a2
are 0.722 and −0.146 respectively, which are very close to the SURF estimates. The
estimate of a1 is statistically different from one and the estimate of a2 is significantly
different from zero at any conventional confidence level. Hence these estimates imply
that shocks have sustained effects on output. Third, b is estimated to be 0.004, which is
a bit larger than the estimate under SURF. The estimate appears to be significant at any
conventional confidence level, which implies that changes in the interest rate do cause
changes in aggregate demand although the effect of interest rate on aggregate demand
is relatively small. Fourth, SORF estimates of both α1 and α2 are positive and highly
significant, which support for the forward-looking Phillips curve implied by the sticky
price-setting mechanism. In particular, one can not reject the hypothesis that α1 and α2
sum to one as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Salemi (2006), and SORF estimates were
obtained with that restriction imposed. One can note that the past and future prices’
overlap in the current price is somewhat skewed toward the future price. This finding is
in general accord with Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), who find that most of the U.S. firms are
purely forward-looking but a fraction are following a backward-looking rule of thumb.
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Fifth, the SORF estimate of β is much smaller than its SURF estimate but is highly
significant at any conventional confidence level, which imply that it is more difficult for
the Federal Reserve to control inflation by changing aggregate demand. Sixth, the SORF
estimate of η is smaller than the estimate under SURF and is significant at marginally
15% level, which imply that an increase in the real oil price has a smaller effect on raising
the inflation rate. Finally, in the evolution process of real oil price, the SORF estimate
of persistence parameter ρ1 is a bit larger than its SURF estimate and is significant at
marginally 10% level, which imply that there is a larger positive correlation between real
oil prices from time period to time period and the real oil price still follows a stationary
autoregressive process.
As the p-values reported in Table 4.1 indicate, the structural parameter α1 is more
precisely estimated under SORF than under SURF. It is believed that a unified ap-
proach of joint estimation of structural model parameters with the parameters of the
policymaker’s objective function provides additional across equation restrictions that re-
sult in a more precise estimation of the model parameters. Hence the SORF estimates
more strongly support a forward-looking Phillips curve. Castelnuovo (2003) argues that
hybrid formulation of the Phillips curve is crucial for appropriate identification of policy
preferences. Moreover, Salemi (2006) suggests that when the interest rate is highly per-
sistent, the best way to reconcile a persistent interest rate process and policy optimality
is to hypothesize that both occurred in an economy where private agents are forward
looking. The finding of highly persistent interest rate in both regimes will be shown
below.
4.5.3 Estimates of Preference Parameters and Test of Policy
Optimality
Table 4.2 reports estimation results for the preference parameters of three policy
regimes identified in U.S. monetary policy, and it also presents two sets of reaction
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function coefficients for each policy regime: SURF estimates (obtained while treating
coefficients of the policy rule as free parameters), and SORF estimates (implied values of
the policy rule coefficients consistent with the policy optimality hypothesis). To interpret
the results on policy preference estimation, one should note that the relative weight on
inflation stabilization objective is normalized to one.
One can notice that, in all three policy regimes under SORF, the estimated values of
wy and wr are very small implying that inflation stabilization was always the dominant
objective of the Federal Reserve. Policy regime one is an interesting case, covering the
post-war deep recessions began in 1973, 1980, 1981, and 2007. Looking at the estimates
describing the Federal Reserve’s preferences during policy regime one, the estimate of wy
is 0.0001 and significantly different from zero at marginally 5% level. The weight placed
on interest rate stabilization is 0.0017 and significantly different from zero. The values
of wy and wr in the first regime are the smallest among three policy regimes. Given the
normalization of the weights, this finding suggests that in conducting its monetary policy
the Federal Reserve was far more concerned with keeping the inflation close to its long
run target path than it was with trying to stabilize output and interest rate around their
targets. Indeed, in policy regime one, both SURF and SORF estimates show that the
policy rule coefficient on lagged inflation c3 is very sizable. The interest rate stabilization
objective appears to be of secondary importance to the Federal Reserve in policy regime
one. The estimates of preferences in policy regime one are consistent with the historical
evidence. As described earlier, in policy regime one the Federal Reserve faced high level
of inflation, and its sole objective was to reduce inflation substantially.
In policy regime two, inflation stabilization was still the dominant objective. The
estimates of the policy preferences in this policy regime suggest that the Federal Reserve
Bank had been conducting its policy in the manner consistent with the policy used during
economic expansionary period. A large weight was assigned to the inflation stabilization
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objective and some weights were placed on output and interest rate stabilizations. Indeed,
the estimate of wy is 0.0059 which is statistically significant at any conventional confidence
level. The estimated policy weight placed on the interest rate stabilization objective wr
is 0.0053 and is significantly different from zero. The objective of output stabilization
was almost equally as important as interest rate smoothing in policy regime two. The
estimated and impled policy rule coefficients on lagged output are sizable. As pointed
out previously, during the expansionary regime the Federal Reserve would put more
concerns on potential exacerbate inflation situation and use instrumental interest rates
wisely. Switching into policy regime two would result in a low level of inflation.
In policy regime three, the normalization of the weights suggests that keeping the
inflation close to its long run target path was far more important for the Federal Reserve
than stabilizing output and the interest rate. The estimate of wy in this regime is 0.0078
and is the largest among three policy regimes. The likelihood ratio test for wy strongly
rejects the null hypothesis that the true weight is zero. In addition, the estimated and
impled policy rule coefficients on lagged output are sizable. The estimate of wr in this
regime is 0.0064 and and is highly significant. The estimate of wr here is the largest
among three policy regimes. However, the interest rate stabilization objective was not
as important as output stabilization to the Federal Reserve in policy regime three.
There is clear evidence that the estimated and implied policy-rule coefficient esti-
mates in three regimes differ significantly and substantially from each other. First, the
coefficient on lagged output (c1) is negative in policy regime one but sizable and positive
in regimes two and three. The coefficient on lagged inflation (c2) is large and positive in
regime one but small in regimes two and three. The SURF coefficient on lagged real oil
price (c4) is positive in regime one but negative in regimes two and three. The coefficient
on lagged two output (c5) is positive in regime one but negative in policy regimes two
and three. Second, SORF estimate of the policy rule coefficient on lagged inflation is
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positive in all regimes and larger than the SURF estimate in regimes two and three. This
suggests that the Federal Reserve should have responded more strongly to inflation than
it did in regimes two and three, which will be discussed shortly.
Did the Federal Reserve set monetary policy optimally with three policy regimes? In
light of Salemi (2006), here a test of policy optimality is a test of the hypothesis that
SORF fits the data as well as SURF, that is, the SORF and SURF policy rule coefficients
are the same. In each policy regime, there are five freely estimated parameters in the
unrestricted policy rule but only two freely estimated parameters, wy and wr, in the
optimal policy rule, so SORF implies nine restrictions. As a result, the relevant likelihood
ratio statistic is 11.873 with a p-value 0.221. Thus the hypothesis that the policy rule
coefficients that fit the data best were those that minimized quadratic expected loss as
defined in (2.6) can not be rejected. Hence, the estimations using a variation of the
structural model show that the Federal Reserve did set monetary policy optimally with
three policy regimes. This conclusion is in line with that in the previous chapter.
4.5.4 Interest Rate Smoothing
As can be seen in Table 4.2, the reaction-function coefficient for the lagged interest
rate is always large compared to the coefficients for inflation and output so that, accord-
ing to the definition provided by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), the Federal Reserve
engages in “interest rate smoothing”. This finding supports the widely held viewpoint
that most central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are very cautious when chang-
ing interest rates. While the estimates in the reaction functions reported in Table 4.2
imply that the Federal Reserve smooths interest rates, SORF estimates suggest that the
Federal Reserve placed small weight on interest rate stability in all three policy regimes.
Thus, in line with the previous chapter, the estimates here are consistent with Sack and
Weiland’s explanation for smoothing. The large coefficient on the lagged interest rate can
be explained by the finding that forward-looking expectations are empirically important
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and the fact that optimal policies require persistent responses to shocks.
4.5.5 Estimated Transition Probabilities
Table 4.3 presents SURF and SORF estimates for the transition probabilities for
switching in three monetary policy regimes. As the p-values indicate, all transition
probabilities are precisely estimated. The probabilities on the diagonal of the transition
matrix are close to unity, which means that all policy regimes show high persistence48–
a feature that is commonly seen in the estimation of Markov switching models, see
Sims (1999) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006). The SURF estimates indicate that, if the
monetary policy is in regime one this period, there is a 98.4 percent probability that it will
be in regime one next period; if the monetary policy is in regime three this period, there
is a 95.9 percent probability that it will be in regime three next period. Similarly, the
SORF estimates indicate that, if the monetary policy is in regime one this period, there
is a 94.8 percent probability that it will be in regime one next period; if the monetary
policy is in regime three this period, there is a 95.9 percent probability that it will be in
regime three next period. These suggest that changes in the monetary policy regime will
occur infrequently.
SURF estimates show that all policy regimes except one are not degenerate regimes.
The p-values for SURF and SORF diagonal probabilities p11, p22, and p33 are measured by
the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the true value of the transition probability
is 0.995, meaning that there is nearly no switch back into the regimes prevailing at the
beginning of the sample period. The test statistic for SURF estimate of p22 can not reject
the hypothesis thus the policy regime two in SURF estimates is a degenerate regime. In
sum, the important findings associated with the three-regime monetary policy are robust
to estimations using a variation of the structural model.
48To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are highly persistence, in the estimation
they were restricted to be no less than 0.900.
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4.5.6 Comparison of Impulse Response Function for Structural
Estimation
To check how much the model can explain the variation in the data, this section com-
pares the impulse response functions (IRF’s) implied by SURF and SORF. This study
makes two assumptions. The first assumption is that monetary policy is conditioned only
on lagged values of output and inflation. The second assumption is that macroeconomic
variables are affected by oil supply disruptions that are exogenous to U.S. economy49.
The second assumption implies that the oil price is predetermined with respect to the
Federal Reserve’s instrument rate. In keeping with these assumptions, this study chooses
the following within period causal ordering for the impulse response function: a shock to
output affects only output contemporaneously, a shock to inflation affects both inflation
and output contemporaneously, a shock to the interest rate affects the interest rate, in-
flation and output contemporaneously, a shock to the real oil price affects all variables
contemporaneously. The ordering makes difference because of the contemporaneous cor-
relation between output and the interest rate in all policy regimes. The ordering also
implies that there is no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to oil price,
while the real oil price contemporaneously affects the monetary policy. Figures 4.4, 4.5,
and 4.6 present the IRF’s for all three regimes. The shade areas in the figures are 95%
confidence intervals computed with parametric Bootstrap method.
The figures show clearly that the SURF and SORF estimates share many features of
the impulse response functions. For instance, SURF and SORF estimates all imply that
a positive shock to output keeps output above its trend for more than 30 quarters. Both
SURF and SORF estimates show that a positive shock to output keeps inflation above
its trend for a substantial period of time. Both show that a positive shock to inflation
49This assumption is in line with many studies, see e.g. Kim and Loungani (1992), Leduc and Sill
(2004), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005), and De Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005). However, there are
studies that argue that since 1973, oil prices have become increasingly responsive to demand conditions,
e.g., Barsky and Kilian (2004), Hamilton (2005), Woodford (2007), Kilian (2008), and Kilian (2009).
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produces moderate inflation persistence with inflation returning to trend in about six
quarters. Lastly, both SURF and SORF estimates imply that a positive inflation shock
causes output to fall below trend for a substantial period of time.
There are significant differences in the impulse response functions across three policy
regimes. In regimes one and two, both SURF and SORF estimates imply that the interest
rate increases then falls gradually to trend after a positive inflation shock; in policy regime
three, SURF estimates show that the interest rate falls then increases gradually to trend
after a positive inflation shock, and SORF estimates show that interest rate increases
above trend then decreases gradually to trend after 30 quarters. Since policy regime one
is the special policy regime that prevailed during the deep post-war recessions that were
in a context of high inflation, the interest rate responds positively to a positive inflation
shock, and the responses are much larger than those in regimes two and three. The
comparisons also imply that the actual interest rate response to inflation was not optimal
in regimes one and three but it was very close to optimal in regime two. A loss-minimizing
policy would have raised the interest rate more in policy regimes one and three. A second
difference is related to the first. SORF estimates imply that the inflation response to a
positive output shock is smaller than implied by the SURF estimates because the SORF
interest rate response to a positive inflation shock is larger than the SURF interest rate
response.
Comparing the IRF’s suggest that actual and optimal responses of the interest rate to
output shocks were not the same in all three policy regimes. In regime one the interest
rate increases initially then falls and returns to trend after a negative output shock,
while in regimes two and three the interest rate falls below trend for a long time then
rises to trend gradually after a negative output shock. Therefore, in policy regime one,
SURF and SORF estimates imply that inflation would be dampened completely. Because
regime one is the special deep recession regime with high inflation, the primary goal of
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the Federal Reserve was to decrease inflation. While regimes two and three are both
expansionary regimes, the Federal Reserve would like to maintain stable inflation level
hence the interest rate responses in regimes two and three are opposite to that in regime
one.
The fourth difference is that, in regimes one and three SORF estimates imply output
declines more after a positive inflation shock than implied by the SURF estimates, while
in policy regime two SURF estimates imply approximate the same output response to a
positive inflation shock as the SORF estimates.
Figure 4.7 plots and compares the response functions of output, inflation, and the
interest rate to a positive oil price shock. As can be seen, in all three policy regimes
SURF and SORF estimates imply that an unexpected increase in the price of oil results
in a decline in output activity. In policy regime one, SURF estimates imply that the
contractionary effect of the oil price shock on output reaches a peak four quarters after
the shock, and SORF peak occurs about 12 quarters after the shock. In policy regime
two, both SURF and SORF peaks occur about three quarters after the oil price shock.
In policy regime three, SURF peak occurs about three quarters after the oil price shock,
and SORF peak occurs about five quarters after the shock. Since policy regime one is the
special deep recession regime with high inflation, the output responses are larger than
those in policy regimes two and three.
In all three regimes, the SURF and SORF estimates also predict a tighter monetary
policy reflected by an increase in the interest rate, possibly aiming at curbing inflation.
The responses of interest rate in regime one are much larger than those in regimes two
and three. However, the patterns in the response of the interest rate are different in three
policy regimes. In policy regime one, both SURF and SORF estimates show that the
interest rate increases gradually then declines slowly to trend after an oil price shock,
while in policy regimes two and three SURF and SORF estimates imply the interest
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rate responds immediately after an oil price shock. These patterns in the response of
the interest rate suggest that quicker policy adjustment in policy regimes two and three
could have contributed to the smoother and faster adjustment of inflation to oil price
shock. The comparisons also imply that the actual interest rate response to oil price was
not optimal in regimes one and three but it was very close to optimal in regime two. A
loss-minimizing policy would have raised the interest rate more in policy regimes one and
three.
Another interesting result is the response functions of inflation in three policy regimes.
Note that in all policy regimes the oil price shock generates an increase in inflation.
However, during policy regimes two and three the increases in inflation are considerably
smaller than that in regime one. The differences in the responses suggest that the mone-
tary policy used during the expansionary regimes two and three might be more effective
in controlling the expectation of higher inflation that follows an oil price shock.
Figure 4.8 compares the responses of output and inflation to an interest rate shock.
The policy rule equation residuals are correlated with the IS and Phillips curve equation
residuals in both policy regimes. On the maintained hypothesis that the monetary policy
reacts to economic conditions only with a lag, this correlation between must be due either
to responses of output and inflation to an interest rate surprise or to responses of output,
inflation, and interest rate to an un-modeled shock. Following Salemi (2006), to obtain
the model’s prediction of responses of output and inflation to a pure interest rate shock,
this study ignores the contemporaneous correlations when computing the IRF’s reported
in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8 shows that in all three regimes SURF and SORF estimates can account
for the “hump-shaped” response of output to an interest rate surprise. In policy regime
one, SURF peak occurs about five quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak
occurs about 12 quarters after the shock. In policy regime two, both SURF and SORF
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peaks occur about 13 quarters after the interest rate shock. In policy regime three, SURF
peak occurs about 15 quarters after the interest rate shock, and SORF peak occurs about
ten quarters after the shock. Both SURF and SORF estimates show that the inflation
rate declines immediately after an interest rate shock and remains below trend for many
quarters. SORF estimates imply a larger inflation response than do SURF estimates in
policy regimes one and two. Because regime one is a special regime with high inflation,
the Federal Reserve would like to decrease inflation hence the SORF inflation response
is much larger than implied by SURF estimates.
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Figure 4.1: Real Oil Price: Level and Growth Rate
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Figure 4.2: Probabilistic Inference for the Three-Regime Unrestricted Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model
is estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The vertical shade
areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were determined to begin
and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 4.3: Probabilistic Inference for the Three-Regime Optimal Monetary Policy
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The figure presents the probability inference for the monetary policy prevailing in each
regime for each date t in the sample when the reduced form of the New Keynesian model is
estimated subjected to the restriction that the reaction function minimizes expected loss.
The vertical shade areas in the figure indicate the dates at which economic recessions were
determined to begin and end according to the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime One
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Two
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
in
Regime Three
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Oil Price Shock
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of Impulse Response Functions to an Interest Rate Shock
for the Model with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
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The figure presents impulse response functions implied by two estimates of the model solu-
tion form. The IRFs labeled SURF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian
model estimated with an unrestricted reaction function for the interest rate. The IRFs
labeled SORF are based on the solution form of the New Keynesian model estimated sub-
ject to the restriction that the reaction function minimized expected loss of the central
bank. The shade areas are 5% and 95% confidence intervals estimated by the parametric
Bootstrap method described in the text.
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Table 4.1: Estimates of Model Parameters for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Estimation with Estimation with
Unrestricted Reaction Function Optimal Reaction Function
SURF SORF
Model Significance Significance
Parameters Estimate (p-value) Estimate (p-value)
λ 0.432 1.000 0.422 1.000
a1 0.700 1.0004 0.722 < 0.0014
a2 -0.134 < 0.001 -0.146 < 0.001
b 0.003 < 0.001 0.004 < 0.001
α1 0.002 0.867 0.5975 < 0.001
α2 0.564 < 0.001 0.4035 < 0.001
β 0.020 0.415 0.0004 < 0.001
η 0.090 < 0.001 0.043 0.188
ρ1 0.108 0.146 0.116 0.119
Log Likelihood 1944.598 1938.662
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the model parameters that
are in the first three equations of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + ηqt + εpi,t,
qt = ρ1qt−1 + εq,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4qt−1 + c5yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the reaction
function. SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction func-
tion minimize the loss function of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values reported in this table are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes. The policy rule coefficients of the interest rate
equation (c1 − c5) are allowed to change across regimes. Estimates for param-
eters of the reaction function are reported in Table 4.2.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the likeli-
hood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter
is 0.
4. The p-value reported in this case is for a test of the hypothesis that a1 = 1.
5. Estimation is conducted subject to the restriction α2 = 1− α1.
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Table 4.2: Policy Rule Coefficient Estimates for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Reaction Function SURF SORF
Coefficients Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
Regime One c1 -0.204 1.000 -0.273 —
c2 0.636 1.000 0.583 —
c3 0.726 0.001 0.909 —
c4 0.006 < 0.001 -0.021 —
c5 0.046 < 0.001 0.231 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0001 0.077
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0017 < 0.001
Regime Two c1 0.427 < 0.001 0.422 —
c2 0.166 < 0.001 0.179 —
c3 0.931 < 0.001 0.936 —
c4 -0.001 < 0.001 -0.002 —
c5 -0.427 < 0.001 -0.421 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0059 < 0.001
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0053 < 0.001
Regime Three c1 0.332 < 0.001 0.414 —
c2 -0.001 < 0.001 0.126 —
c3 0.957 < 0.001 0.938 —
c4 -0.072 1.000 -0.073 —
c5 -0.312 < 0.001 -0.392 —
Loss Function Wt. on y — — 0.0078 < 0.001
Loss Function Wt. on r — — 0.0064 < 0.001
Log Likelihood 1944.598 1938.662
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the policy rule coefficients that
are in the fourth equation of the following model economy.
yt = λEtyt+1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 − b(rt −Etpit+1) + εy,t,
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βyt + ηqt + εpi,t,
qt = ρ1qt−1 + εq,t,
rt = c1yt−1 + c2pit−1 + c3rt−1 + c4qt−1 + c5yt−2 + εr,t.
SURF estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the reaction function.
SORF estimation requires that the parameters of the reaction function minimize the
loss function of the Federal Reserve. The values of the reaction function coefficients
reported for SORF are those derived jointly by the model parameters, the loss func-
tion weights, and the requirement that the policy rule minimizes loss. The policy rule
coefficients are allowed to change across regimes.
2. Loss function weights measure the relative importance to the Federal Reserve of
stabilizing output and the interest rate. Here, the weight on stabilizing inflation is
normalized to 1.
3. Parameter-estimate significance is measured by using the p-value of the likelihood
ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that the true value of the parameter is 0.
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Table 4.3: Transition Matrix Estimates for the Model
with Three-Regime Monetary Policy
Transition SURF SORF
Probabilities Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
p11 0.9844 < 0.0015 0.9484 < 0.0015
p21 0.000 1.000 0.008 0.004
p31 0.013 < 0.001 0.029 < 0.001
p12 0.008 < 0.001 0.000 1.000
p22 0.9484 1.0005 0.9844 0.0345
p32 0.028 < 0.001 0.012 < 0.001
p13 0.008 < 0.001 0.052 < 0.001
p23 0.052 < 0.001 0.008 0.002
p33 0.9594 < 0.0015 0.9594 < 0.0015
Log Likelihood 1944.598 1938.662
1. The table shows Maximum Likelihood estimates of the
probability parameters of the following transition matrix
which the monetary policy follows.
P =
 p11 p21 p31p12 p22 p32
p13 p23 p33
 ,
where pjk = Pr{jt+1 = k|jt = j} is the probability switch-
ing from regime j at time t to regime k at time t + 1,∑3
k=1 pjk = 1, and pjk ≥ 0, ∀ k, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. SURF
estimation imposes no restrictions on the parameters of the
reaction function. SORF estimation requires that the pa-
rameters of the reaction function minimize the loss function
of the Federal Reserve.
2. The model parameter values are assumed to remain the
same for three policy regimes, while the policy rule coeffi-
cients of the interest rate equation are allowed to change
across regimes.
3. Parameter-estimate significance for an off-diagonal proba-
bility of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-
value of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis
that the true value of the parameter is 0.
4. To guarantee that the diagonal transition probabilities are
highly persistence, in the estimation they were restricted to
be no less than 0.900.
5. Parameter-estimate significance for a diagonal probability
of the transition matrix is measured by using the p-value
of the likelihood ratio test statistic for the hypothesis that
the true value of the parameter is 0.995.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This study implements a unified approach of econometric policy evaluation to in-
vestigate “endogenous” evolution of monetary policy over time. The unified approach
allows the structural parameters of forward-looking model to be estimated simultane-
ously with the parameters of the central bank’s objective function. A policy regime is
defined as a set of preference parameters which central bank chooses for minimizing the
value of its objective function. While being computationally challenging, the technique of
policy preference identification exhibits several significant advantages. First, describing
monetary policy behavior at the level of policy objectives, rather than at the level of
reaction function coefficients, allows for direct estimation of the preference parameters
in central bank’s objective function. Therefore, this methodology is more appropriate
when one’s primary objective is to investigate evolution of policy preference parameters
in the objective function over time. Second, the unified estimation approach allows one
to test whether an estimated policy rule is the outcome of central bank’s optimal be-
havior and assess whether observed economic outcomes can be reconciled and accounted
for within an optimal policy framework. Indeed, the setup of the problem allows for
a formal test of the hypothesis that the policy is implemented in a manner consistent
with the loss-minimizing behavior of the central bank. Third, while assuming the policy
rule is loss-minimizing, the unified approach to policy preferences estimation also consid-
ers additional economic structural equations. Therefore, by estimating monetary policy
that was indeed loss-minimizing, the methodology could sharpen estimates of the model
parameters.
This study assumes that the evolution of monetary policy depends on a stochastic
switching process that evolves according to a Markov chain. The Markov-switching
framework is an appealing technique for evaluating monetary policy behavior over time.
First, it reflects the common view on the likelihood that monetary policy may take the
form of an abrupt shift from one policy regime to another. Second, the technique reveals
a new policy regime rather than making assumption on the timing of a switch in policy
regime. At the same time this approach can utilize full-sample information to make
accurate inference. Finally, using the Markov-switching approach respects the Lucas
critique in monetary policy evaluation. According to the Lucas critique, policy changes
are embedded in private agents’ perception, and agents will change their expectations
and decisions accordingly with changes in policy. Markov-switching models are expected
to fit data well if there were policy changes and important expectation effects of these
policy changes on private sectors’ behavior.
This study estimates two different types of models subject to the condition that the
policy equation minimizes a well-defined loss function. Both models are New Keynesian
in spirit in that policy affects aggregate demand through a conventional interest rate
channel and inflation through a Phillips curve specification. The first model is a baseline
model that determines the equilibrium relationship among the output gap, the inflation
rate, and the short-term interest rate controlled by the central bank. While sharing some
broad characteristics, the second model differs substantially from the baseline model by
introducing oil as an input in the production process. Therefore, the second model has
a more complex relationship between the structural and reduced form parameters.
Estimating the baseline model with data from 1965 through 2001 suggests three dif-
ferent policy regimes can be better used to describe U.S. monetary policy than two policy
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regimes. Policy regime one is a special regime that only prevailed between 1979 and 1984.
During this period, the Federal Reserve successfully reduced high inflationary pressure in
the U.S., and this period of time is commonly known as the Volcker disinflation period.
Policy regime two is a regime which the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into
during the expansionary periods, and regime three is a regime which the monetary policy
switched into during the recessionary periods. The results provide evidence that infla-
tion stabilization was a far more important policy objective of the Federal Reserve than
output and interest rate stabilizations throughout the sample period. Finally, the data
can formally reject the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was loss-minimizing.
Estimating the baseline model with extended data from 1965 through 2008 shows sim-
ilar results to those obtained with the shorter sample data. Indeed, three different policy
regimes provide a better description of U.S. monetary policy than two policy regimes.
Policy regime one is a special regime that only prevailed between 1979 and 1984 and is
commonly known as the Volcker disinflation period. Regime two is a regime prevailed
during the economic expansionary periods, and regime three is a regime prevailed during
the economic recession periods. In all policy regimes, the inflation stabilization objec-
tive is found to dominate the Federal Reserve’s preferences. Contrary to the previous
findings, the results here suggest that the Federal Reserve did follow an optimal policy
during the extended sample period. The Federal Reserve’s monetary actions were very
close to their optimal counterparts during policy regimes two and three.
The results from estimating the augmented model support the presence of three policy
regimes. Policy regime one is a regime that only prevailed during the deep post-war
recessions began in 1973, 1980, 1981, and 2007. Policy regime two is a regime which
the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy switched into during the post-1985 expansionary
periods and mild recessions in 1990 and 2000. Policy regime three is a regime which
the monetary policy switched into during the pre-1985 expansionary periods and mild
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recession in 1970. Therefore, the important findings associated with the three-regime
monetary policy are robust to estimations using a variation of the structural model.
The results here still suggest that three different policy regimes can provide a cogent
description of U.S. monetary policy although the interpretation for each policy regime
is different from that in the previous findings. In line with the previous findings, the
results also suggest the Federal Reserve consistently placed greater weight on inflation
stabilization than on output and interest rate stabilizations in all three policy regimes
including the economic expansionary periods. Lastly, the Federal Reserve did follow an
optimal policy during the extended sample period. This conclusion is also consistent
with that in the previous findings. The Federal Reserve’s monetary action was very close
to their optimal counterpart during policy regime two.
The analysis of this study suggests several avenues for the future research. One inter-
esting extension would be to experiment with a broader class of central bank objective
function. Central banks may respond to far-from-target realizations of inflation or output
by raising the weight placed on stabilizing the variable that has strayed. For instance,
a central bank might only change preference weights on objectives by responding to in-
flation that exceeds the target band and pursue different objectives when inflation stays
within the band. Second, it would be interesting to experiment with different specifica-
tions of central bank’s reaction function. For instance, one can model monetary policy
as optimal discretion or commitment rather than the Taylor-type policy rule. Finally, it
is interesting to apply the approach in this study to data for different countries and to
different and larger economic models.
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Appendix A
Descriptions of Baseline Model
Solution and Estimation Algorithms
A.1 Model Solution Algorithm
It is straightforward to rewrite the reduced-form model equations in the text as the
following form
A

Etyt+1
Etpit+1
Xt
 = B

yt
pit
Xt−1
+DSt, (A-1)
where Xt = [yt pit rt yt−1]′ is a vector of state variables, St = [εy,t εpi,t εr,t]′ is a
vector of structural shocks, and where A, B, and D are 6× 6, 6× 6, and 6× 3 matrices,
respectively.
Since matrix A can be singular, Klein (2000) suggests computing a QZ decomposition
to obtain generalized eigenvalues: for any pair of square matrices like A and B, there
exist matrices Q and Z and upper triangular matrices S and T such that
A = Q′SZ ′, (A-2)
B = Q′TZ ′, (A-3)
QQ′ = ZZ ′ = I (A-4)
Furthermore, Q and Z are reordered so that all possible zeros of S occur in the lower
right corner and such that the remaining ratios tii/sii of diagonal elements in T and S
are non-decreasing in absolute value as one moves down the diagonal. These ratios are
the generalized eigenvalues of the pair A and B. If the number of unstable eigenvalues
equals the number of non-predetermined variables, then there exists a unique saddle path
solution for the model that may be written as a first-order vector autoregression
Xt = GXt−1 + ϕt, (A-5)
where G ≡ Z11S−111 T11Z−111 is the reduced form model solution, Z11, S11, and T11 are the
4 × 4 lower left blocks of matrices Z, S, and T respectively. ϕt is the 4 × 1 vector of
reduced-form errors with typical elements ϕkt, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, and ϕ4t = 0. For the
model used in the text, a unique saddle path solution exists if there are four stable and
two unstable eigenvalues.
A.2 Model Estimation Algorithm
The parameters of the model are divided into three groups: V , ∆, and W . Vector V
contains the parameters of the IS equation, Phillips curve, and Choleski decomposition
of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form errors. ∆ is a vector that contains the
coefficients of the monetary policy rule. W is a vector that contains the parameters of
the central bank’s loss function, which measure the importance to the central bank on
inflation, output, and interest rate stabilizations, respectively. As a normalization, the
weight on inflation stabilization is fixed at 1.
SURF algorithm estimates V and ∆ without restricting ∆, while SORF algorithm
estimates V and W subject to the restriction that the vector ∆ is a function of vectors
V and W , that is ∆ = g(V, W ). Hence SORF nests the central bank’s minimization
problem as described in equation (2.8) inside the model solution algorithm. For given
V and ∆, the SURF and SORF algorithms use the algorithm of Klein (2000) described
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previously to compute the solution for the model, which is then used to compute pre-
dicted values for Xt in equation (2.5) and to compute residuals and log likelihood values.
Because the algorithm of searching model solution may try values of V and ∆ that do
not have a unique solution for the rational expectation system, in light of Salemi (2006)
the maximand used in the SURF and SORF estimations is log likelihood minus a penalty
value. Let J1 through J6 be the eigenvalues of matrix A in equation (2.4) sorted in as-
cending order. If a unique saddle path exists, then |Jk| > 1 for k = 1 and 2 and |Jk| < 1
for k = 3, . . . , 6. Let Ik be the indicator function that equals 0 if the root condition is
satisfied for the kth root and 1 if it is not. The penalty function is
Penalty = p¯
6∑
k=1
Ik(|Jk| − 1)2,
where p¯ is a constant chosen to guarantee that the value of Penalty is large relative
to log likelihood. If the root condition is satisfied, Penalty = 0. If it is not satisfied,
Penalty is a smooth, positive function of the differences between out-of-bound roots
and 1. When the root condition is violated, the Klein formula for G in equation (2.5)
can evaluate to complex numbers. In order to guarantee that the solution algorithm
search all points in the parameter space, the elements of G are set to the real part of the
corresponding solutions of Klein (2000) algorithm. When the saddle path condition is
met, the conversion has no effect.
Having obtained the model solution, both SURF and SORF use the Markov-switching
algorithm to estimate the model with nj policy regimes. The Markov-switching algorithm
takes the previous values of the probabilities as input, then uses these results to get
the unconditional joint distribution of Xt, which is calculated by summing conditional
distribution of Xt over possible number of regimes nj.
f(Xt|It−1,Θ) =
nj∑
k=1
P (jt = k|It−1,Θ) · f(Xt|jt = k, It−1,Θ), (A-6)
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where It−1 = (Xt−1, . . . , X1) denotes information set available at time t − 1. Θ is the
vector of parameters, including all parameters of the model and transition probabilities.
The weights are probabilities of being in nj policy regimes.
The conditional distribution f(Xt|jt = k, It−1,Θ) is the conditional normal density
function for the regime jt = k:
f(Xt|jt = k, It−1,Θ) = (2pi)−
q
2 · |Σ−
1
2
k | · exp
{
− u
′
t,kΣ
−1
k ut,k
2
}
, (A-7)
where q is the number of variables in Xt, Σk is the non-zero block of the variance-
covariance matrix of ϕt in regime jt = k, ut,k is a vector of errors between the actual
values and the predicted values of Xt in regime k.
To get the values of parameters Θ, the algorithm maximizes the log value:
L(Θ) =
T∑
t=1
ln(f(Xt|It−1,Θ)). (A-8)
The Markov-switching algorithm also updates the probability of being in each policy
regime at every period t based on the information up to that date, which is known as
filtered probability. The filtered probability is computed using the iterative filter proposed
by Kim and Nelson (1999):
P (jt = k|It,Θ) = P (jt = k|It−1,Θ) · f(Xt|jt = k, It−1,Θ)∑nj
k=1 P (jt = k|It−1,Θ) · f(Xt|jt = k, It−1,Θ)
. (A-9)
To implement the maximization of the log likelihood in (A-8) with respect to model
parameters, this paper utilizes the Hooke-Jeeves method that is a direct search hill-
climber. This method maximizes the log likelihood function without any explicit or
implicit derivative information, which is particularly robust in cases when the objective
185
function is highly non-smooth50. The optimization procedure is sensitive to the initial
step size, thus this study restarts the maximization algorithm several times. At each
time the algorithm uses the previous terminating values of the parameters as the new
starting points and reduces the search step size.
50All earlier attempts to use derivative based hill-climber were unsuccessful, which can be explained
by the high degree of non-smoothness exhibited by the log likelihood function.
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Appendix B
A New Keynesian Model with Oil
Price
To make the study self-contained, this section lays out the detailed derivation of key
structural equations implied by an oil-producing model economy that is similar to the
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models used in Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta
(2007) and Montoro (2010). The model’s dynamics are enriched by indexation of oil
price and introducing oil as a production input. Here oil is represented by M , and the
real price of oil is denoted by Q that can be derived to be exogenous.
B.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households on a unit interval. A rep-
resentative household i ∈ [0, 1] maximizes the expected inter-temporal discounted utility
function defined over consumption Ct and labor Lt
Ut0 = Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U
(
Ct−t0 , Lt−t0
)
, (B-1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount factor, and Ut(·) is the instanta-
neous utility function assumed to be separable across consumption and labor.
The specific functional form of the period utility function is
U
(
Ct, Lt
)
=
C1−σt
1− σ −
L1+νt
1 + ν
, (B-2)
where σ and ν represent the coefficient of risk aversion and the inverse of the elasticity
of labor supply, respectively.
The budget constraint for a typical household is given by
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
= WtLt +Bt−1 + Γt + Tt. (B-3)
The household receives labor incomeWtLt, whereWt is the nominal wage. It also receives
Γt the share of the representative household on total nominal profits created by firms,
and Tt transfers from the government, respectively. The household uses these funds to
finance consumption Ct, which costs Pt per unit. There is a private financial bond in
the economy. In every period t, a household purchases bond Bt, where Bt is the end of
period nominal bond holdings. Rt is the nominal gross interest rate.
A representative household solves its utility maximization problem subject to the
real budget constraint. The set of first order conditions from the household optimization
problem can be written as follows
1 = βEt
[
Rt
(
Pt
Pt+1
)(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ]
, (B-4)
Wt
Pt
= Cσt L
ν
t =MRSt. (B-5)
Equation (B-4) is the standard Euler equation that determines the optimal path of con-
sumption. At the optimum, the representative consumer is indifferent between consuming
today or tomorrow. Equation (B-5) describes the optimal labor supply decision. MRSt
denotes the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption.
In this study, labor markets are assumed to be competitive. Each household is en-
dowed with one unit of potential work-time every period which it supplies inelastically
to the labor market. Households work in each intermediate good producer z ∈ [0, 1].
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Therefore, Lt corresponds to the aggregate labor supply in period t
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt(z)dz. (B-6)
B.2 Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of final goods producers of mass one, indexed by f ∈ [0, 1]
that operate in an environment of perfect competition. Each final good producer uses
intermediate goods as inputs, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] to produce final good using the
following technology
Yt(f) =
[ ∫ 1
0
Yt(z)
ε−1
ε dz
] ε
ε−1
, (B-7)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods.
Yt represents the aggregate level of output
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(f)df. (B-8)
Then the demand function of each type of differentiated good is obtained by aggregating
the input demand of final goods producers
Yt(z) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−ε
Yt, (B-9)
where the aggregate price level is equal to the marginal cost of the final goods producers
and is given by:
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
1−εdz
] 1
1−ε
. (B-10)
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B.3 Oil Producers
A representative household owns a continuum of oil firms, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] that
operate in a perfect competitive market. Each firm produces a quantity Xt(j) of oil
according to the technology
Xt(j) = ZtIt(j), (B-11)
where Zt is a component of aggregate productivity common to all oil firms, and the
input It(j) is purchased from the final goods producers as is the consumption of the
representative household.
The aggregate productivity of the oil sector, Zt, is assumed to vary according to a
stationary AR(1) stochastic process in natural logs
ln(Zt) = ln(Z) + ρ ln(Zt−1) + εz,t, (B-12)
where coefficient ρ ∈ (0, 1) measures the persistence in the process, and εz,t is the shock
process. As a result, 1/Zt measures the real marginal cost of all oil firms.
The produced oil is sold at the real price Qt, which the oil producers take as given.
Hence, Qt = 1/Zt, and the real oil price, Qt, also follows an AR(1) process in logs
ln(Qt) = ln(Q) + ρ ln(Qt−1) + εq,t, (B-13)
where Q is the steady state level of oil price. εq,t is an independent and identically
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance σ2q .
The total amount of final goods demanded by competitive oil producers is
It =
∫ 1
0
It(j)dj. (B-14)
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The total amount of oil produced by the competitive oil producers as a whole is given by
Xt =
∫ 1
0
Xt(j)dj. (B-15)
B.4 Intermediate Goods Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] that
operate in a monopolistic competitive market. Each firm specializes in production of a
single differentiated good using CES technology with two inputs of production, labor Lt
and oil Mt
Yt(z) =
[
(1− α)(Lt(z))
ψ−1
ψ + α(Mt(z))
ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
, (B-16)
where ψ represents the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between labor and oil
inputs, α denotes the share of oil in the production function. Generally, ψ is assumed to
be less than one.
From the cost minimization problem of the firm, one can obtain an expression for real
marginal cost
MCt(z) =
[
(1− α)ψ
(
Wt
Pt
)1−ψ
+ αψ(Qt)
1−ψ
] 1
1−ψ
, (B-17)
where MCt(z) represents the real marginal cost, Wt is nominal wage, and Pt is con-
sumer price index. Since technology has constant returns to scale and factor markets are
competitive, marginal costs are the same for all intermediate firms, MCt(z) =MCt.
The individual firm’s labor demand is given by
Ldt (z) =
(
1
1− α
Wt/Pt
MCt
)−ψ
Yt(z), (B-18)
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and oil demand is given by
Mt(z) =
(
1
α
Qt
MCt
)−ψ
Yt(z). (B-19)
B.5 Price Setting
Final goods producers operate under perfect competition and therefore take the price
level Pt as given. In contrast, intermediate goods producers operate under monopolistic
competition and face a downward-sloping demand curve for their products, whose price
elasticity is positively related to the degree of competition in the market. As a result,
intermediate goods producers enjoy monopoly power over the goods they produce, and
they can treat the price of the good as a choice variable. Under the flexible pricing
mechanism, each intermediate good producing firm’s optimization problem is to choose
Pt to maximize its profits while producing whatever quantity of its good demanded at
this price.
Many studies have provided ample evidence for sluggish price adjustment in goods
market. Producers do reset prices only from time to time. This study introduces a
staggered pricing mechanism as in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), who use a variant of the
mechanism formulated by Calvo (1983). In each period, a share of 1− θ of the firms are
allowed to change prices while the remaining firms keep prices fixed. Of the firms which
are allowed to change their prices, a fraction 1− ω do so in an optimal, forward-looking
manner while a fraction ω instead set the new price using a rule of thumb, which is based
on past price developments. The reason for firms to use the backward-looking manner
is that there are some costs associated with the process of setting an optimal price, such
as information gathering costs, decision making costs, and contractual obligations.
A firm who can reoptimize in a given period will choose P ft (z) to maximize expected
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discounted profit
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkζt,t+kΓ(P
f
t (z), Pt+k,MCt+k, Yt+k), (B-20)
where ζt,t+k = β
k
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−σ(
Pt
Pt+k
)
is the stochastic discount factor. The function Γ(P ft (z), Pt+k,MCt+k, Yt+k) ≡
[(1− τ)P ft (z)−Pt+kMCt+k]
(
P ft (z)
Pt+k
)
Yt+k is the after-tax nominal profits of the supplier of
good z with price P ft (z), where the aggregate demand and aggregate marginal cost are
Yt+k and MCt+k, respectively. τ is the proportional tax on sale revenue and is assumed
to be constant. The optimal price that is chosen to solve this firm’s problem is given by
P ft (z)
Pt
=
µEt
[∑∞
k=0 θ
kζt,t+kMCt+kF
ε+1
t+k Yt+k
]
Et
[∑∞
k=0 θ
kζt,t+kF εt+kYt+k
] , (B-21)
where µ ≡ ε
ε−1/(1 − τ) is the price markup net of taxes, Ft+k = Pt+kPt is the cumulative
level of inflation. The optimal price is determined by the average of expected future
marginal costs, and it can be rewritten as follows
P ft (z)
Pt
= µEt
[ ∞∑
k=0
ϕt,t+kMCt+k
]
, (B-22)
where
ϕt,t+k ≡
θkζt,t+kF
ε+1
t+k Yt+k
Et
[∑∞
k=0 θ
kζt,t+kF εt+kYt+k
] . (B-23)
A backward-looking firm is assumed to follow a rule of thumb as the following
P bt (z)
P bt−1(z)
=
(
P ∗t−1
Pt−2
)(
Pt−1
P bt−1(z)
)
, (B-24)
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where P bt (z) is the price charged by a backward-looking firm z that is adjusting its price
at t, P ∗t−1 is an index of new prices posted at t−1. According to equation (B-24), the gross
price adjustment at t under the rule,
P bt (z)
P bt−1(z)
, equals the average gross price adjustment
by those who changed price in the previous period,
P ∗t−1
Pt−2
, times a factor Pt−1
P bt−1(z)
which
corrects for the firm’s relative price in that period.
Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) show that
P ∗t−1
Pt−2
provides a guide as how much the firm should
change price at t since it reflects the average adjustment by firms that had to make a
similar decision just one period earlier. This measure is adjusted by the firm’s relative
price at t to correct for the initial position of the firm’s price relative to the average.
Therefore, a firm that has its price above average in t − 1 will increase it by less at t,
everything else equal.
Equation (B-24) can be simplified to
P bt (z) =
(
P ∗t−1
Pt−2
)
Pt−1. (B-25)
Thus, all rule of thumb adjusters choose the same price P bt at period t.
The aggregate price index, defined as the price of the final good that minimizes the
cost of the final goods producers, can be expressed as
Pt =
[
θ(Pt−1)1−ε + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε
, (B-26)
with
P ∗t =
[
ω(P bt )
1−ε + (1− ω)(P ft )1−ε
] 1
1−ε
. (B-27)
These equations are used to derive the recursive representation of the Phillips curve.
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B.6 Government
In the model, this paper abstracts from any other roles for the government and as-
sumes that it runs a balanced budget every period. The government collects a propor-
tional tax on sale revenues and transfers all the revenues to households. The budget
constraint implies that total net transfer in period t in real terms is
Tt
Pt
= τYt. (B-28)
B.7 Monetary Policy
A central bank conducts monetary policy by targeting the nominal interest rate in
the following way
Rt = R
φr
t−1
[
R
(
Πt−1
Π
)φpi(Yt−1
Y
)φy(Qt−1
Q
)φq]1−φr
exp(εr,t), (B-29)
where φpi > 0, φy > 0, and φq > 0 measure the response of the nominal interest rate to
lagged terms of inflation, output, and oil price, respectively. Also, the policy rule allows
for an inertial adjustment of interest rates. The degree of interest rate smoothing is
measured by 0 ≤ φr ≤ 1. The steady state values are expressed without a time subscript
and with an upper bar. The term εr,t is a shock to monetary policy and follows a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2r . The central bank’s monetary policy rule is
a Taylor-type reaction function, and it is used to close the model.
B.8 Market Clearing
In equilibrium, labor, oil, intermediate goods, and final goods markets clear. The
output of final goods is demanded by two types of buyers: households that account for
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demand Ct, and oil producers that purchase It:
Yt = Ct + It. (B-30)
The oil market clearing condition is given by:
Xt =Mt, (B-31)
where the demand for oil comes from the aggregation of individual intermediate producers
Mt =
∫ 1
0
Mt(z)dz =
(
1
α
Qt
MCt
)−ψ ∫ 1
0
Yt(z)dz (B-32)
=
(
1
α
Qt
MCt
)−ψ
Yt∆t, (B-33)
where ∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−ε
dz is a measure of price dispersion. Since relative prices differ
across firms due to staggered price setting, input usage will differ as well, implying that
is not possible to use the usual representative firm assumption. Therefore, the price
dispersion factor, ∆t appears in the aggregate labor demand equation.
The labor market clearing condition is given by:
Lt = L
d
t , (B-34)
where the demand for labor is the aggregation of individual intermediate producers in
the same way as for the labor supply
Ldt =
∫ 1
0
Ldt (z)dz =
(
1
1− α
Wt/Pt
MCt
)−ψ ∫ 1
0
Yt(z)dz (B-35)
=
(
1
1− α
WtPt
MCt
)−ψ
Yt∆t. (B-36)
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B.9 The Steady State
Here, variables in the steady state are denoted overlined (i.e. X). The non-stochastic
steady state of endogenous variables for Π = 1 is provided as the following.
Interest rate in the steady state is
R = β−1. (B-37)
Real marginal cost in steady state is
MC =
1− τ
ε/(ε− 1) ≤ 1. (B-38)
Real wage in steady state is given by
W/P = (1− α)MC
(
1− α
1− α
) 1
1−ψ
, (B-39)
where α ≡ αψ
(
Q
MC
)1−ψ
is the share of oil on total cost in the steady state.
Output in steady state is given by
Y = ((1− α)MC) 1σ+ν (1− αMC)− σσ+ν
(
1− α
1− α
) 1+ψν
σ+ν
1
1−ψ
. (B-40)
Labor in steady state is
L = ((1− α)MC) 1σ+ν (1− αMC)− σσ+ν
(
1− α
1− α
) 1−σψ
σ+ν
1
1−ψ
. (B-41)
Note that, from the definition of α, the steady state values of real wage, output, and
labor depend on the steady state ratio of oil price with respect to the real marginal cost.
This implies that a permanent change in oil price would generate a permanent increase
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in α given ψ < 1, and it would also lead to changes in the steady state of real wage,
output, and labor.
In standard New Keynesian models, the real marginal cost in steady state is equal
to the inverse of the mark-up. Since monopolistic competition and tax affect the steady
state of the model, output in steady state can be below the efficient level. Therefore, the
steady state is distorted. In the special case that τ = −1/(ε − 1) < 0, distortions are
eliminated and the steady state is efficient. One can denote the steady state distortion
by
Φ = 1− 1− τ
ε/(ε− 1) . (B-42)
Hence Φ = 0 when a subsidy on sales makes the steady state undistorted.
B.10 The Log-Linear Economy
The non-linear model can be approximated linearly. The linearization simplifies the
model equations and illustrates the effects of oil price in the dynamic equilibrium of
the economy. The approximate linear relations are obtained from taking a log-linear
approximation of variables around their deterministic steady state values. This paper
denotes variables in their log-deviations around the steady state with lower case letter,
xt = ln(Xt/X).
After imposing the goods, oil, and labor market clearing conditions and eliminating
real wage from the system, the dynamics of the economy are determined by the following
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equations:
lt = yt − [(σ + ν)ζyyt − ζqqt], (B-43)
mct = χ(ν + σ)yt + (1− χξ)qt, (B-44)
pit = γbpit−1 + γfEtpit+1 + κmct, (B-45)
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σϑy
[rt − Etpit+1 + σϑq(qt+1 − qt)], (B-46)
qt = ρqt−1 + εq,t, (B-47)
where
ζy = ψ
[( 1
1 + νψ
)(
1 +
ψ
1 + νψ
$yχ
)
− χ
]
,
ζq = ψ
[( ψ
1− νψ
)
(1− χξ)$y −$q
]
,
$y =
ν − αMC(ν + σ)
1− αMC ,
$q =
αMC(1− ψ)σ
(1− αMC)(1 + νψ) ,
χ =
(1− α)(1− αMC)
(1− αMC)(1 + ανψ) + αMCψσ(1− α) ,
ξ = 1 +
αMCσ
(1− αMC) ,
γb =
ω
θ + ω(1− θ(1− β)) ,
γf =
βθ
θ + ω(1− θ(1− β)) ,
κ =
(1− ω)(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ + ω(1− θ(1− β)) ,
ϑy = 1−
( αMC
1− αMC
)
ψχ(ν + σ),
ϑq =
( αMC
1− αMC
)[
1− ψχ
(
1 +
αMCσ
1− αMC
)]
.
ζq and (1−χξ) account for the effects of oil price in labor and marginal cost, respectively.
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κ is the elasticity of inflation respect to marginal cost.
Equation (B-45) is generated by the variant of the Calvo pricing structure. In the
equation, inflation depends on its past value as well as its future value, this framework
is capable of generating significant inflation inertia.
Interestingly, the effect of oil price on marginal cost, given by (1 − χξ) in equation
(B-44), depends crucially on the quasi-share of oil in the production function α and on the
elasticity of substitution between oil and labor ψ. Thus when α or ψ changes, marginal
cost changes correspondingly. It is important to note that even though the quasi-share
of oil in the production function α can be small, its impact on marginal cost α can be
magnified when oil has few substitutes, that is when ψ is low. Moreover, a permanent
increase in real oil price Q or in the distortions of steady state such as a decrease in MC,
would increase α therefore make the marginal cost of firm change its sensitivity to oil
price.
B.11 Derivation of Efficient Output Level
Here output gap is denoted by xt, and it is defined as the difference between the sticky
price level of output and its corresponding efficient level, xt = yt− yEt , where yEt denotes
the log deviation of the efficient level of output. In this economy, the efficient allocation
is achieved when MC = 1, which corresponds to the equilibrium where intermediate
firms are perfectly competitive.
To derive the efficient level of output, it is convenient to first derive the level of output
under flexible price. Rewrite equation (B-44) as
mct =
κy
κd
yt +
κq
κd
qt, (B-48)
where κy = (1−α)(ν+σ)(1−αMC), κq = (1−αMC)α(1+νψ)−αMCσ(1−ψ)(1−α),
κd = (1− αMC)(1 + ανψ) + αMCψσ(1− α).
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Under flexible price, mct = 0. Condition that defines the natural level of output in
terms of the oil price
yFt = −
κq
κy
qt. (B-49)
Notice that in this economy the flexible price level of output does not coincide with
the efficient one since the steady state is distorted by monopolistic competition. In this
study, the efficient level of output is defined as the level of output with flexible price
under perfect competition, one can use equation (B-48) to calculate this efficient level of
output under the condition that µ = 1 as follows
yEt ≈ −
(
αE
1− αE
)(
1− α
α
)
κq
κy
qt, (B-50)
where αE = αψ(Q)1−ψ. This parameter can be also expressed in terms of the participation
of oil under flexible price as follows
αE = αµψ−1. (B-51)
Notice that when there is no monopolistic distortion or when ψ = 1, αE = α and yEt = y
F
t .
Using the definition of efficient level of output, one can write the marginal cost equa-
tion in terms of the efficient output gap xt, where xt = yt − yEt in the following way
mct =
κy
κd
(yt − yEt ) +
1
κd
µt, (B-52)
where
µt = κy
[
1−
(
α
1− α
)(
1− αE
αE
)]
yEt . (B-53)
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Using equations (B-45) and (B-52), the Phillips curve can be written as follows
pit = γbpit−1 + γfEtpit+1 +
κκy
κd
xt +
κ
κd
µt, (B-54)
One can further write µt in terms of the oil price using the definition of the efficient level
of output
µt = κq
[
α− αE
(1− αE)α
]
qt. (B-55)
The dynamic IS equation can also be written in terms of the efficient output gap
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σϑy
[rt − Etpit+1 − rEt ], (B-56)
where rEt is the natural interest rate that is the real interest rate consistent with y
E
t . r
E
t
can be written as follows
rEt = σ
[
ϑq +
(
αE
1− αE
)(
1− α
α
)
κq
κy
]
Et[∆qt+1], (B-57)
where the expected variation in the level of real oil price is
Et[∆qt+1] = Etqt+1 − qt. (B-58)
As a result, the economy can be represented by two equations in terms of the efficient
output gap xt and inflation pit
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σϑy
[rt − Etpit+1 − rEt ], (B-59)
pit = γbpit−1 + γfEtpit+1 +
κκy
κd
xt + κµqt. (B-60)
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where κµ =
κκq
κd
[
α−αE
(1−αE)α
]
. One can notice that when there is no monopolistic distortion
or when ψ = 1, αE = α, which implies that κµ = 0.
The expression for efficient output level is used to compute the output gap, xt, which
introduces contemporaneous oil price term into the inflation equation. Thus, the model
used in this study opens an additional channel for affecting inflation dynamics. This
extra source is a special feature of the economy that uses oil as an input. Changes in
the nominal oil price affect real oil price, which in turn influences the efficient output
level. Variations in the efficient output level translate into fluctuations in the output gap,
which feeds into the inflation dynamics.
B.12 Structural Model of the Economy
Since the investigation taken up in this study does not concern the deeper structural
parameters in the model, the coefficients in equations (B-59) and (B-60) can be aggre-
gated to obtain the model equations in the text. The following two equations are the IS
curve and Phillips curve with reduced form coefficients, which are estimated simultane-
ously with the central bank’s monetary policy.
xt = λEtxt+1 + a1xt−1 + a2xt−2 − b(rt − Etpit+1) + εx,t, (B-61)
pit = α1Etpit+1 + α2pit−1 + βxt + ηqt + εpi,t, (B-62)
where pit, xt, rt, qt can be measured by inflation rate, output gap, short term interest
rate, real oil price. εx,t and εpi,t are disturbances. Note that the IS equation is amended
with two lags of output gap. The lag terms are added to the model since they can
help explain the inertial movements of consumption and aggregate output. It is widely
agreed that some adjustment process must be added to the equation in order to match
the inertial responses of output that are apparent in the data, see e.g. Fuhrer (2000).
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εx,t represents an aggregate demand shock. One can notice that the natural interest rate
rEt is incorporated into the disturbance term εx,t. As a result, it is highly possible that
demand shock is correlated with the oil price shock. In the Phillips curve, εpi,t is used to
account for supply shocks that shift the inflation-output trade-off. εpi,t is assumed to be
an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance
σ2pi.
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